The world’s a stage — use it well

Department of Health Minister Yeh Ching-chuan (葉金川) was in for a surprise in Geneva yesterday when two Taiwanese students approached him after dinner and asked him to clarify his position on the designation of Taiwan as “Chinese Taipei” at the World Health Assembly (WHA), the WHO’s decision-making body.

After regaining his composure (he whimpered, lost control), Yeh said he might consider taking legal action — back in Taiwan — against the two women.

Aside from Yeh’s sobs, the reaction of the Taiwanese government and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) was one of outrage, with references to Taiwan being an international “laughingstock” and to the feelings of Taiwanese being hurt by the two women’s actions.

More interesting was Presidential Office Spokesman Wang Yu-chi’s (王郁琦) comments on Monday, who said that while he understood there were differences of opinion over whether Taiwan should agree to the name “Chinese Taipei” at the WHA, the public should voice its discontent at home rather than at international events.

There was, undoubtedly, some loss of face involved with the incident on Monday, which marred an otherwise perfect day for the Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) administration, as it finally had something to show for its pursuit of détente with Beijing. After all, despite its doing so as an observer, this was the first time since 1971 that Taiwan participated in a UN body.

Beyond the loss of face, however, is the fact that the success of the contentious rapprochement between Taiwan and China initiated by Ma after he came into office last year is contingent on opposition to those less-than-transparent efforts not being internationalized. In other words, the rosy picture that has been painted of China-Taiwan relations by international media, investors and most of the world’s capitals in recent months must not be undermined by news that there is something rotten in Taipei, that millions of Taiwanese either oppose, or at a minimum apprehend, the manner and speed by which talks with China have proceeded. This strategy was on full display over the weekend, with the KMT and most foreign media downplaying the importance of the anti-Ma protests in Taipei and Kaohsiung on Sunday and reporting that “thousands” or “tens of thousands” of demonstrators took part in the rallies when, in reality, there were hundreds of thousands.

Facing a weakened opposition Democratic Progressive Party, the KMT/Ma administration, which control both the executive and the legislature, appear to have reached the conclusion that as long as trouble can be kept at home and does not spill out, they can continue to ignore dissent and proceed with their cross-strait negotiations.

Monday’s incident in Geneva threatened all that, however, because all of a sudden the world (or at least the Swiss and the participants at the WHA), were made aware — perhaps for the first time — that there is real opposition to Ma’s policies and that Taiwanese will not only travel to voice their discontent, but even risk arrest to do so. Yeh’s threat to sue may have been overreaction from a man who has clearly demonstrated his inability to handle stress. But depending on whether this materializes or not, it could also be an attempt to use prosecution as a means to deter others from expressing the fears and discontent of Taiwanese on the world stage.

Perhaps it is easy for the world to ignore little Taiwan when shouts of anger are expressed on the island, as happened this weekend. It might be more difficult to turn a blind eye to what’s going on here, however, if Taiwanese take the fight abroad. Perhaps those two young ladies in Geneva were on to something. (As Michael Turton points out, though, it would have helped if the ladies had protested in English or French, so that what was said could be understood by the audience.)

The Associated Press fails at history. Again [UPDATED]

This is something that I and others have written about on countless occasions already. But as long as international wire agencies and news outlets continue to misrepresent the facts in Taiwan, I will continue to sound like a broken record and persist in taking them to task.

In its coverage of the May 17 demonstrations against the Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) administration’s pro-China policies, The Associated Press (AP) today recycled many of the falsities, misrepresentations and biases that we have come to expect when it comes to Taiwan. The AP ’s Annie Huang, for example, writes that demonstrators were “underscoring their view that after six decades of separate governance, the democratic island and the communist mainland should never come together.”

“China and Taiwan,” she continues, “split amid civil war in 1949” and Sunday’s protest “may not have come at an opportune time for the [Democratic Progressive Party] to convince the wider population … as the local stock market is soaring amid expanding cross-strait links.” Huang also writes that “China has recently shown a willingness to accommodate [“the Harvard-educated”] Ma’s push for greater international recognition for the island.”

The problems:

“… after six decades of separate governance.” Huang conveniently forgets the 50 years of Japanese rule on Taiwan, from 1895 until 1945, years that had a formative impact on Taiwanese consciousness and nationalism. At the very least, Taiwan and China have had separate governance for more than 110 years, or 11 decades. Not six.

“… split amid civil war in 1949.” (also used by Agence France-Presse’s Benjamin Yeh, while Reuters’ Ralph Jennings does a far better job.) Taiwan and China did not “split.” The losing side in the war, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), fled to Taiwan and imposed itself on the people there. Taiwan was not a participant in the Chinese civil war (1927-1949); in fact, except for the last four years of the civil war (from the end of World War II until the KMT’s defeat in 1949), Taiwan was part of Japan, so it would have been impossible for it to be part of that war. (One simply cannot split from something it is not a part of to begin with.) Furthermore, the literature clearly shows that Taiwanese after 1945 had no intention whatsoever to be sent to China to fight there, and (despite the KMT) great efforts were made to ensure that Taiwanese would remain on Taiwan to defend its territory.

“… soaring stock market amid expanding cross-strait links.” While the TAIEX has indeed performed quite well in recent weeks, this alone is not sufficient as an indicator that the economy is doing better. In fact, some economists have pointed out that Taiwan’s economic fundamentals remain abysmal and that Taiwan may be a perfect candidate for a stock bubble. It should also be noted that the stock market can easily be manipulated to give the impression that the economy is reviving, or that the upward trend is the result of closer ties with China.

“… China has recently shown a willingness … for greater international recognition for the island.” Huang and AP cannot even be bothered to mention what that “willingness” signifies, which is a single event — Taiwan’s “invitation” to attend, as an observer, the World Health Assembly meeting in Geneva this week, under the title “Chinese Taipei.” To believe that this single instance, which does not depart from Beijing’s “one China” principle, is a sign that China is “willing” to give Taiwan more international space belies tremendous naivety on Huang and AP’s part, or a lack of understanding of China’s approach to diplomacy when it comes to Taiwan (see, for example, my article “On Chinese zero-sum diplomacy,” Taipei Times May 3, 2009).

“… Harvard-educated Ma.” No mention is even made of the DPP leader, Tsai Ying-wen (蔡英文), who consistently is never referred to as “the London School of Economics-educated Tsai.”

As happens far to often in wire copy about politics in Taiwan, important facts are left out that mislead the reader or unconsciously tip the odds in one side’s favor (the KMT). The silence on key determinants in Taiwanese identity — in this case Japanese colonialism — added to the usual “split in 1949” will serve to convince those who do not know better — that is, pretty much everybody outside Taiwan — that Taiwan has always been part of China and therefore that the hundreds of thousands of people who took part in today’s demonstrations in Taipei and Kaohsiung were nothing but disgruntled individuals who “oppose” better relations with China. Troublemakers, irritants, extremists, like former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁).

If, on important events like today (which newspapers abroad are more likely to pick up), wire agencies cannot even get their basic facts right, what else are they getting wrong on ordinary days?

UPDATE

Thanks to Michael Turton for pointing out that I failed to take AP to account for another glaring mistake in its report: that Sunday’s protests was “the first large protest against Ma’s policies” since Ma come to power on May 20 last year. Large demonstrations were held on Aug. 30, Oct. 25, and throughout Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait Chairman Chen Yunlin’s (陳雲林) visit in early November, culminating with the “siege of Boai” on Nov. 6, all of which attracted hundreds of thousands of protesters. In other words, 517 was the fourth large demonstration against Ma in the past 12 months, not the first, as AP claims.

Why we (foreigners) get involved

The question of whether waiguoren, or “foreigners,” should get involved in Taiwanese politics is one that has been asked for decades, starting with those, like George Kerr, Linda Gail Arrigo and Lynn Miles, to name but a few worthies, who sought to defend this beautiful country from the abuses of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) regime from 1947 on. Quite often, the argument is made that foreigners do not understand Chinese culture, which inherently makes them outsiders and mere meddlers in domestic affairs.

A recent comment posted in response to an entry titled “PRC police to Taiwan” on Michael Turton’s excellent blog, The View from Taiwan, perfectly encapsulates that viewpoint and is well worth, abusive language notwithstanding, quoting in full:

Great!! … The sooner [foreigners leave Taiwan] the better!! … As a matter of fact, all of the foreigners supporting TI [Taiwan independence] with no intention of sheding [sic] your blood, or scraificing [sic] your family or your property should leave Taiwan tomorrow … We Taiwanese will be happy NOT to see your face again EVER!! BYE~~ BYE.

Leaving aside the possibility that this response was posted by a hardcore pro-unification individual, and bearing in mind that such opinions are by no means shared by all Taiwanese, the key factor here is the perception that somehow expatriates in Taiwan are all transitory, perpetual exiles that have no real sense of belonging here. Having been confronted to such accusations myself — made by Taiwanese, Chinese and expatriates — I have long pondered their meaning and whether there might not be some truth in them. After all, the future of Taiwan is for Taiwanese themselves to decide, right?

The problem with this argument, however, is that it altogether fails to take into account the impact of globalization and multiculturalism. Brought down to a local level, it is akin to reprimanding someone who seeks to improve the community he inhabits based on the fact that he was born in the village next door. This has often made me think about my past, when, in 1994, I left home in Quebec City and moved to Montreal, 250km westwards, to go to university. Would someone have been justified in criticizing me for seeking to make my environment a just, clean, tolerant one simply because I was not born there? Of course not. Over time, Montreal became my new home, and the part of the city I lived in — in the “gay village,” which happened to be relatively inexpensive and close to my workplace — became a community that I identified with and cared for. I also wanted the various ethnic groups that constitute that vibrant city — my Lebanese and Colombian friends, and the Italians, Haitians, Pakistanis, Algerians, Jews, Muslims — to be treated with respect and justice. As such, as I developed roots there and became part of that community — in other words, as Montreal turned into my new home — I wanted it to evolve and improve itself because I cared for it. In fact, there was a selfish need in that desire to see the city prosper: I was proud of it, proud of being one of its inhabitants, and the better it got, the more international attention it gained through its achievements, the prouder I became. After all, there is nothing wrong with seeking a nice living environment for oneself.

Eleven years later, I left Canada and moved to Taiwan, which for various reasons came to feel more like home than anywhere in Canada. Having discussed this with many expatriates in Taiwan, I know for a fact that this is a sentiment that is shared by many. Several expatriates — British, Americans, Canadians, Australians, among others — have been in Taiwan far longer than I have. Many have wives or husbands here, and quite a few have children who are Taiwanese citizens. Close friendships have also developed over the years, oftentimes with Taiwanese. Many of those foreigners are therefore not simply “passing through” Taiwan like in the old days, seeking to make a quick buck before moving on to something else. Many have started families, worked on their careers here and, as a result, have become part of the community, which in the past 10 to 15 years has become increasingly multiethnic.

As such, why is it that we never (or at least far less often) hear critics say that Lebanese in Montreal, or South Koreans in Los Angeles, or Indians in London — or Taiwanese in Vancouver — should mind their own business when they seek to improve their communities and fight for justice in their adopted countries, but it is perfectly acceptable for Taiwanese or Chinese to berate foreigners in Taiwan who seek, as members of the community, to make it a better place? Why can a Haitian in Montreal work to make the city more inclusive, or, once he becomes a resident of Canada, vote on whether Quebec should separate from Canada — in other words, become a full participant in the decisions that have a real impact on the fate of the community — while a Canadian like yours truly in Taipei should shut up and not, as an equally involved member of this community, endeavor to make Taiwan a better place for all and ensure that the decisions that pertain to its future are not made through coercion, fear, military threat, or lies? Is it not conceivable, for a person like me who has a Taiwanese partner, who works as a reporter in a (still) free press, to seek to change things when I hear about plans for authoritarian China to deploy Chinese police officers in Taiwan, or when a Hakka Taiwanese is told by the authorities that he cannot obtain a license for his company because the proposed name of said company alludes to a pro-independence movement from years ago? This is not mere missionary zeal, or an odd twist on the “white man’s burden” (which begs the question: have my accusers managed to rid themselves of their colonial mindset?) — this is the real, selfish desire to live in a place that is free and democratic, the same desire that animated me when I sought to do by part for the community in Montreal, or afterwards in Ottawa.

In the modern world, the very terms “foreigner,” “waiguoren” and “expatriate” have become antiquated, a provincial viewpoint on locality that does not stand scrutiny. As the yellow banners in the picture above clearly state, Taiwan is my country. I may have been born a Canadian, but right now Taiwan is my home.

Should the “foreigners” who have made Taiwan their home, who have developed roots here and care about the place, get involved? You betcha!

Mutually assured destruction in the Taiwan Strait: A review of Craig Addison's 'Silicon Shield: Two Chinas, One World' documentary

HTML version of this article available here.
PDF version available here.

What if something other than military hardware, balance of power and savvy diplomacy could serve as a deterrent against military invasion? According to Craig Addison’s documentary Silicon Shield: Two Chinas, One World, the computer chip preserves the peace across the Taiwan Strait.

No single development has had as great an impact on how we live today than the microchip. The world’s military powers seized on the immense potential of computers to refine the art of war, which became more precise and deadlier: whoever took the lead in the technological arms race gained an advantage. In one instance, however, computer technology became a deterrent against the folly of warfare. Small enough to fit in the palm of the hand, the computer chip guaranteed Taiwan’s survival.

So argues Craig Addison in his documentary Silicon Shield: Two Chinas, One World. More so than any other flash point across the globe, the Taiwan Strait exemplifies how the semiconductor has not only made our world smaller, but changed the nature of warfare forever — and not for the reasons you might think.

For the 25 years after the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) scrambled across the Taiwan Strait following its defeat to the Communists in 1949, the focus of the many academics, diplomats and military experts who tackled the question of Taiwan was on how, through conventional balance-of-power means, war could be averted. Weapons were sold, alliances pitting the “free world” against a seemingly communist front were made, and the world held its breath as the brinkmanship of Chiang Kai-chek (蔣介石) and Mao Zedong (毛澤東) threatened international security, more so after China successfully detonated its first nuclear device in October 1964.

Gradually, as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) gained diplomatic recognition, the isolation of the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC) became increasingly acute.

GOING ELECTRONIC

Seeing the writing on the wall and understanding that isolation exacerbated the threat to the ROC’s survival, the government in Taipei launched an initiative in the 1970s to turn Taiwan’s mostly labor-intensive industrial base into a high tech one. This achievement, which through interviews with key participants and historical footage Silicon Shield outlines with brio, would not have been possible without the dedication of former premier Sun Yun-suan (孫運璿), who spearheaded the initiative and sought help from overseas Taiwanese. Top engineers and scientists, among them Pan Wen-yuan (潘文淵), were brought back to Taiwan to brainstorm about the future of the country. In a matter of days, Pan elaborated a strategy that would spawn an economic miracle.

In 1976, Taiwan sent a team of young, bright Taiwanese to the US to study the nascent field of semiconductors and bring back the know-how. That same year, US electronics manufacturer RCA licensed its 7-micron metal oxide semiconductor (MOS) process (which lagged about a decade behind the most advanced technology at the time) to Taiwan for US$3.5 million. This was a huge gamble and Sun put his career on the line when detractors criticized the millions of dollars that were being spent on a “novelty.”

But the leap of faith paid off, as back in the US, a pair of young technicians — Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak — produced the first commercially successful computer.

The rest, of course, is history and Taiwan happened to be in the right place at the right time. Computers needed memory chips, and Taiwan, having successfully performed a technological leapfrog thanks to its investment in RCA and the bright young minds who made the technological transfer possible, soon became the nerve center of the semiconductor industry. By the 1990s, California’s Silicon Valley and Hsinchu, where most semiconductor manufacturers established themselves, were joined at the hip. Around that time, successful Taiwanese engineers working in the US, such as Morris Chang (張忠謀), then at Texas Instruments, were persuaded to return to Taiwan to lead the semiconductor revolution.

As Taiwan consolidated its lead in the sector, it came to produce about one-fifth of worlds chips, more than the total production in the entire EU. In 2006, contract chip manufacturers TSMC and UMC alone accounted for 67 percent of the global foundry work, while Taiwan ranked No. 1, with 30 percent of global market share, in chip assembly and testing, and No. 2, at 20 percent, in design. By then, the total semiconductor industry was worth about US$250 billion annually, the equivalent of Thailand’s GDP.

SILICON SHIELD

Control of tensions in the Taiwan Strait, Addison argues, is not contingent on arms buildup or savvy politics, but rather on the semiconductor, which has become so important to the global economy that disrupting its cycle of production and distribution — as an attack by China against Taiwan could — would be self-destructive. Intel giant Andy Grove called this “the computing equivalent of mutually assured destruction.”

Thus was born the concept of the silicon shield, an invisible yet extremely resilient wall that deters cross-strait conflict, a notion that Addison first expounded in his book Silicon Shield: Taiwan’s Protection Against Chinese Attack (Fusion Press, 2001). In other words, the level of economic integration and interdependence between Taiwan and China is such that the latter would be committing suicide by attacking the former.

Economic integration in the Taiwan Strait, the documentary argues, is analogous to Europe after World War II, when US president Harry Truman called for the consolidation of Europe’s coal and steel industries to create interdependence and thereby reduce the risk of war. While the analogy is helpful, one interviewee in Addison’s documentary observes that there are substantial differences between post-war Europe, where all future members of the EU already existed as states, and the cross-strait situation. Taiwan’s political status remains undetermined, which has implications for the ease with which economic integration can be realized — especially when the principal partner is China.

If somewhat obliquely, Silicon Shield posits that the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis — the closest the neighboring countries came to war in decades — didn’t escalate because of the silicon shield, and that Beijing was dissuaded from turning military saber-rattling into all-out invasion after weighing the economic consequences of an attack.

Interviewed for this documentary, former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) provides what is probably a better assessment of the reasons why China did not attack: a precariously positioned, just-installed president Zhang Zemin (江澤民) was being pressured by the military to send a message to Taiwan ahead of its first presidential election. There was no intention to attack Taiwan to begin with.

As William Perry, US secretary of defense under then US president Bill Clinton, tells the interviewer, the silicon shield raises the stakes, but it is not an absolute deterrent.

It would have been helpful if decision-makers in Beijing who played a role in the crisis had been interviewed, but at no point in Addison’s documentary are his assumptions tested by having Chinese officials discuss the matter. This is probably the greatest weakness in what is an otherwise interesting documentary.

So far, so much unproven.

Given that the bulk of the foundries that buttress Taiwan’s semiconductor industry are located in Hsinchu, it would be relatively easy for China to circumvent the silicon shield by simply not attacking the area.

Addison’s argument is also predicated on the notion of the rational actor model, in which decisions are made based on rational cost-benefit analysis. When it comes to Chinese nationalism and the question of Taiwan, however, it could be dangerous to assume rationality in Beijing, or that it would not countenance the economic cost of an attack — especially if it believed it could quickly achieve its military objectives.

It is too soon to forecast what will happen to the silicon shield in President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) rush to forge closer ties with China, which Silicon Shield the documentary, released late last year, takes into consideration toward the end.

While some see greater economic interdependence as benefiting both China and Taiwan, others worry of a “hostage effect,” whereby Taiwanese companies could become so dependent on China that Taipei will be vulnerable to leverage from Beijing. Another fear is the “hollowing out” effect, or “brain drain.” Lastly, there is no reason why China, as it gains access to, or steals advanced Taiwanese technologies, and as Taiwanese chipmakers build higher specification fabs in China, could not emulate the technological leapfrogging that Taiwan achieved in the 1970s and 1980s and become the new center of semiconductor manufacturing, in the process obviating Addison’s thesis in the Silicon Shield.

Did the silicon shield prevent war between China and Taiwan over the past three decades? That’s debatable. But as China shows no sign of abandoning its goal of annexing Taiwan — by force if necessary — a silicon shield is better than a fig leaf.

Review: Nixon and Mao: The week that changed the world
By Margaret Macmillan

Historian Margaret Macmillan’s Nixon and Mao, the record of US president Richard Nixon’s surprise visit to China in 1972, may have been published a little more than two years ago, but it was only recently that I felt compelled to read it. Perhaps that choice was prompted by signs that Taiwan may be up for yet another round of “secret” diplomacy in which its future and the fate of its 23 million people is to be decided by outsiders. Macmillan’s approach is reminiscent of David Halberstam’s in his classic The Best and the Brightest, in which short biographies of the key participants, ostensibly as a means to explain the policy decisions they make, are woven into the narrative. This is a technique that the late Halberstam had used to great effect and one that Macmillan also uses well.

The key personalities in the story of how the United States opened up to communist China, which culminates with the visit, in 1972, of president Nixon and the signing of the problematic Shanghai Communiqué, are Nixon, his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, Mao Zedong (毛澤東), and premier Chou Enlai (周恩來).

While there is nothing controversial in Macmillan’s take on the years of secret diplomacy (mostly performed by Kissinger) leading up to the meeting, she successfully presents the main geopolitical considerations — on both sides — that made rapprochement possible: shared fears of the Soviet Union and the US war in Indochina. Macmillan also does a fair job showing how the White House sidelined other agencies — especially William Rogers’ State Department — an approach that, though preferred during the Nixon years, may very well have been exacerbated by the knowledge that dealing with the Chinese is very much a person-to-person affair. Doing so also conveniently disposed with the friction that naturally happens in a democratic system, where competing voices with sometimes different agendas must be taken into consideration when policy is fleshed out. In the present case, the principal casualties are Rogers, the State Department and the American media, contempt for which Nixon made no effort to conceal. Nevertheless, whenever doing so was convenient in negotiations with authoritarian China, where Mao’s and Chou’s decisions were very much policy, Nixon and Kissinger complained to their Chinese counterparts that their hands were tied, that they could not ignore other voices in the US political arena — the Chinese (Taiwanese) lobby, conservative Republicans, Democrats and so on. Despite Nixon’s attempts to circumvent a large swathe of the American political system, the inherent pressures remained, and if one thing, the reader is left with the impression that accomplishments notwithstanding, Nixon’s plan involved at its core the betrayal of American democracy and that of its allies, especially Japan and Taiwan.

The book is filled with little-known anecdotes (what did Canada offer to China when the two countries established diplomatic relations? Answer: a pair of beavers, stuffed in the washrooms of an Air Canada flight; Nixon’s low resistance to alcohol and how he almost set the White House on fire while trying to demonstrate how one could set fire to a mao-tai drink; and how the president became increasingly grumpy as his week in China imposed interminable sightseeing tours).

Macmillan makes little effort to conceal her admiration for Kissinger’s and Chou’s negotiating skills, while portraying Mao and Nixon as the strategic thinkers who had final say over the agreements reached.

In terms of organization, Macmillan’s book could have been better, as it goes back and forth in time for no real purpose. Her nonlinear approach does not add to the narrative; in fact, it gives the impression that the book is more repetitive than it actually is.

Where Nixon and Mao gains its importance is in showing how ambiguity resulting from a desire to establish contact at all cost can sow the seeds of future conflict. On this, no question has been more problematic, or so undermined the efforts of the principal players in the visit, than that of Taiwan. The passage in which a meek Kissinger, after begrudgingly receiving input from State Department officials, goes back to his Chinese counterparts and asks for revisions to the Shanghai Communiqué after it had been approved by Mao and Nixon is quite entertaining, as is Macmillan’s description of the to-ing and fro-ing that ensued. It is also very important, as the final text, vagueness, compromise language and all, established the foundations of what became US policy vis-à-vis the Taiwan question and shows that, had Nixon not been forced out of office after the Watergate scandal, Taiwan very likely would have been sold out.

Instead, what we have today is an extension of that communiqué, with Taiwan’s status remaining — a dangerous word these days, judging for the treatment reserved Japan’s de-facto ambassador to Taiwan, Saito Masaki — “unresolved.” Two reasons why it might be important to return to Nixon’s opening to China — and hence why Macmillan’s book should be read — is signs that the administration of US President Barack Obama may be willing to act in similar fashion with China, and the equally secretive approach to negotiation that has characterized relations between the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) under President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and China, with all the undemocratic shortcomings that doing so implies.

There is no doubt that at one point the world would have to recognize the People’s Republic of China and its 1.3 billion people. It is equally natural that as it sought to modernize, China could not remain forever in isolation and had to join the international community. This conjunction, added to war in Vietnam and other, more tactical, considerations created a natural platform for Nixon’s visit. What remains in question, however, is whether the US had to promise so much so that channels of communication could be established — especially when, as it soon became clear, it could not deliver on all those promises, partly as a result of the same democratic, multi-agency pressures discussed above. Perhaps deep inside Kissinger knew that, which would explain the ambiguous language that ultimately wove itself into the communiqué (the US “acknowledges” China’s position that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China) and haunts the relationship to this day. Or perhaps, in a more sinister twist, Kissinger used that language so that the State Department and the Taiwan lobby would not be overly distressed and block the process. The answer to that question, sadly, rests with Kissinger, and despite her best efforts Macmillan comes no closer to providing elucidation on that question.

While executive diplomacy may bring quick results, the secrecy that it necessitates also means that the checks and balances that usually (and should) accompany sound diplomacy are lacking. While, as in the Taiwan Strait today, this approach may serve short-term political needs, it may also, in its shortsightedness, create more problems for the future. This is what the Ma administration appears to be doing today, in the name of expediency. In the long run, however, whatever benefit may emerge from the talks could spell trouble for all those involved.

If Macmillan’s book serves one purpose beyond providing an informative and entertaining recapitulation of the week that changed the world, it is this — a warning to American and Taiwanese negotiators that there is no such thing as a quick fix with China. Or, rather, that a quick fix with China comes at a steep price.

Widening the door for PRC spying

The announcement on Wednesday last week that Far EasTone Telecommunications Co intended to sell a 12 percent stake to China Mobile Ltd following a decision by the government to allow Chinese institutional investors to invest in Taiwan’s equity market was understandably welcomed by financial analysts. But behind the deal — which will require government approval — lies a world of dangers.

While a 12 percent minority stake in a firm may appear innocuous, the target sector — telecommunications — is a sensitive one, as it touches on matters of individual liberties and freedom of expression. In democratic countries, intelligence agencies must obtain a warrant before they can intercept someone’s conversations on mobile phones, land lines or via electronic means of communication such as the Internet.

Op-ed, published today in the Taipei Times, continues here .

‘Taipei Times’ v. the ‘People’s Daily’

As a frequent contributor to and editor at the Taipei Times newspaper, I often search the Internet to see which Web site carries our stories, or what is being said about them in chat rooms and blogs. Especially when it comes to my articles, I use this as a means to see whether my arguments are getting traction with readers as well as to remain critical about the assumptions that underlie my writing.

As expected, comments cover the full spectrum of reactions, from character assassination (“numbskull,” “vermin” and so on) to flattery (“eloquent,” “knowledgeable), with the core of responses lying somewhere in between.

One position that, above all, strikes me as odd is the perception, not so much in Taiwan but abroad, that somehow the Taipei Times is a “mouthpiece” of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), with one commentator going so far as to claim that the Taipei Times is Taiwan’s equivalent of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-controlled People’s Daily newspaper.

This comparison is not only wrong (there is no institutional connection between the DPP and the Taipei Times or its parent company, the Liberty Times Group), but it also fails to take into account the vastly different environments in which the two newspapers operate. While it is true that, like the DPP, the Taipei Times supports independence for Taiwan, it certainly has not been uncritical of the DPP administration when it was in power, or of its policies since it became an opposition party last year. In fact, in both its coverage and editorial page, the Times was often quite critical of DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh’s (謝長廷) campaign strategy, and has never boycotted or censored comments made by the President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) administration. In other words, despite its political inclinations, it does not represent a political party and its management has not pressured reporters and columnists into avoiding certain subjects or warned them against criticizing the pan-green camp.

Obviously, this much cannot be said about the People’s Daily, which by virtue of its being controlled by an authoritarian regime, cannot depart from the party line and will censor anything that smacks of criticism of the Chinese leadership.

The key here is the nature of the political systems in which the papers operate. If, as some critics have averred, the Taipei Times were but a mouthpiece for the DPP, its survival in a free-market and highly competitive democracy would be very much in doubt, as its editorial line would justly be construed as overly biased and therefore unreliable. To put it in evolutionary terms, it would be selected out by market mechanisms, with readers refusing to consume it. In a democratic system such as Taiwan, as well as in the countries where people read the Taipei Times (certainly not China, where its Web site is blocked by the authorities), readers can make informed decisions as to where they get their news from, and while those decisions are undeniably influenced by one’s political views, if a source is deemed unreliable, or incapable of providing a reasoned counterweight to political views at the other end of the spectrum (say, pan-green versus pan-blue media, or, in newspaper terms, Taipei Times versus the China Post), it will be dropped. That is why, despite the obvious polarization of Taiwan’s media environment, pan-blue (i.e., pro-KMT) channels such as TVBS, or newspapers like the China Times, will at times be critical of the Ma administration, and why the Taipei Times, the Liberty Times and Taiwan News will not refrain from criticizing the DPP when criticism is warranted.

Unlike China, where such topics as the health of senior CCP cadres or disease outbreaks are “state secrets,” Taiwan does not have “no-go areas” in terms of news coverage — if one thing, it is maddeningly intrusive, to an extent that would probably result in lawsuits in many countries. This media openness allows for media to remain critical and, as a whole, to provide enough competing views so that citizens can make their own informed decisions (not everybody does that, of course, and there will always be those who choose media that tend to confirm their views). The same rules apply to the UK, the US, Canada and France, to name a few, where no newspaper that strictly adheres to a party line — as does the People’s Daily — or completely departs from reality, could survive, given the market mechanisms. In democracies, toeing the line to the extent that a news outlet becomes a mouthpiece for a political party would be corporate suicide, something that does not apply to the People’s Daily, which, funded as it is by the CCP, does not depend on readership or subscriptions for its survival.

Does the Taipei Times have an editorial line that at times overlaps with the policies of the DPP? Absolutely, as does the New York Times vis-à-vis the White House, or the Guardian vis-à-vis 10 Downing Street. But to claim that it is an organ of the DPP is an invidious accusation that completely fails to understand the nature — and impact — of authoritarianism, versus that of democracy, on information.

A little bit of cross-strait game theory

With Straits Exchange Foundation Chairman Chiang Pin-kung (江丙坤) and his team of negotiators just back from the third round of cross-strait talks in Nanjing, it is time to dwell a little on the concept of game theory. A branch of applied mathematics, game theory is an attempt to understand human behavior in a strategic context, wherein a party’s success is contingent on the decisions made by another party.

In the context of negotiations, game theory contains four possible outcomes that guide decision-making, which can be represented in the matrix commonly known as the prisoner’s dilemma: win-win, win-lose, lose-win and lose-lose.

How negotiators weigh their options and how they negotiate is predicated on whether they intend to play a zero-sum or non-zero-sum game.

My op-ed “On Chinese zero-sum diplomacy,” published today in the Taipei Times, continues here.

CSIS Public Report 2007-2008: A feeling of déjà vu

My former employer, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), released this week its 2007-2008 Public Report, in which, as it does every year, it provides an assessment of the threat environment and the organization’s priorities. As with every annual release, the report is an exercise in vagueness, and aside from the message from the director, Jim Judd, section, is almost verbatim what had been provided in previous reports from 2001 on. Given that CSIS tends to recycle and rehash information in not only its operational reports, but also in court affidavits and Federal Court warrants, it is no surprise that the unclassified annual report would fail to give new information.

As always, we are told that terrorism was the No. 1 investigative priority, followed by espionage and proliferation. Naturally, the report spends quite a bit of time on terrorism, mentioning the principal actors and countries where, since 9/11, terrorist attacks have been committed, while repeating, for the 6th year in a row, that al-Qaeda has singled Canada as an “important ally of the U.S. and is therefore deemed a legitimate target by the group.” It also writes that because of its participation in Afghanistan, Canada may appear as a legitimate target for attacks. While no Canadians have been targeted in recent years, the report tells us, it does not mean that the threat is any less, which, absent details, the reader must take on faith. Not a single reference is made to specific counterterrorism cases in Canada, except for the brief mention of the detonation of an explosive device outside a Jewish community center in Montreal in April 2007, which caused damage but no injuries. Including this incident in the terrorism section is actually misleading (and shows how little CSIS has to offer), as — to quote the Gazette newspaper — “The pair [of suspects] were arrested Thursday morning and questioned. The investigation did not turn up links to any terrorist or hate groups, said Constable Christian Emond, of the Montreal police fraud and arson squad.”

Stretching the definition of terrorism even further, the report continues:

Terrorism, however, remains a real threat to the safety and security of Canadians. Since the 9/11 attacks in the U.S (in which 24 Canadians were among those killed), there continue to be major terrorist acts committed across the globe. In Afghanistan, 301 Canadian soldiers were killed in 2007-08, most of them victims of improvised explosive devices … or roadside bombs.

Sad as the deaths of Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan are, they did not fall at the hands of terrorists, as they are a foreign military occupying another country. To refer to the deaths of Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan in its terrorism section is misleading and either underscores a lack of understanding of terrorism by the authors of the report, or a desire to muddy the water by making the threat of terrorism against Canadians seem more serious than it actually is.

The rest of the report is equally thin on specifics and does not provide anything new. In the espionage and foreign interference section, the usual intelligence-gathering activities of foreign powers — industrial espionage, cyber attacks, etc — are mentioned, but none of the principal suspects (China, Russia) are mentioned. Not even once. Nor are we given any information on actual foreign activities on Canadian soil. Instead, the report once again repeats the old “Canada as an ally of the US,” “Canada as an advanced industrialized country,” “Canada as a NATO member” as reasons why it is being targeted — with more sophistication and aggressiveness, the report claims.

The rest of the report is equally uninformative, with statistics on number of employees, gender representation, budget (C$389 million for FY2007-08), and donations to charity. A brief mention of the need for more review and accountability is made, but nothing is said about what CSIS or monitoring bodies, such as the Inspector General and SIRC, have done to ensure more transparency — except for CSIS’ outreach program, which is more an exercise in PR targeting academia and the media rather than a real means to ensure that CSIS act with honesty.

In all, with a few minor exceptions, someone who reads the 2007-08 report will not be learning anything new. I remembering memorizing, almost to the letter, the 2002-03 report during the many months I was involved in the hiring/screening process to become an intelligence officer at CSIS. Five years on, very little has changed …

Wang Jin-pyng addresses the TFCC

Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) met the Taiwan Foreign Correspondents’ Club (TFCC) at the Thompson Reuters office in Taipei today to discuss, among other things, plans by Taiwan to sign an economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) with China.

Wang, a member of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), gave a 20-minute presentation — mostly on the ECFA talks — before taking questions from the audience. Unfortunately, as there were only eight earpieces for simultaneous translation to be shared among a roomful of correspondents, a lot of time was wasted translating questions into English or Chinese, which were then followed by translations of Mr. Wang’s responses.

In the opening question, Mr. Wang was asked to talk about the planned purchase of weapons from the US, to which the legislative speaker responded with the standard: Taiwan’s fleet of Mirage 2000 and F-16A/B aircraft is aging; newer aircraft (i.e., F-16C/Ds) as well as PAC-3 missile batteries are required to maintain the military balance in the Taiwan Strait; and the Legislative Yuan has approved the budgets to obtain them.

The rest of the questions skirted around ECFA and Taiwan’s bid to gain observer status at the World Health Assembly (WHA), the decision-making body at the World Health Organization. On the latter, Wang said that while he did not know under which name Taipei would seek to gain entry, the preferred name would be (1) Republic of China and (2) Taiwan. He said that while the bid may appear straightforward, in reality it is very complex, involving many players in the international community — the US, Japan, and of course China and Taiwan. Wang expressed hope for a final resolution to the nation’s entry into the WHA rather than one that would have to be renewed annually. He said he could not speak for the executive on how to approach the negotiations, or under which name to do so, adding he was certain “the executive had developed a good strategy,”without elaborating.

Asked if unofficial exchanges between the KMT and the Chinese Nationalist Party (CCP) had already been made on an ECFA, Wang said he could neither confirm nor deny the rumors, adding that it was not his position, as legislative speaker, to address matters pertaining to the executive. He mentioned that he had been promised, by either the KMT or the executive, that once the details of an agreement are fleshed out, they would be submitted to the legislature — not for ratification, mind you, but more as a courtesy.

Asked, if somewhat indirectly, if the KMT, which according to certain polls is increasingly perceived as “pro-China” rather than “pro-Taiwan,” can be trusted to represent the interests of Taiwan in negotiations with China, Wang said that a majority of card-carrying KMT members were against unification and preferred maintaining the “status quo,” adding that even among pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) members, the majority also supported maintaining the “status quo.” After admitting that under the previous government, the DPP’s controlling the executive and the KMT the legislature was “not necessarily a bad thing,” Wang said that despite the KMT now controlling both the executive and having a majority in the legislature, there was no such thing as total control, as every bill has to be approved by legislators, who are elected by the people and act as their representative in monitoring the activities of the executive. Unexpectedly, here Wang was ever the champion of the legislative system (which, it must be said, he has made great contributions to over the years).

This somewhat skirted the question and represented a bit of a contradiction, as he had previously said that documents pertaining to an ECFA with China would only be submitted to the legislature for reference, which would mean that the executive would remain unchecked, as happened with previous cross-strait agreements with China. Wang nevertheless mentioned that according to Interpretation 520 of the Council of Grand Justices, matters pertaining to the future of the state (as an ECFA surely is) should be debated, and clearly stated that the contents of the agreement should be deliberated on in the legislature and altered if needed. He also admitted that while some sectors would benefit from an ECFA, others would suffer, which the government would seek to mitigate. (It would be interesting to see if the sectors that stand to benefit also happen to be predominantly controlled by KMT-affiliated individuals, a question that wasn’t asked.)

Also not asked was Mr. Wang’s level of confidence on whether the KMT would inform the legislature of the full details of an ECFA, given that he himself, as speaker, has been left in the dark (or claims that he has) as to whether meetings have already taken place between the KMT and the CCP. This also raises the question as to whether the small, unaccountable groups of people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait that have held dialogue on various agreements also reflect Wang’s contention that the majority of KMT members favor the “status quo” — especially when China has made no secret that it sees an ECFA and other agreements as stepping stones toward unification. Whether there might be conflict of interests, or deals we are unaware of, remains a mystery, albeit a distinct possibility. It would have been interesting to hear Mr. Wang’s comments on such musings, but time restrictions made it impossible to raise them at the meeting.

Lastly, asked if Mr. Wang would respond favorably to invitations for him to visit China, he said that he would only do so if four conditions were met: dignity, equality, reciprocity and consent. While hinting that a visit would have been possible when the DPP was in power (though the conditions were clearly not met), he seemed to say that at present it would not be a good time to do so.

In all, the session did not deliver surprises or any information that wasn’t already known. Unfortunately, Mr. Wang far too often relied on the “I cannot speak for the executive” argument to deflect questions, which was not unexpected. We can suspect that, on certain questions, he knew far more than he let on, but given his position — and the KMT contingent in the room — he had to toe the party line and not contradict the executive.

Canada’s new brand of ‘terrorists’ — British MPs

During my 14 weeks of training as an intelligence officer at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) a few years ago, I spent countless hours memorizing what, according to the law, constitutes terrorism — a definition that was somewhat altered following the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks against the United States. There were those who had committed terrorist attacks, those who were planning to commit a terrorist attack, and those who abetted, or helped, others in the commission of, or planning for, a terrorist attack.

The main difference in how the law interpreted what constitutes terrorism was that prior to 9/11, an individual, or group, needed to have committed an act of terrorism to face charges of terrorism, whereas after the legal changes (promulgated in Bill C-36), intent and support were now sufficient to investigate and prosecute someone on terrorism charges. What this meant was that someone who donated money to a terrorist organization, raised funds for it or provided material support, could now be accused of engaging in terrorism, provided, of course, that a proper investigation by intelligence agencies determined that one had indeed engaged in such activities. At an extreme, the new law meant that the more than 100 Canadians who in recent weeks have chipped in to purchase a plane ticket for terror suspect Abousfian Abdelrazik, the Sudan-born Canadian national who has been stranded in Sudan since 2002, could technically be accused of aiding a terrorist. (Abdelrazik has been cleared of terrorism charges by Canadian and Sudanese authorities, but remains on the 1267 UN watch list, which targets individuals associated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and Ottawa has yet to provide him with a passport).

Pushing the definition of what constitutes terrorism one step further, the Canadia Border Services Agency (CBSA) in early March barred British MP George Galloway, an outspoken critic of the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, from entering Canada, on grounds that he represents “a threat to national security” — a decision that was not overruled by a Federal Court judge on Monday.

The main fault of Mr Galloway, who was scheduled to give a speech at a “Resisting War from Gaza to Kandahar” forum in Toronto on Monday, was that on March 11 he, along with about 50 British and Scottish volunteers, delivered money, humanitarian aid and vehicles to war-torn Gaza directly rather than through a recognized international aid agency or the UN. By doing so, Galloway sought to demonstrate that it was possible, despite the Israeli/Egyptian blockade imposed since 2006 — which the UN and aid organizations say has caused a humanitarian catastrophe in the territory — to deliver aid. In other words, he refused to abide by a state-sponsored system that has ensured that, despite Israel’s claims to the contrary, Palestinians remain in a state of destitution.

In a letter dated March 20, Ottawa said that during his visit to Gaza, Galloway gave Hamas — listed as a terrorist organization by Israel, the US, the European Union and Canada, among others — US$45,000.

Canadian Immigration Minister Jason Kenney has said that those who support, promote and help terrorist organizations should not be allowed to come to Canada.

The problem with the CBSA and the Federal Court’s decision is that Galloway has denied the charges that he supports, promotes and helps terrorist organizations, and no investigation has been launched by CSIS or other Canadian intelligence agencies to prove him right or wrong. In other words, beyond the questionable wisdom of branding Hamas a terrorist entity, an assumption of guilt underlies the Canadian government’s decision to bar him entry, which contravenes the presumption of innocence that lies at the core of the Canadian legal system. Based on my experience at CSIS, if there is any intelligence supporting the claim that Galloway gave money directly to Hamas, it came from a single-thread, or “uncorroborated,” Israeli source of questionable credibility — which sadly is often enough to convince allied agencies to act.

It is therefore quite feasible that Mr Galloway was denied entry into Canada not because he is a terror suspect or, risibly, poses a threat to national security, but rather because he has been a supporter of the Palestinian cause, has been critical of Israel, and opposed the neo-imperialistic interventions in Iraq — which Ottawa ostensibly opposed — and Afghanistan, where more than 2,000 Canadian soldiers have been deployed since 2001. The decision is also reflective of the position the Conservative Stephen Harper administration (as has the Liberal opposition leader, Michael Ignatieff) has taken on Israeli aggression against Lebanon in 2006 and Gaza in December and January, which was overwhelmingly supportive of Jerusalem’s actions.

By twisting anti-terror legislation and disregarding the process by which an individual can be accused of engaging in terrorist activity, the Canadian government has with Mr Galloway’s case entered the realm of preventing free speech and once again shown its disregard, if not contempt, for the fate of ordinary Palestinians.

He said it'd be OK to kill my wife

We met when I worked as an intelligence officer in Canada, part of an organization that at times risked making racism and hatred for the “other” — in that case, mostly Arabs and Muslims — a normal policy. After nearly three years in that suffocating environment, whose siege mentality I could no longer bear, I resigned, choosing to abide by the values of humanity and inclusiveness that I cherished and believed defined me as a Canadian.

Throughout the long, difficult months that preceded my decision, my partner, a Taiwanese, was always supportive and helped me in uncountable ways, as did other members of her family.

Soon afterwards, we left Canada — her adopted homeland — and moved to Taiwan, where I sought to build a new life and write a book about what I had gone through at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

What immediately struck me in Taiwan was the warmth, friendliness, selflessness and generosity of its people, at a level I had possibly only encountered in Cuba on my two visits there [...]

Op-ed on Kuo Kuan-ying (郭冠英), hatred, ethnic divisions and the series of vitriolic articles he wrote under the pseudonym Fan Lan-chin (范蘭欽), continues here.

Book Review: It's war in the Taiwan Strait

The year is 2012. In Taiwan, a charismatic new leader named Yo Tuan occupies the Presidential Office — and he is filled with ambition to make his county independent. Across the strait, president Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) has been replaced by Wei Ching-chun, an inexperienced and somewhat stoic leader whose ability to steer the Chinese Community Party (CCP) remains unproven. In Washington, President Jocelyn Adams, an African-American woman, succeeded George W. Bush in 2008 and is seeking re-election in a country weighed down by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and severe water shortages that are threatening to create domestic instability.

For my review of William E. Cooper's novel Flashpoint China, published today in the Taipei Times, click here. (.pdf format).

Education key to future of China’s economic ‘miracle’

China’s economic “miracle” has pulled 200 million people out of poverty in the past two decades, a feat largely generated by the “necessary evil” of migratory workers. But as the birthrate — pulled down by the “one child” policy and women entering the workforce in larger numbers — drops, China will soon face a series of new challenges: higher salaries, greater demand, and fewer workers. To deal with this, Beijing will have to turn to one often overlooked spoke in the great development wheel: education.

Despite its “rise,” China’s education system — especially in rural areas — remains mostly primitive, underfunded and weighed down by rampant poor health. And yet, the government does not appear to be making the investments and adjustments that will allow future generations of Chinese workers to maintain the country's industrial competitiveness.

Stanford University’s Dr. Scott Rozelle, a specialist on agriculture and rural development in China, was in Taiwan to address Academia Sinica and National Taiwan University on the above challenges. He also spoke at Taipei American School, which I covered for the Taipei Times. The article can be accessed here.

‘Ultranationalists’ versus ‘terrorists’

News broke out on Tuesday that Israeli prime minister-designate Benjamin Netanyahu, who is seeking to strengthen the position of his minority Likud party in parliament, had brought into his “unity government” Yisrael Beitenu’s Avigdor Lieberman, who, in Reuters’ words, is “a far-right politician whose policies have raised Arab ire and international concern.”

In its coverage, Agence France-Presse referred to the future Israeli foreign minister Lieberman — who among other things supports continued illegal settlements in the West Bank (he is himself a resident of one, Nokdim) as well as law that would force Arab Israelis to sign an oath of loyalty to Israel or lose their citizenship — as an “ultranationalist,” a “controversial firebrand” and, quoting his detractors, a “racist.” The Associated Press, for its part, also used the designation “ultranationalist” and “racism” in describing him, while the Guardian newspaper called him an “outspoken far-right Israeli politician” and “unashamed hardliner, adding that the former nightclub bouncer from Moldova had resigned from the government in protest at the resumption of peace talks with Palestinians.

The New York Times, meanwhile, referred to Lieberman as a “nationalist” and “often indelicate and outspoken politician whose threatening language aimed at Arabs arouses suspicion and some trepidation abroad.”

Five news organizations. One “ultranationalist” whose party — which would also handle the internal security, infrastructure, tourism and integration of new immigrants portfolios in the “unity government” — undeniably stands against peace. The question is, what kind of adjectives would the same five news organizations have used if the individual in question, rather than be an Israeli politician, had been a new member in the Palestinian Cabinet advocating the same policies? Would he have been an “unashamed hardliner,” an “ultranationalist,” a “firebrand” or a “racist”? Of course not. He would have been characterized as an “extremist” and “terrorist.”

This is not to say that the news organizations sampled above did not do a good job raising questions about Lieberman’s political stance (in fact, the Guardian did a pretty decent job). But they still couldn’t bring themselves to use language with the kind of even-handedness one would expect from professional and supposedly “impartial” media. Perhaps this has something to do with the fact that had any one of those organizations catalogued Lieberman as an “extremist” or “terrorist,” the Anti-Defamation League and other Israeli lobby organizations would have screamed “anti-Semitism.”

Where the f*** is ‘Chinese Taipei’ anyway? [UPDATED]

As I was searching the Web for data on Taiwan’s accomplishments for a book I am working on — provisionally titled Democracy in Peril: Taiwan’s struggle for survival from Chen Shui-bian to Ma Ying-jeou — I came upon the following passage:

Gender Equality in Chinese Taipei

It is perhaps easiest to consider the situation of women in Chinese Taipei in comparison with that of women in mainland China (PRC). While Chinese Taipei has adopted a Western civil and capitalist legal system over the past century, its Civil Code retains strong paternal characteristics whereas PRC legislation upholds the principle of gender equality …

The site, Wikigender.org, shows the Nationalist flag with the caption “flag of Chinese Taipei.” The About page informs us that Wikigender is a project initiated by the OECD Development Centre to “to facilitate the exchange and improve the knowledge on gender-related issues around the world.” One listed source, APEC Gender in Chinese Taipei, Chinese Taipei Framework for the Integration of Women in APEC, links to http://gender.wrp.org.tw, a page on the Framework for the Integration of Women in APEC, which also refers to Taiwan as “Chinese Taipei.”

Given China’s weight at APEC and its bullying of member states on the question of Taiwan, it is not surprising that the designation “Chinese Taipei” would be used, and it is in fact the name under which Taiwan has participated at its meetings. But at a project initiated by the Paris-based Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development? (It should be noted that while China is not an OECD member, it is what is called an “enhanced engagement country.”)

This bodes ill. Little by little, the name Taiwan (or even Republic of China) is being effaced and replaced with the name “Chinese Taipei.” The global commons of free information is being exploited to cultivate future generations of people who will have no clue that there once was this place called Taiwan. On the gender equality question, which I wanted supportive data on, the great accomplishments that the people of Taiwan have made on that front — Taiwan is second to Japan in all of Asia — are being ignored by the designers of the Wikigender site and the OECD. The Taiwanese architects of that great success are being replaced by people in that odd place that doesn’t exist called “Chinese Taipei,” as if Taiwanese didn’t even have a right to be proud of what they’ve achieved. By rebound, this creates the impression that China — or part of China, as “Chinese Taipei” must be — would be capable, under the current government there, of such social accomplishments.

I have written to the designers of the Wikigender site to complain. As always, if they bother to respond (or, less likely, correct the error), I will keep readers informed.

[UPDATE] Wikigender responded today in a short e-mail: “Based on OECD agreements with the Chinese Authorities, the Development Centre (as the creator of Wikigender) is equally obliged to follow this denomination.

After filing an application for observer status at the OECD in September 2003, Taiwan was granted “ad hoc observer status” in December 2004 under the name … “Chinese Taipei.” OECD sources at the time, however, said the designation was a “temporary arrangement” rather than a “formal status.” Regardless of whether the deal was made with Taipei or Beijing, it coincides with China’s strategy of removing the name “Taiwan” from international institutions. Four-and-a-half years on and with presumed pressure from Beijing (the so-called Chinese Authorities mentioned in Wikigender's reply to me, presumably), the “temporary” arrangement risks congealing into something more permanent; in other words, it is turning more into a “status.” All OECD documents and publications, it should be noted, refer to Taiwan as “Chinese Taipei.”

Not a time for a nation of sheep

Since dialogue between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) was initiated following President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) taking office in May, Beijing has made no secret of its ultimate intentions regarding Taiwan. In speech after speech, the Chinese leadership — including President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) and Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶) on the proposed economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) — has been surprisingly transparent about the fact that cross-strait talks and various agreements are a means to an end, the stepping stones toward the great goal of “reunification.”

It is puzzling, therefore, that the Ma administration would continue to argue that an ECFA and other pacts with China are nonpolitical and will not undermine the sovereignty of the nation. And yet, despite the unequivocal signals from Beijing, this is what the administration keeps harping about, vaunting the economic benefits of closer ties with China and the alleged security benefits attendant to cross-strait dialogue.

Op-ed, published today in the Taipei Times, continues here.

A professional military by 2014? A pipe dream

On Monday, the Ministry of National Defense said that starting in 2011, the Taiwanese military would start replacing military conscripts with professional soldiers at a rate of at least 10 percent annually, with conscript measures ending in 2014. At present, all men above the age of 20 are required to do one year of military service.

The idea of a professional army is not a creation of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), nor is it the result of supposed reduced tensions in the Taiwan Strait. In fact, plans to create an all-volunteer or “partial” all-volunteer military were first floated during the first term of the Democratic Progressive Party administration.

Given the increasingly sophisticated weapons systems soldiers have to operate in a modern combat environment and the relatively short period of training conscripts receive during their one-year compulsory service, attracting motivated career soldiers who can be fully trained and upgraded as systems and concepts change makes perfect sense. In fact, under the current conscription system, one could be excused for doubting that young Taiwanese fresh out of compulsory service would be able to defend the nation if China attacked. Aside from the month or so they spend in boot camp, the great majority of conscripts spend time pushing paper in a stuffy office and cannot wait to resume their civilian life.

The problem with the ministry’s announcement on Monday, however, is that it comes amid cuts in the military budget by the KMT government, which has used the illusion of warmer ties with Beijing to justify the reduction. Taiwan’s overall defense budget for 2009 is US$10.17 billion, or NT$10.4 billion (US$301.4 million) lower than the 2008 level.

As studies have shown, creating a fully professional army is a costly endeavor. One initial estimate, mentioned in Bernard D. Cole’s Taiwan’s Security, was more than US$4 billion, or NT$138 billion, while the initial cost for a “partial” professional army was set at US$400 million. To put things in perspective, creating a fully professional army would cost Taiwan about one third of its overall defense budget for 2009. Even if this is spread over a five-year period, the project represents a major investment.

Without an increase in defense spending or special budget allocations, the creation of a fully professional army by 2014 will be financially impossible. And yet, when the ministry made the announcement on Monday, it did not mention any increases in defense spending. Nor has it said anything about raising soldiers’ salaries (about US$1,000 a month presently) to make the military an attractive employer for young Taiwanese. Absent career opportunities and remuneration that can compete with what is offered in the private sector, or even in academia, there is no way the military will manage to attract the talent, in large enough a quantity, it needs to meet its requirements.

What this means is that either the professional military will be anything but — a botched job — or the number of professional soldiers that current budgets allow for would be so low as to make Taiwan’s military unable to defend the nation. Either way, this bodes ill for Taiwan’s future ability to defend itself.

A Beijing conveniently forgetful

As I wrote in my article “A parade to end all parades,” published today in the Taipei Times, China is in a celebratory mood this year, what with the upcoming 50th anniversary of the “liberation” of Tibet next month and, in October, the 60th anniversary of the birth of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Another key date that Beijing has been conspicuously silent about, however, is Feb. 17, 1979, which is when Chinese forces invaded Vietnam in response to the latter’s invasion of Cambodia to oust the Khmer Rouge regime.

Today in China, not a single state-run newspaper carried news of the 30th anniversary, while a Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesman limited himself to comments to the effect that the past should be left alone and that “China and Vietnam had an unhappy period in history.”

Unhappy indeed, as the People’s Liberation Army invasion, which led to low-intensity warfare through most of the 1980s, resulted in tens of thousands of deaths on both side. To this day, study of the conflict is banned in Chinese schools.

This refusal to acknowledge the past may have something to do with the fact that there was no clear-cut outcome to the costly war, which for the PLA in effect became a smaller version of the US’ own debacle in Vietnam, or that of the Soviets in Afghanistan around the same time. Defeat simply has no room in PRC history books, especially in times of economic crisis when the state hopes to maintain the illusion of Communism’s great achievements. Through this filter, the invasion of Tibet is refashioned as a “liberation,” while the birth of the PRC, which came on the heels of the defeat of Nationalist forces, conveniently omits mentioning the years of devastating civil war that preceded it. Like everything else in China, negatives are twisted into positives, and when doing so is impossible, things are just ignored.

At a time when Beijing faces accusations, mostly from the West, that its massive, no-questions-asked investments abroad are propping up repressive and genocidal regimes (Sudan, Myanmar, Zimbabwe, North Korea, to name a few), CCP cadres would probably also want us to forget that 30 years ago, Beijing was an ally of the homicidal Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot, who killed millions of his own people.

China’s parade to end all parades*

Amid news that millions of migrant workers are roaming the Chinese countryside unemployed, a severe drought affecting eight breadbasket provinces and state authorities admitting that 2009 could be a year of unprecedented social unrest, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials must be looking left and right these days for ways to retain their grip on power. After all, much of the CCP’s legitimacy rests on its ability to promote economic growth and pull millions of Chinese out of poverty, which in the past two decades or so it has managed to accomplish with some success.

However, failure to sustain such growth, the pessimistic theory has it, could result in serious social unrest, rebellion and, in the worst-case scenario, the fragmentation of the country.

Op-ed, published on Tuesday in the Taipei Times, continues here.

* Unfortunately the article refers to the 60th anniversary next month of the Tibetan uprising. In reality, it will be the 50th anniversary of the March 1959 uprising. Apologies for the error.

Book review: ‘Bob of Arabia’ explores the ills of our troubled times

How does one review a book by a man who has spent the past three decades reporting on the world’s bloodiest conflicts, who has interviewed Osama bin Laden and who, by Air France calculations, travels more frequently than any Air France crew member? Robert Fisk’s journalistic resume is impressive, from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to Israel’s own invasion of Lebanon, Iran after the overthrow of the Shah to the US-led invasion of Iraq, as well as the killing fields of Algeria, Syria, the Occupied Territories and other trouble spots in the Arab world.

Book review of Robert Fisk’s The Age of the Warrior continues here.

Some Tibetan lessons for Taiwan

Next month will mark the 50th anniversary of the “liberation” of Tibet by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). As Beijing — and purportedly all Tibetans — ready themselves to rejoice in the festivities surrounding “Serf Emancipation Day” on March 28, people in Taiwan would be well advised to turn to the history books.

For starters, the so-called liberation of Tibet did not occur in 1959, but rather nine years earlier, when the PLA made its first incursion into Tibet. Along with thousands of soldiers, the liberators brought the Seventeen-Point Agreement, a document that was purportedly intended as a blueprint for the “modernization” of “backward” and “barbaric” Tibet by a benevolent China and which called for the ouster of “reactionary governments” and “imperialist” forces that had thrown Tibet “into the depths of enslavement and suffering.”

Op-ed, published today in the Taipei Times, continues here.

O Canada, land of double standards

In recent weeks, Ottawa has sounded as if its speeches were written by the Jewish Anti-Defamation League or B’nai Brith, a Canadian Jewish advocacy organization. First, during Israel’s bombing of Gaza in December and January, Junior Minister of Foreign Affairs Peter Kent said that the escalating number of Palestinian being killed was solely Hamas’ fault. Then it was Liberal Party Leader Michael Ignatieff, who on Jan. 8 also blamed Hamas for everything, as if Israel — which was killing more than 100 Palestinians for every Israeli killed in the one-sided war, and was using weapons, such as phosphorus shells, in violation of international law — did not share at least part of the blame for the bloody catastrophe or for creating the conditions that led to it.

On Feb. 3, Kent justly condemned vandalism against the Mariperez Synagogue, the main synagogue in Caracas, Venezuela, calling the “act of anti-Semitic vandalism … an assault on the freedoms that Canada and all democratic nations cherish.”

“The scourge of hate-filled bigotry must be confronted and rejected whenever and wherever it rears its ugly head. Canada denounces this act of anti-Semitism and all acts of anti-Semitism around the world,” Kent said, calling on Caracas to launch an investigation.

About fifteen people broke into the synagogue on Friday night, tying the security guards, destroying scriptures and spraying graffiti, which among others included references to former US president George W. Bush, the Star of David and the Swastika.

As a multicultural country that takes pride in its ideals of justice, Canada and its government should always, in the bluntest terms, deplore acts of hatred targeting a people for their ethnicity or religion, and in that regard Kent’s outrage was perfectly justified.

The problem, however, is that when similar acts are committed against non-Jewish religious centers, Kent and Ottawa tend to remain silent. To wit, as the Observer newspaper reported on Jan. 4, the 12 Palestinians killed — six of them children — when an Israeli missile struck the entrance to the Ibrahim al-Maqadna mosque in Beit Lahiya, Gaza.

“The Israeli military has destroyed several mosques during its week-long offensive in Gaza,” the British newspaper reported at the time. In all, McClatchy Newspapers wrote on Jan. 23, Israel damaged or destroyed 23 mosques during the 22-day war.

Not once did Kent, Ignatieff or other Canadian politicians who ostensibly oppose “the scourge of hate-filled bigotry” react to the destruction of Muslim religious institutions in Gaza. In Ottawa’s political book, graffiti inside a synagogue is blasphemy that warrants strong condemnation. But when bombs and missiles, rather than spray paint, deface or altogether vaporize a mosque, all we get is silence, even when, unlike the sad incident in Caracas, people — innocents — are killed in the act.

If Canada really stood by its vaunted ideals, Kent’s comments would have read as follows: “… act of racist and discriminatory vandalism … an assault on the freedoms that Canada and all democratic nations cherish … The scourge of hate-filled bigotry must be confronted and rejected whenever and wherever it rears its ugly head. Canada denounces this act of racism and discrimination and all acts of racism and discrimination around the world.”

Perhaps this goes beyond Kent’s ability to see clearly, but deploring discrimination only when it affects a specific group while ignoring it when it concerns another is, in and of itself, racist — in this case, anti-Muslim. Surely this goes against the Canadian values of freedom and justice.

Hamas is responsible, but …

Outgoing, corruption-haunted and altogether discredited Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert vowed on Sunday that Israel would respond “disproportionately” to the continuing, albeit sporadic, firing of rockets from the Gaza Strip. In the long, sad and bloody history of disproportionate responses by Israel, Olmert’s comment may actually set a precedent, in that the Israeli leader no longer even attempted to hide the fact that his country’s military is breaking international law. Put through the political doublespeak filter, what Olmert essentially said was “we shall break international law.”

Two additional ironies marked the warning.

First, despite an intense 19-day bombing campaign in Gaza to “end” the firing of rockets into Israeli territory, causing about US$2 billion in damage to the Gaza infrastructure, killing 1,300 Palestinians and injuring thousands, rockets are still being fired, a humiliation of Israel’s military that is reminiscent of similar adventurism in Lebanon in 2006.

Second, while Jerusalem and its shrinking list of equally discredited supporters have blamed Hamas for the rocket attacks and, with odd logic, the devastating response by Israel, the latest rocket attacks (which caused no damage or injuries) were claimed by a wing of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, a group belonging to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’ Fatah faction. In Israel’s book (and likely in US Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton’s, as well as special envoy’s George Mitchell’s), Hamas are the bad guys, while Fatah (or at least Abbas) are the “moderate” Palestinians, the ones that “peace” can be negotiated with.

Now that the “good” guys — the “good Arabs” of the non-“terrorist” sort — are also firing rockets into Israel, who will Israel talk to? Quite the quandary, indeed. Could it be that Olmert’s latest disproportionate response in Gaza in December and January managed to anger even the portion of Palestinians it thought it could deal with? Could this mean that Israel’s US-backed blunt approach to peacemaking is finally backfiring, proving that “peace” at the end of a cannon, “peace” that isn’t accompanied by justice and respect for international law, can turn even one’s “friends” into enemies?