Monday Horror Renews Debate on (and Thirst for) Capital Punishment

The satisfaction of bloody retribution notwithstanding, capital punishment is the lazy way out, as it doesn’t require us to address the real issues 

Once again the crowds were calling for blood on Monday after an individual decapitated a four-year-old girl with a meat cleaver in Neihu, Taipei. The random act of incomprehensible violence has re-energized those — a majority here — who support capital punishment and could turn into a challenge for the incoming Tsai administration that is far less amenable to maintaining the death penalty. Although anger is perfectly understandable under such circumstances, Taiwanese society cannot afford to let hot emotions dictate how it deals with such matters; cool, analytical minds must prevail in such trying times. 

The truth of the matter is that capital punishment doesn’t work, at least not if it is regarded as a means to deter heinous crimes. Individuals who butcher toddlers in cold blood in front of their mothers do not operate under the rational, cost-versus-benefit analysis that governs the rest of us. The morals (variations of “thou shalt not kill” that exist across civilizations) and instinct for self-preservation that make killing another human being so abhorrent to ordinary people do not register with psychopaths who either do not comprehend the consequences of their acts or simply do not care. With them, fear of retribution doesn’t act as a check on their actions. 

My article, published today in Thinking Taiwan, continues here.

With Party Chair Election, KMT Takes One Step Forward, Two Steps Backwards

Hung’s election is the worst possible outcome for Taiwan, as it puts the KMT’s formidable assets at the disposal of politicians who should have bowed out a long time ago 

As expected, Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱) was elected chairperson of the struggling Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) by a comfortable margin on Saturday night, ending more than 100 years of male dominance at the helm of a party that suffered a major setback in the presidential and legislative elections in January. While the rise of a female politician within the KMT is in step with prevailing attitudes in Taiwan today (she also ran against Wu Poh-hsiung in 2007), Hung’s ascension represents a shift toward a more conservative stance at the party at a time when social forces are calling for rejuvenation. We take a quick look at the implications for the KMT and the nation’s politics. 

Although polls had long indicated that she was likely to prevail against her three opponents (including another woman), Hung’s victory on Saturday was an impressive comeback by a politician who, back in October last year, had been ignominiously dropped as the KMT’s presidential candidate. In the months prior to her demise, Hung’s out-of-step policies and pro-Beijing stance had fueled widespread discontent within the KMT, leading to expulsions and walkouts by party stalwarts and the threat of collapse months before the Jan. 16 elections. 

My article, published today in Thinking Taiwan, continues here.

China Faces Not One But Two Forces for Independence in Taiwan

Beijing does not only have to contend with traditional 'taidu,' but 'huadu' as well, two forces that, when joined, play a key role in ensuring Taiwan's resilience 

With the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) set to assume office in Taiwan less than two months from now, the Chinese commentariat has shifted into high gear with warnings about Beijing’s “red lines” and the sundry ills that could befall Taiwan should incoming president Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) cross any of them. One recurrent red line takes aim at “Taiwan independence,” a concept that is anathema to Beijing. But China has a much bigger problem on its hands, as there is not one but rather two independence movements in Taiwan. 

Sometimes overlapping and sometimes clashing, these two movements are united in their opposition to Taiwan or the Republic of China (ROC), as it is officially known, becoming part of the People’s Republic of China. And taken together, these two groups account of the majority of the people in Taiwan regardless of their voting preferences. 

My article, published today in the China Policy Institute blog, continues here.

Yes, China Has Re-established Ties With The Gambia. Now Calm Down

As a post-modern state, Taiwan should not worry too much about its official diplomatic allies, many of which are micro-states. It must instead focus on substance with countries of influence 

The rumors, which had been circulating for a while, were confirmed early in the evening of March 17. China was resuming diplomatic ties with The Gambia. The African country had been in political limbo since November 2013, when it had severed ties with Taipei only to be spurned by Beijing, ostensibly because the Chinese government did not want to shatter the “diplomatic truce” it had struck with President Ma Ying-jeou. Now the question on everybody’s lips is whether Beijing’s apparent change of heart constitutes a “warning” to Tsai Ing-wen, who will assume the presidency on May 20, and signals an end to the informal arrangement whereby the two sides of the Taiwan Strait wouldn’t “steal” diplomatic allies from each other. The short answer is maybe, but even if that were the case, there is no reason for Taiwan to panic. 

My op-ed, published today in The News Lens International, continues here (photo: Xinhua).

家園、價值與民主：論台灣認同的興起

作為對照及定義自身認同的對象，台灣人在今天的中國身上看見的，正是他們所不願成為的模樣

這個趨勢幾年前就開始了，不論台北和北京的兩個政府是怎樣同步勸誘台灣人回心轉意，大造宣傳還是施以甜頭，都無法阻擋：越來越多台灣人認同自己是台灣人而不是中國人。有幾項人口統計因素對今日台灣人自我認同的穩定成長有所影響，但有一項因素似乎特別催化了整個進程，那就是中國本身。

回顧 1990 年代中期，當時在台灣還只有 44% 的人自認為台灣人，還有超過 30% 的人認為自己是中國人。到了今天，根據《聯合報》的一項民意調查（註1），認定自己就是台灣人而不是其他人的比率達到了 73% ，創下這家親藍營媒體調查以來的新高。自認為就是中國人而不是其他人的比率則下降到 11% 。其他為時多年的調查（註2）也追蹤到類似的進展。

教育在這樣的轉變中無疑發揮了一些作用，尤其是在李登輝政權後期以及陳水扁執政八年之中。可是，如果國家機制（例如教育）足以影響甚至形塑自我認同，那麼我們自然會預期馬英九執政八年以來，中國認同的情感必定有所增長。然而中國認同不但未見增長，台灣人的自我認同更在馬英九任內深化了，這意味著自我認同的產生多半獨立於國家主動培養特定認同的舉動之外，至少在國家的舉動違背社會自發趨勢時是這樣。

有一項或許最為人所知的因素，是世代與人口結構的轉變。隨著時光流逝，由於出生在中國大陸或身為中國移民直系後裔而對中國懷有特殊情感的人數逐漸減少，取而代之的則是生長在台灣的幾代人。因此，一個人的自我認同是從他認定什麼是「家園」形塑而成的，與族群身分並不相干。這可以部分解釋在同一份《聯合報》民調之中，為何 20 到 29 歲這一年齡層的人自認為台灣人的比例高達 85% 。

同樣重要的則是人們成長於其中的社會型態，以及這一社會型態如何與界定另一群他者的行為準則形成對比，特別在後者宣稱前者是自身一部分的情況下。在此尤須指出，20 到 29 歲年齡層的作答者們所知的唯一一種政治體制即是自由民主制度，這與身為台灣人的意義何在是不可分割的。對這些青年而言，如今仍存續在中國的那種專制獨裁只能被看作是外在生成的，但在過去幾代親身體驗戒嚴專制的台灣人來說就並非如此。而對於前幾個世代的台灣人，專制獨裁則是與中國直接相關的，因為那樣一種體制是從中國發源，而後以中國國民黨的形貌強加於台灣社會。因此，那種至今仍在中國運行，在許多方面都延續著長年慣習的政治體制，在他們看來同樣是「異己的」，充斥著各種負面意涵的。只有極少數人對台灣的戒嚴威權時代還戀戀不捨。實際上，就連一度成為國民黨總統候選人，卻在選前最後一刻被撤換的親北京人士洪秀柱，她的死忠支持者們也堅決認定「我們」中華民國和「他們」中華人民共和國不同（註3）。我問他們差別在哪裡，而他們幾乎每一個人都指出價值觀的差異，以及各自政治體制本質的不同。

還有一個更晚近的因素進一步加深了兩個社會的對比，而自我認同多半是將自我與「他者」對比之下產生的：那是中國共產黨說明自己在 1989 年天安門屠殺，以及蘇聯解體之後至今仍能屹立不搖的新說法。中共越來越訴諸於民族主義，訴諸於昔日創傷恥辱與今後榮光的敘事，同時把自己抬舉成了中華民族復興不可或缺的衛道士。根據西東大學（Seton Hall University）汪錚教授的研究，前國家主席江澤民是這一轉向的設計師（註4），他用愛國主義和民族主義替代了共產主義與社會主義，成為中國的新一套意識型態。

台灣與中國敘事之間的對比再強烈不過了，從雙方在第二次世界大戰之前和戰爭期間與日本往來經驗的顯著差異開始，到歷史創傷（「百年國恥」相對於二二八屠殺）都不一樣。說到對未來的展望，中華民族復興敘事則是以文明思維放眼全世界，而這樣的野心對於完全甘願於扮演小型或中等強國的台灣人並沒有多大吸引力。

中國官方敘事在現任國家主席習近平領導下展現對外領土野心、尚武象徵及偏執仇外的走向，也更加凸顯了中國和台灣兩個社會的根本差異。再沒有什麼比最近幾個月來圍繞著「習大大」而生的領袖崇拜更能概括雙方差異的了（註5），這種現象在中國是從毛澤東時代以來僅見，而在當代或許只有鄰近的北韓（朝鮮）差可比擬。

這看來似乎瑣屑，卻非同小可。在習近平被拱上神壇的背後，包藏着一套強調獨裁強人領袖不可或缺的國家敘事。用這種敬拜對照台灣人如何對待他們平凡的總統：台灣的總統並不被看作神人，而是經常被公然嘲弄、丑化，甚至像馬英九好幾次親身遭遇的，成了丟鞋的靶子。

就一切「贏得台灣人心」，並營造台灣人可能支持與中國統一條件的努力來說，北京（更明確地說，就是習近平主席本人）最大的敵人是自己。這倒不是因為中國領導人繼續堅信著經濟決定論的空想，而是互相對反的歷史敘事，加上我們最近在中國所見的過度領袖崇拜與國族野心，在在證實了這兩個社會是由互不相容的價值與行為界定的。於是，作為對照及定義自身認同的對象，台灣人在今天的中國身上看見的，正是他們所不願成為的模樣。

（寇謐將，英文想想論壇總編輯，諾丁罕大學中國政策研究所非常駐資深研究員。）

中譯：William Tsai
Original article: Home, values and democracy: Explaining the rise in Taiwanese identification, China Policy Institute blog, March 16, 2016

Home, values and democracy: Explaining the rise in Taiwanese identification

By making the contrast between the two societies increasingly sharp, Chinese nationalism inadvertently helps consolidate Taiwanese self-identification 

The trend began several years ago, and no matter how hard the current government in Taipei and the one in Beijing try to convince them otherwise, with propaganda and sweeteners, there was no stopping it: more and more Taiwanese people identify as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. Several demographic factors have contributed to this steady rise in Taiwanese self-identification, but one in particular seems to be accelerating the process: China itself. 

Back in the mid-1990s, only 44 percent of people in Taiwan identified as Taiwanese and more than 30 percent thought of themselves as Chinese. Today, according to a recent poll conducted by the United Daily News, the number of people who regard themselves as Taiwanese-only is 73 percent, a new high for the pan-blue-leaning UDN poll. Those who identify as Chinese-only are down to 11 percent. Other multiyear surveys have tracked a similar progression over time. 

My article, published today in the China Policy Institute blog, continues here (photo by the author).

Why Beijing has no desire to turn the screw on Tsai Ing-wen and threaten stability across the Taiwan Strait

Warnings by the international media and marginal players do not reflect the reality among top leaders 

If we believed many of the article headlines that have appeared in international media since the January 16 election of Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party, we would think the roof was about to come crashing down on the Taiwan Strait. Time and again, articles and editorials have warned that if Tsai refuses to recognise “one China” or the 1992 consensus, Beijing could – or should – punish Taiwan by, among other things, severing all official and unofficial contact. Such alarmism, however, doesn’t pass the reality check. 

While ascertaining the future behaviour of any authoritarian regime will always be a challenge, so far, the Chinese leadership has reacted to Tsai’s landslide victory in a predictable fashion, with every indication that it wants a stable relationship across the strait. Therefore, while senior officials have reiterated the predictable lines on, say, Taiwan independence, their language in no way suggests plans for retributive action against Taiwan or escalatory policies that would threaten stability. There are several reasons why. 

My op-ed, published today in the South China Morning Post, continues here.

BOOK REVIEW: Taiwan, the White Terror and the Power of Literature

A Review of Shawna Yang Ryan’s ‘Green Island’ 

It wasn’t the dreaded knock on the door in the middle of the night. Instead, the undercover military police officers posed as clients wanting to buy tea from Mr. Wei. Their main objective was something of an entirely different nature, however: to recover incriminating documents from the White Terror era that Mr. Wei had in his possession and which he had advertised for sale on the Internet. In all, after luring him out of his residence, eight men accompanied Mr. Wei back to his home, where they made it clear that “bad things” could happen if he refused to let them search his house without a warrant and did not hand over the documents (which he kept hidden in a dehumidifier unit). To keep the matter quiet, the officers later allegedly offered Mr. Wei NT$15,000 (about US$500) in return for his silence. 

Mr. Wei did not take the money, nor did he remain silent. 

My book review, published today in Thinking Taiwan, continues here.

McCafé Ad Promoting Acceptance of Gays Draws Fire from Conservative Groups

The latest reaction by a conservative religious alliance in Taiwan occurs just as Beijing passes new controversial regulations banning the depiction of homosexual acts on television 

All eyes within the LGBTQI community were turned on China in the past week after Beijing unveiled its new General Rule on TV Productions (電視劇製作通則), which characterizes homosexuality as “unusual sexuality” and bans it along with “other perversions,” sexual abuse, and incest from TV content. While China was taking one major step backwards on the issue, a restaurant chain in Taiwan did the exact opposite with a TV commercial that promotes acceptance — and yet here too, backward forces mobilized to arrest progress and limit our freedom of expression. 

In its new McCafé ad campaign, McDonald’s Taiwan introduced a TV spot in which a young man at a McCafé “comes out” to his father by scribbling “I like boys” (我喜歡男生) on a paper cup. After reading the message, the ill-at-ease father walks away, leaving his anxious son alone at table. A few seconds later the father comes back, grabs his son’s cup, and draws an insert symbol with the words, “I accept you” (接受你). 

My article, published today in Thinking Taiwan, continues here.

Country Risk: Taiwanese election tests Chinese strategy

Key Points 

China remains committed to eventual unification with Taiwan despite its moderate response to the election of an anti-unification Taiwanese president in January.

The acquisition and development of more advanced weapons capabilities by China has shifted the military balance across the Taiwan Strait, but military conflict remains unlikely.

Instead, Beijing is likely to use economic influence, non-state actors, and intelligence operations to manipulate Taiwan's democratic institutions and build support for unification among the population. The election of the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) Tsai Ing-wen as Taiwanese president on 16 January 2016 has ushered in a new era in relations across the Taiwan Strait.

My analysis, published today in IHS Jane's Intelligence Review, is available here (paywalled).

The Great Cross-Strait Doublethink Act

As long as the governments in Taipei and Beijing remain pragmatic and flexible, the sky won’t fall over the Taiwan Strait 

With the May 20 inauguration approaching, it’s increasingly safe to say that the analysts who were predicting a rapid souring of cross-strait relations or punitive action by Beijing following Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) landslide victory in the Jan. 16 elections were too alarmist. Both sides have demonstrated an ability to act pragmatically, and even though the fundamentals remain unresolved, a new modus vivendi is in the making that will conceivably ensure stability and continuity in the Taiwan Strait for years to come. 

The sticking point, of course, is “one China” and the so-called “1992 consensus” that Beijing has repeatedly insisted on as a prerequisite for continued dialogue. During the election campaign, a struggling Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) repeatedly sought to exploit the consensus—which it has adhered to wholeheartedly—by warning that the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) refusal to recognize it would seriously harm relations with Beijing. 

My article, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here (Photo: Rick Bajornas).