Taiwanese are
the products of an education system that militates against the spirit of
revolt. While a few may develop the notion through exposure to foreign ideas, there
might not be enough of them to change the system
As I was
returning home on the MRT late last night, I had the sudden urge to snatch
smartphones — surely one of the most nefarious inventions in recent years — from
all those captive minds on the train and shatter them to pieces. I imagined
checking every single screen to determine what it was that so transfixed them.
If it was one of those stupid video games, or trivial chat about one’s dinner,
the phone was doomed to obliteration. If instead the individual was reading up
on the terrible undemocratic act that had been committed by the Executive Yuan
and compliant legislators earlier today, the device would have been spared.
But l’homme
révolté from the title isn’t
about me; or rather, this article isn’t about me, but the Taiwanese whose way
of life, whose freedoms, are under assault. Although a nucleus of issue-oriented
activists has formed in recent months, tackling various contentious issues, I
fear that this isn’t enough, that the relatively small numbers aren’t creating
enough momentum to really make the government, whose ways are becoming
increasingly undemocratic, pay attention.
The
deterioration of Taiwan’s democracy has been, until recently, gradual and
subtle, enough so that the authorities have gotten away with it. Starting last
year, however, there has been a noticeable change in government behavior and
attendant degradation of democratic mechanisms. A number of factors can help
explain this, including a disorganized opposition; the ascension of Xi Jinping
in China; President Ma Ying-jeou’s re-election in 2012; and the fact that,
under Taiwanese law, this will be his last four-year term as president.
All those factors,
added to growing Chinese impatience at the pace of “progress” in the Taiwan
Strait — by this read the commencement of negotiations on Taiwan’s political
future — and fears that whoever comes after Ma might not be able, or willing,
to deliver the political goods, have resulted in Beijing applying tremendous
pressure on Taipei, and thus forcing it into a reactive position. Already, some
prominent individuals have observed that Ma’s government has failed to take the
initiative in cross-strait negotiations by allowing China to set the
agenda, a most dangerous strategy (or non-strategy).
After a year of
transgressions, the Ma government yesterday truly flexed its undemocratic
muscles when Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Legislator Chang Ching-chung (張慶忠), the presiding chair of the legislature’s Internal
Administrative Committee, declared that the committee had completed review of a
hugely controversial Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement and sent it straight
to a vote. Except that there was a small, shall we say, problem: Chang made his announcement
before the review, which the KMT and DPP had agreed would involve a
clause-by-clause review of the agreement, had even begun. Explaining the move, KMT
caucus whip Lin Hung-chih (林鴻池) said that Chang had acted legally as
the committee had failed to review the agreement within the stipulated period
of 90 days. (There was admittedly a fair bit of blocking action and fighting inside the legislature.)
Soon thereafter,
the Executive Yuan congratulated Chang for his “hard work” in getting the agreement
out of committee.
But there’s a
catch: The three-month clause only pertains to executive orders, which the
trade pact isn’t — or at least shouldn’t be, given the wide-ranging
ramifications on society and the economy. Nor is the pact a treaty, for that
matter. Instead, much like ECFA, the agreement lies in limbo, and the executive
seems to have concluded that it is doing the legislature a favor by submitting
it for consultations.
Prior to
yesterday, the agreement was already clouded by controversy. The public
hearings, ostensibly held to pacify the public, were a complete farce, with
dissenters usually prevented from attending by large contingents of police
officers. Negotiations, conducted in China, were not transparent, and when the
document was returned to Taiwan in June last year, even KMT legislators
recoiled in horror at the breadth and scope of the agreement.
Like ECFA,
Taipei and Beijing contend that the agreement is more generous to Taipei than
it is to Beijing. If that is the case, then one should perhaps wonder why it is
that the CCP has repeatedly instructed their Taiwanese counterparts to quickly
pass the agreement. The reason for their impatience is most certainly not for
altruistic or humanitarian considerations, but political ones (many of the
components of the agreement would play directly into China’s United Front and
psychological warfare efforts, not to mention dramatically increasing its
ability to position people in Taiwan).
Facing
dissenters within his ranks, Ma, as KMT chairman, imposed what could only be
regarded as internal authoritarianism by threatening expulsion of any KMT
legislator who voted against the party line on the matter. The measure quickly
succeeded, and opponents who rightly feared the negative impact of the
agreement on the districts they represent could affect their chance of being
re-elected fell into line.
The next — and
last — line of defense is civil society. As I mentioned earlier, their numbers
are few, much less than, say, the Alliance Against Media Monsters, the No Nukes
movement, or the seemingly deflated Citizen 1985. One reason why the movement
has failed to attract more people perhaps lies in the nature of the threat,
which remains distant and largely abstract. The pros and cons are
overwhelmingly academic and far too complex for ordinary people to jump into.
For most, the agreement is probably regarded as another ECFA: Maybe, like its
predecessor, it won’t yield much results (at least not to the majority of the
people), but it probably also won’t cause too much evident damage. As long as
their interests aren’t directly affected — and they won’t know until the
agreement is implemented and cheaper Chinese-invested businesses elbow them out
of the market — they won’t see the need to take action.
I spoke with one
of the young people who were holding an all-night vigil in front of the
legislature last night. The young man had just got off work at a night market
and gone straight to the Legislative Yuan. After he’d ejaculated a few
unprintable expletives against the government, I asked him why he was there.
“Most people at the night market will be affected by the agreement,” he said.
“But they don’t seem to know, or they are simply resigned and don’t believe
they can make a difference.”
The young man
was right on the mark. Either people can’t be bothered, as long as they can
continue with their middle-class “lives of material comfort,” or they are convinced that
resistance is futile. Much of this is the result of decades of martial law and
an education system that, to this day, reinforces conformity and citizen’s
responsibility to comply with top-down directives. Basically, the education
system should have been reformed at its very foundations during democratization
and the eight years of DPP rule, but it never was. Consequently, rather than
serve as an incubator of ideas, it reinforces a conservative view of the
citizen as subject. And most educators — many of whom are not worthy of the
title — drill such views into their students, discouraging them from caring
about politics and berating them (or calling their parents) if they refuse to
listen.
As a result, the
majority of young Taiwanese and the generation before them have little notion
of revolt. The few who do either learned it while studying abroad, or through
contact with outside material, literature, et cetera. The huge task of
attracting more people to their cause and convincing them that risk-taking in
the defense of one’s way of life is a worthy endeavor, discomforts
notwithstanding, now lies upon their noble shoulders. This is dirty work, and
many of them will be disparaged for being “violent,” “irrational” and
“undemocratic” in their means, but at this stage, barring a return to
accountability in government institutions and the judiciary, playing by the
rules might just be the surest way to lose the game. If the movement gains
enough momentum, the possibility exists that allies in government and within
the KMT who currently lie dormant will join the ranks of the opposition and
increase the pressure on the government. But people won’t know unless they try.
It’s never too
late to start learning. L’homme révolté,
the French philosophe Albert Camus wrote in his book of the same title, is
defined by a “no.” What is this “no”? It is, among other things, the
affirmation that “things have been the same for too long”; “Until now, yes, but
beyond that, no”; “You have gone too far”; “There is a limit that you shall not
transcend.” Simply put, it is the determination of a border, a frontier, and
the will to combat any excesses that threaten to cross that line, beyond which
lie the rights of the homme révolté. Je me révolte, donc nous sommes... (Photo by the author)
New! A Chinese-language translation of this article is available here.
New! A Chinese-language translation of this article is available here.
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