tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29099853.post2246323593246598447..comments2023-10-26T22:53:59.503+08:00Comments on The Far-Eastern Sweet Potato: Two more Taiwanese officials indicted for spyingJ. Michael Cole 寇謐將http://www.blogger.com/profile/12125612369359079447noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29099853.post-77404611584825870292012-04-18T14:57:04.924+08:002012-04-18T14:57:04.924+08:00@Mike: You need to show a bit of patience as you a...@Mike: You need to show a bit of patience as you await responses from me. I'm running around most of the time, and my blog isn't exactly at the top of my priority list.<br /><br />Last time I heard of someone linked to Taiwanese intelligence being arrested in China was in August last year. A retired official surnamed Wu. Wo Weihan, who was executed, also comes to mind as a somewhat recent example.<br /><br />A lot of Taiwanese businesspeople recruited by Taiwanese intelligence were arrested over the years. Now, I guess this is all contingent on how the PRC defines espionage, a net that in many ways is much wider than the definition used here in Taiwan, or in the West.<br /><br />Another thing is that such arrests probably do not get as much publicity in China as they do in Taiwan. In other words, several arrests probably go unreported in Chinese media.<br /><br />To answer your second question: Based on my research and interviews I've accessed with Taiwanese arrested for spying for the PRC, ideology, rather than money (or sex), appears to be the overarching principle. In most instances, the agent's definition of "the enemy" was blurred, which made it easier for them to rationalize their actions and to see it as something other than what, in the traditional sense of the word, constituted treason.<br /><br />To use an example from my past in that funny world called intelligence, I’d say this is analogous to, say, a Canadian intelligence officer passing on, via unofficial channels, classified information to, say, BSIS, or ASIO. While this is against the law, the perception is that this isn’t as bad as, say, giving the same intelligence to Iranian intelligence, Cuba, or China.J. Michael Cole 寇謐將https://www.blogger.com/profile/12125612369359079447noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29099853.post-5588157029263050052012-04-18T13:10:38.366+08:002012-04-18T13:10:38.366+08:00No answer.
Well, the relatively trivial sum of mo...No answer.<br /><br />Well, the relatively trivial sum of money paid to these two moles would seem to incidicate that their defection was motivated either by threat (e.g. against their families) or by ideological persuasion.<br /><br />Threat is one thing, but ideological persuasion is another and far more interesting. One would think that, since Taiwan is so unlike China in that it is a wonderful democracy (where the people can actually vote for differently coloured versions of the "public interest" banner under which their properties can be confiscated), many Chinese intelligence officers would be only too eager to defect to Taiwan.<br /><br />Hence my question.Mike Faganhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08745281285031316740noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29099853.post-63321180730501165692012-04-17T23:27:59.028+08:002012-04-17T23:27:59.028+08:00A question if I may: when was the last time you he...A question if I may: when was the last time you heard of a <i>Chinese</i> intelligence officer being arrested and/or tried in China for gathering intel or counter-intel for Taiwan?Mike Faganhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08745281285031316740noreply@blogger.com