Taiwan the victim of Asian geopolitics

Currently in India on a three-day visit, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said on Saturday she was optimistic that a defense agreement between India and the US could soon be finalized. The “end-user monitoring pact,” as defense export controls are commonly known, will be essential for US defense contractors seeking to sell advanced weaponry to India. Once it is passed, US firms will be able to bid for a contract — one of the largest arms deals in the world, estimated to be worth US$10.4 billion — to provide India with 126 multi-role fighters as part of the Indian military’s US$30 billion, five-year modernization plan. Russia, France and Sweden, as well as the European consortium behind the Eurofighter Typhoon, are also in the race. Two US firms, Lockheed Martin Corp and Boeing Co, stand to gain from the pact.

Given the strategic competition that has been developing between India and China, compounded by the latter’s perennial fear of encirclement, news of the coming deal will exacerbate apprehensions in Beijing. Ironically, China’s ally and main source of weapons, Russia, could be contributing to that sense of vulnerability should Moscow win the contract with its MiG-35, though the unease would probably be worse if US firms landed the deal. Although in recent years Beijing and New Delhi have settled a number of territorial disputes, a sense of insecurity and mistrust continues to characterize relations between the two rising Asian giants. Part of India’s drive for modernization is also fueled by fears and the many unknowns surrounding China’s “rise,” as a recent article in Indian Defense Review, which claimed China could attack India by 2012, indicates. Meanwhile, with India firmly in the US sphere of influence and increasingly seen as a counterbalance to China, it would not be surprising if Beijing increased the rhetoric as the sale approaches, or used the modernization of India’s military, as well as US-Indian cooperation on nuclear energy (an agreement expected to be signed by Clinton during her visit), as an argument for further investment in its military.

Whether China represents a threat to India is highly in doubt, but in the increasingly realist world of Asian relations, such fears are used by governments, defense departments and arms dealers to justify heavy investment.

One potential victim of this reality is Taiwan, which continues to underinvest in its defense, a trend that has accelerated under the presidency of Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九). The more China feels it is being encircled and the more insecure it becomes, the higher will be its investment in its military, both in terms of modernization and real numbers (i.e., Order of Battle). The implications of this are that even if China’s military development is geared toward India, Japan or the US, part of the growing arsenal will have applications for a Taiwan contingency, not to mention the impact the perception of encirclement would have on Chinese nationalism and its effect on decisionmaking.

Arms races are never good news, as they exacerbate tensions, increase the likelihood of error and ultimately aggravate the cost of war. If the modernization of India’s military prompted more defense expenditure in China, we can expect Japan would follow suit, thus creating a feedback loop similar to the one that made the Cold War such a threat to the human race. An accelerating arms race in Asia would be even worse news for Taiwan, for despite Chinese unease vis-à-vis external opponents, the principal objective of its military remains the tract of land it claims at its own, a mere 140km across the Taiwan Strait. In such a scenario, either Taiwan would maintain defense spending at the same level, meaning that with every year that passes the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait would further tilt in Beijing’s favor, or it, too, would join the arms race bandwagon and thereby make its own contribution to China’s military drive.

See also: Japan's 2009 Defense White Paper.

Taiwan can’t afford a fissiparous DPP [UPDATED]

The Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) Central Advisory Committee will hold a meeting next Thursday to make a final decision on the expulsion of members Fan Chung-tzung (范振宗) and Hsu Jung-shu (許榮淑) for defying a party ban on attending a cross-strait forum last week. DPP regulations stipulate that DPP members are allowed to visit China in a personal capacity, but are barred from doing so as officials, which is why Fan and Hsu are facing expulsion.

While the cross-strait forum is very much a Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT)-Chinese communist Party (CCP) affair, this time around Beijing made “accommodations” so that DPP members could attend. As I argued in a previous article, as the main opposition party the DPP cannot afford to not know what’s going on at the forum, especially at a time when cross-strait rapprochement is being managed by the KMT and CPP in less than transparent fashion and when the Legislative Yuan has been sidelined by the executive. My argument was that the DPP should seek to achieve an admittedly difficult balancing act by sending observers while clearly stating its opposition to the manner in which rapprochement has been orchestrated under the administration of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九).

Fan and Hsu did not go as observers, nor did they attend in a personal capacity. In other words, they attended as DPP members, which the CPP (and to a lesser extent the KMT) could exploit to tell the world that the pro-independence party agrees with the process of unification — in other words, that it has come to its senses. In TV interviews last night, Hsu made it clear that her attending the forum in Changsha should not result in questioning of her allegiance to Taiwan, which, given her long service to country and party, is a fair statement. Her participation does not mean that she has abandoned her aspirations for Taiwanese independence.

Yes, Chang and Hsu broke party rules. But expelling them would be self-defeating, as it would play into the CPP’s divide and conquer strategy and splinter a party that since its twin defeats in the legislative and presidential elections last year, added to its minority in the Legislative Yuan, has struggled to remain relevant. Delinquent members, if they can be thus called, should be reprimanded for their infractions, but expulsions are too drastic and would further weaken the party while serving as fodder for those who argue that the DPP is intransigent, intolerant and unable to make accommodations.

The DPP’s problem is not that it bars members from going to China — to wit, Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu’s (陳菊) visit in May to promote the World Games — but that it lacks a strategy regarding its members’ participation in cross-strait talks, which whether we like them or not are simply inevitable. Dialogue is not intrinsically bad; what’s needed is for a confident opposition to ensure that talks do not sabotage Taiwan’s sovereignty and right to determine its own future. Expelling members for attempting to do so simply closes the door on dialogue and monitoring, and helps ensure that the process remains opaque. Admittedly, that opacity creates fears in the Taiwanese polity, fear that the DPP can exploit to its advantage. But a self-respecting political party worthy of running a country must have more to propose its people than that. Fear is the weapon of the weak, a poor alternative to ideas and policies.

DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) should overturn the decision to expel Fan and Hsu — hopefully via democratic means, meaning through party vote — before more harm is done to the party’s image. Failure to do so will open yet another door, one that allows critics of the DPP and Taiwan independence to portray the party as “extremist” and oppositionist at all cost. In other words, a party that claims to fight for democracy but that in reality acts far short of the principle.

UPDATE

Thanks to Taiwan Echo (see comments for this story) for providing extremely useful precisions on Hsu’s comments after she returned to Taiwan. This has forced me to revisit my assumptions about the gravity of her “error” and what the DPP should do about it. One question that needs to be asked, now, is what motivated her to do and say what she did? This is highly hypothetical, but I’m beginning to wonder if Chinese operatives might not have been keeping DPP officials under observation for signs of weakness or shifts in ideology for possible cultivation. It would be interesting to see if Hsu was directly invited by the CPP to attend — and if so, who. I have long argued that increased contact following an influx of Chinese in Taiwan would result in more espionage, collection and — yes — influence of local leaders. If, and this is a big if, Hsu was cultivated and approached by China because they were aware of a “weakness” in her identification with the DPP (old age, conflicts of interest, blackmail or perhaps even failing mental health), she could indeed have been used to create a rift within the DPP. Under such a scenario — this calls for investigation, not a witch hunt — I would definitely be in favor of her being expelled from the party.

2012 will not be 1996 redux

In my piece “Why 2012 will be a deadly deadline” published earlier this week, I argued that 2012 would be a dangerous year in Taiwan’s history, mostly because of the risks that electoral retribution could undermine President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) efforts to pursue rapprochement with China. As I state in my op-ed, Beijing has made not secret of the fact that it sees cross-strait talks and a possible economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) as means to ultimate unification. Both Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) and Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶) have openly stated their views on the matter, hard facts that moot the criticism of those who have expressed apprehensions about the lack of transparency in cross-strait dialogue.

The 2012 presidential election in Taiwan, therefore, will be a pivotal point in the nation’s history, as it will serve both as a public verdict on Ma’s pro-China policies and an opportunity for the opposition to halt a process that has dovetailed perfectly with Beijing’s designs on Taiwan — with or without Ma’s blessing. In my article, I point out that in the lead-up to the elections, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) will likely seek to exploit the threat of Chinese attack to its advantage: Vote for us and there will be no war; vote for the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and China might attack. Ironically, the KMT could be right in raising such fears, because Beijing could very well resort to force if it perceives that the political pendulum is about to shift in the DPP’s favor.

This is where critics of this argument come in. One commentator has argued that my assumption that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would do a replay of 1996 — firing missiles off the waters of Taiwan to influence the Taiwanese electorate and compel voters not to vote for pro-independence Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) and the DPP’s Peng Ming-min (彭明敏) — is flawed. Where the critics of my argument are wrong, I think, is in their failure to comprehend the tremendous changes that have occurred in China’s military posture in the 16 years between 1996 and 2012, during which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has seen double-digit growth in its budget for more than a decade. China’s declared defense expenditures at the time of the missile crisis in 1996 was about US$10 billion — the equivalent of Taiwan’s military budget today. In March 2007, Beijing announced it would increase its annual defense budget by 17.8 percent from the previous year, to US$45 billion. In March 2008, the submitted budget was about US$57.22 billion, followed by a nearly 15 percent rise announced in March 2009. The period 1996-2009 also experienced a shift in China’s military reorganization and modernization drive following the Gulf War of 1991. Assuming similar double-digit growth in PLA expenditure until 2012, we can expect a defense budget by that year to be in the neighborhood of US$80 billion. While this still falls quite short of the US defense expenditure, and recognizing that the PLA has yet to achieve parity with the US military, there is no question that China is becoming more assertive within the region, both as a result of its growing economic clout and military strength.

This is not to say that it would make light of a decision to risk war with the US over Taiwan. But there is no question that the PLA today — and in 2012 — is far more confident in its abilities to fight a war than it was in 1996, when the missile crisis was more bluff than real threat. By 2012 Beijing could miscalculate by believing it could win a quick war over Taiwan, that its extended power projection could deter the US from intervening in the country, or even reach the conclusion that an already overstretched US military cannot afford to fight on another front in the Asia-Pacific region. The latter point is often neglected by critics of the 2012 scenario, who only focus on the Order of Battle and quantifiable forces while neglecting military commitments. The US military budget, and the quality of its forces, will dwarf China’s for many years to come, but this does not change the fact that the US military is serving in every corner of the world, fighting a war on terrorism in Afghanistan, in the Horn of Africa and in Iraq, while providing support in countries such as the Philippines, Pakistan and Colombia. China, meanwhile, has very little military commitments, its borders are secure and up until recently it has not become embroiled in the “war” on terrorism. A substantial part of its military budget, therefore, is solely dedicated to a Taiwan contingency or can quickly be reconfigured to meet that requirement.

One critic — ostensibly in reference to my background as an intelligence officer — wrote that:

It must be said how often these kind of predictions have been made in the past decade without actually coming to pass, you need only think of Lee Teng-Hui’s warning about 2008, or the warnings of trouble ahead of each of the elections since ‘96, to see how often they are proved wrong. I know Mr. Cole won’t like me making this comparison, but this is all rather reminiscent of the on-going crisis surrounding the Iranian nuclear program, where pundits feel free to make regular predictions of the inevitability of military action against Iran, and never seem to learn from the failure of their predictions to come true. Just as with Iran, the most likely outcome is that in three years time we will be roughly where we are now.

The problem with this argument, as anyone who has studied threat analysis will know, is that it adopts the fallacy known as T=T-1 (T is time, and what was applicable yesterday continues to be so today). What the critic implies is that my assumptions about 2012 are a “a failure of intelligence.” In reality, however, “intelligence failures” are as frequently overassumptions (e.g., Iraq and WMDs) as they are T=T-1 fallacies (e.g., the Iranian Revolution, Iraqi invasion of Kuwait). In the context of the Taiwan Strait, threat assessments made on the T=T-1 assumption — or that 2012 will be the same as 1996 — are extremely dangerous and blind us to changing realities, not only in terms of military capabilities, but also in political differences. In 1996, China was nowhere near achieving annexation of Taiwan; today and by 2012, that long-held dream is within reach, and the US, weakened by military campaigns, record national debt and the economic crisis, is no longer the dominant power it was a few years ago. Other imponderables, such as rising Chinese nationalism, social unrest and new CCP leadership, also make comparisons with 1996 tenuous at best.

I do not believe for one second that China is bent on expanding its empire, which is why I fully disagree with reports such as the Indian Defense Review that argue that “China will attack India by 2012 to divert the attention of its own people from ‘unprecedented’ internal dissent, growing unemployment and financial problems that are threatening the hold of Communists in that country.” I have just finished reading Bobo Lo’s Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing and the New Geopolitics, which I will be reviewing in the Taipei Times over the weekend. Lo’s analysis convinces me more than ever that China has no interest in invading other countries, whether it be India or the Russian Far East, as its focus remains on domestic development. In that regard, the CPP has very much been the professional, rational actor. But I maintain that when it comes to Taiwan — which Beijing never ceased to regard as an “internal” problem along the lines of Tibet and Xinjiang — critics of my 2012 argument had fain avoid committing a second common mistake in intelligence analysis, and that is the assumption that the rational actor model applies in every case.

Even over Taiwan, China will never make light of a decision of going to war especially if this risks a confrontation with the US and Japan. This said, if China is to miscalculate, based on 16 years of solid military buildup — quantitative and qualitative —, a weakened US and cross-strait dynamics, 2012 will be it. I stand by my assessment regarding that year.

Why 2012 will be a deadly deadline

In an op-ed published today in the Taipei Times — meant for publication in newspapers abroad but not picked up by any — I argue that failure to pressure the Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) administration now on human rights, transparency and accountability in its interactions with Beijing is sowing the seeds of disaster for 2012, when Taiwanese could very well derail his plans through electoral retribution. What, in this scenario, makes 2012 such a dangerous year is that aware of this possibility, Beijing has continued apace with the modernization of its armed forces despite better relations across the Taiwan Strait. If, after coming so close to unification (its openly stated goal for the cross-strait talks), Beijing saw that its plans risked failing because of Taiwanese voters, the likelihood that it would resort to force to complete the process could be higher than it’s ever been — much higher than during the 1996 missile crisis, when Beijing’s saber rattling was much more bluff than signs of a coming attack. This piece attempts to set the record strait and to provide a counterbalance to all those “experts” who have hailed Ma’s opening as “pragmatic” and “masterful,” or claimed, without ever setting foot here, that everybody in Taiwan is on the same wavelength on how to approach talks with China.

Al-Qaeda has a new enemy: China

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an Algeria-based offshoot of al-Qaeda, has reportedly threatened to target Chinese interests overseas in retaliation for Beijing’s deadly crackdown against Uighurs in Xinjiang last week, in which 184 people were killed. Quoting a security consultancy, the South China Morning Post wrote that while AQIM was the first al-Qaeda-linked group — or, according to experts on terrorism, a loose umbrella for regional extremist organizations — to issue such a threat against China, others were likely to follow.

It matters little that, according to Beijing’s claims, of the 184 people who were killed in the clashes in Urumqi and elsewhere in Xinjiang, 137 were Han Chinese rather than Muslim. For extremist organizations like AQIM (a rebranding of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, GSPC) and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the decades of victimization of Muslims in Xinjiang is the essence of the problem; last week’s violence was simply the trigger.

Interestingly enough, the targeting of China follows a pattern established with the West, and the US in particular, whereby the interests of the “oppressor” are targeted by al-Qaeda where they are weakest and as a means to pressure its central government to (a) change a policy and (b) leave the region. In this present case, the proximate enemy is China, but ETIM and other extremist organizations in Central Asia — China’s rear — are in no position to target it head-on. Instead, they will punish Beijing by attacking soft targets abroad: Chinese workers, diplomatic missions, firms, and so on. Just like the US, China will be the victim of its growing presence abroad. Given China’s severe reliance on oil and natural gas, combined with the fact that a large share of those resources comes from the Persian Gulf, Africa and Central Asia, exposure of Chinese interests to radical groups will not be minimal.

In coming weeks and months, therefore, we can expect kidnappings and attacks on Chinese soft targets in Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Maghreb and the Middle East, as well as certain parts of Latin and Central America with large Muslim populations, with the first two regions the likeliest to see violence. Should this transpire, we can predict that China, which so far has remained relatively hands-off on regional security, to become more involved militarily in Central Asia to protect its people, interests, and the flow of energy.

Implications for Taiwan

Two things stand out for Taiwan relative to this development. First — and this harkens back to my days in the Threat Assessment Unit at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service — by virtue of their similar features and language, Taiwanese abroad could be mistaken for Chinese and targeted by such extremist organizations. This is akin to the threat level facing Caucasians whenever al-Qaeda or other extremist groups call for attacks against Americans or British.

Another offshoot of this threat is that it will likely add urgency to US-Chinese cooperation on antiterrorism, as a terrorist attack against Chinese interests would “confirm” that Beijing and Washington face a common enemy. If this were to happen, this would provide Beijing with yet another lever with which to pressure the US — especially under a scenario where the People’s Liberation Army is called upon to exercise a security role in Central Asia and perhaps further into Afghanistan, where ETIM elements are believed to have sought refuge.

A slightly different version of this article appeared in the Taipei Times on July 19.

The CCP wants things to be ... simpler

The fifth round of talks between the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continued in Changsha on Sunday, with more discussion on cultural matters. Aside from calling on academics and researchers from both sides of the Taiwan Strait to collaborate on standardizing scientific and specialized Chinese terms and to develop software that translates traditional Chinese characters into simplified form, a joint statement called on both sides to “gradually reduce the differences” between traditional and simplified Chinese characters.”

This statement can only mean one thing: One does not reduce differences between two systems by adding complexity to the simpler one; rather, they are reduced by dumbing down the more complex of two. In other words, Taiwan’s use of the more complex traditional Chinese would be simplified, one stroke at a time, in line with the simplified Chinese characters introduced by the CCP after it came to power in 1949.

While I’ve never been one to equate language with ethnicity (e.g., French as a defining factor in Quebec identity vis-à-vis Canada), the fact remains that language provides a direct link to the cultural baggage of a people; it serves as a bridge to the past, whereby ancient wisdom is kept alive, passed on from one generation to another.

When it comes to traditional Chinese, Taiwanese did not retain the more complex version for the sake of complexity, or as a means to prove their intellectual superiority vis-à-vis people in China. Nor, conversely, did the CCP adopt the simplified form solely for the purpose of helping to educate the masses. Rather, it’s the importance a people gives to the past that matters. While one system of government (Taiwan) chose to maintain ties with ancient times (both as a source of knowledge and a means by the KMT to “resinicize” Taiwanese after 50 years of Japanese colonial rule), the other (China) sought to reinvent the national discourse by disconnecting the population from the past. By abandoning the traditional system and imposing the simplified form, the CCP made sure that it could gradually engineer a population that did not know where it come from and therefore would be less likely to question authority based on the lessons of history (under authoritarian systems, ignorance is bliss — for those in power). Of course, ancient texts written in the traditional form could be translated into simplified characters, but this would take time, and the state could control which texts could be permissibly translated. “Dangerous” or “polluted” ones, works that did not dovetail with Communist China’s version of history after Year Zero, if you will, would be barred from translation and further recede into oblivion as generation after generation grew up under the simplified system. There is a reason why many people today will say that Chinese do not know their history — it was stolen from them after 1949.

Symbolically, the more Taiwan drifts toward simplified Chinese, the more it will be seen as doing so politically and culturally as well. If it came about, it would also threaten Taiwanese people’s understanding of their past. If a people doesn’t know where it’s from, it will be hard for it to dispute claims that it belongs to another.

To go or not to go: A DPP dilemma

The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Chinese Communist Party (CPP) — rather than Taiwan and China, as some wire agencies would have us believe — launched this weekend the fifth round of cross-strait economic, trade and cultural forum in Changsha, Hunan Province. Despite what Wang Yi (王毅), head of the Taiwan Work Office of the CCP said, the forum is not “in line with the common aspirations of people in the mainland and Taiwan,” as the main opposition party in Taiwan, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), refuses to participate. It is, at most, a meeting between CCP and KMT representatives, two political parties whose views on unification tend to run in parallel.

The principal reason why the DPP will not send officials is that by doing so it would risk playing into the CCP’s hands. As Michael Turton of The View from Taiwan pointed out yesterday, DPP participation would quickly be manipulated by Beijing, which would claim that the party’s presence was proof that “splittists” had finally come to their senses. Another risk is that its presence at the forum would divide the pan-green (“pro-independence”) camp and draw accusations from the grassroots that it has abandoned its pro-independence spirit, which is enshrined in its Charter.

Conversely, by choosing not to participate, the DPP invites accusations that it is intransigent and against cross-strait dialogue, which helps both the KMT and the CCP (via the media) score points in the war of minds over the Taiwan independence question. Whatever it does, the DPP’s image gets hurt.

Where I differ with the DPP leadership and Mr. Turton, however, is in their insistence that nobody from the DPP should attend the forum. Rather than keep itself in a lose-lose position, the DPP could clearly state its moral opposition to unification while sending non-participating observers. Doing so would serve a number of purposes:

First, it would help mute accusations that the DPP is a “radical” party that opposes dialogue at all costs. Second, by sending observers it would make it more difficult for Beijing to portray its presence as a seal of approval to the talks and unification. And third — perhaps the most important element — by monitoring the talks, DPP officials would be able to see what’s going. This is primordial, as ever since Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) came into office on May 20 last year, cross-strait talks between the KMT and the CCP have been anything but transparent. The lack of accountability has fed fears that the KMT is selling out Taiwan while allowing the KMT and its Chinese counterpart to bypass democratic processes in the road to rapprochement. We need to know. The presence of DPP observers could infuse some accountability into a negotiation mechanism that so far has been marked by opacity. More information would also help the DPP formulate better policies as it strives to ensure that the interests of Taiwanese are protected during cross-strait negotiations.

It’s one thing for the DPP to stick to its principles — and let us hopes it never abandons them. But as the main opposition party, it also has a responsibility to keep its eyes open and ensure that the Ma administration and the KMT do not hide things from the public, which they ostensibly have done, to some degree. The DPD cannot afford to remain an outsider and to remain in the dark as a result of moral opposition to the forum. What is required at this sensitive moment is a little more than principles — what’s needed is ingenuity in a critical, and by no means easy, balancing act.

Ups and downs

As I walked into my office today, I was excited to see that I had received a package from the publisher of my book Democracy in Peril, which meant that I would finally get to see what the end product of more than two years of hard work looks like. I must say that iUniverse did a commendable job; the front cover looks good, the print is of fine quality, and the paper is nice and thick. I am, by and by, quite satisfied with it and was thrilled that I was finally holding it in my hands.

Only after the initial excitement had subsided did I look at the package itself. To my horror, I discovered that the DHL sticker read “Neihu, Taipei TA, 114 Taiwan Province of China.” Sparing the reader the expletive that escaped from my lips, I then pointed out to my coworkers how ironic it was that a 440-page book arguing in favor of Taiwanese sovereignty would be shipped in a package with a “Province of China” sticker affixed to it.

I now need to determine whether it was the UK-based printer of my book that provided this address (the one I gave them obviously didn’t have the unfortunate addition) or DHL UK. Either way, this warrants a letter of complaint.

Ups and downs, news good and bad. Everything in balance. Well, maybe not. The book is out and I like how it turned out.

Xinjiang finally explodes, Taipei remains silent [UPDATED]

On July 29 last year I published an op-ed titled “Much suffering in store for Uighurs,” in which I argued that despite the world’s attention directed at it because of the Olympic Games, there was a high likelihood that Beijing would not hesitate to use force against Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang after Commander Seyfullah, a self-styled leader of an extremist movement, claimed responsibility for a series of bombings earlier that year. Thankfully, I was wrong, and the world did not witness the crackdown I was expecting.

By no means did this signify, however, that the level of popular discontent with Beijing’s discriminatory policies, mass arrests, population displacements and extreme poverty (among the highest in China) was any less. In fact, it continued to build up among Uighurs, and it finally exploded in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, on Sunday, with mass protests pitting ethnic Uighur Muslims against the dominating Han Chinese (Uighurs are the largest ethnic group in Xinjiang, but not in Urumqi, where Han have been squeezing out the local population). According to reports, the protest, which involved between 1,000 and 3,000 demonstrators, spun out of control after protesters refused to disperse. Chinese security officials soon intervened, leaving at least 140 dead and as many as 828 injured, numbers that are expected to rise.

After the clashes, paramilitary police were marching on the streets, and parts of the city had been blocked. Internet access was cut, and many residents said their mobile phones didn’t work, in what was likely another attempt by Beijing to ensure that as few images of state repression came out of China as possible (Chinese state-controlled media showed graphic images of the violence on Monday, but all will have had to pass through Chinese censors).

Later on Monday, a new protest was being reported in Kashgar (the Chinese government has a controversial plan to destroy 85 percent of the old, historic part of the city as part of a “development” project).

The incident, Xinjiang Communist Party official Wang Lequan said, was “a profound lesson learned in blood,” and Beijing “must take the most resolute and strongest measures to deal with the enemies’ latest attempt at sabotage.” As usual, Beijing accused outside forces — in this instance exiled Uighur leader Rebiya Kadeer — of inciting the violence and attempting to “split” the country. “This was an incident remotely controlled, directed and incited from abroad, and executed inside the country,” a CCTV commentator said over images of the violence. “It was a planned and organized violent crime.”This begs the question: why, given state monitoring of Internet activity (specific Web sites were mentioned by the authorities), such organization would have been allowed to develop into a mass protest in the first place.

In the coming days, the international community, multilateral organizations like the UN and rights organizations will call on China to show restraint, and Beijing will counter by saying that the international community should mind its own business, as it is a domestic problem. The old minuet will play itself out, the dancers' legs will tire, and a few days from now everything will return to normal, with China continuing to play the role of Mecca for global merchants and investors.

Still, Xinjiang once again unmasks the murderous regime the Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) administration wants to establish friendly ties with. These are the officials in Beijing, those who give the orders to spill blood, with whom Ma and his henchmen are dealing. These are the decisionmakers who are closer than ever of realizing their dream of annexing Taiwan, which would turn Taiwanese into another ethnic minority in China, another group to silence, repress and crush.

As expected, the Ma administration has been silent about this latest instance of state repression in China, lest doing so offend its new friends. In his defense, Ma is returning from his visit to Central America, so it may have been difficult to make an official comment. But in his absence, other state organs should — but have yet to (and perhaps will not) — release statements on the matter. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had nothing; the Mainland Affairs Council’s spokesman’s phone, meanwhile, was off, with the deputy spokesman answering calls for comment by saying that it was the spokesman’s responsibility to issue comments on the matter. In other words, “no comment.”

So far, exiled Wu’er Kaixi — a student leader at Tiananmen Square and himself a Uighur — has been the sole voice of authority to come out of Taiwan condemning the slaughter.

The longer this silence continues, the longer Taipei fails to condemn in no uncertain terms the Chinese Communist Party’s repression, jailing and mass-slaying of Uighurs, Tibetans and ordinary Chinese, the harder it will be to continue calling Taiwan a beacon of freedom in Asia.

UPDATE: In as clear a sign as one could find that Uighurs face a serious handicap in obtaining international support amid the carnage, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said the US was “deeply concerned” about the reported deaths in Urumqi and called on both sides to “exercise restraint.” The problem for Uighurs is that States have been “deeply concerned” about Chinese authorities massacring their own population so often that the term has lost all meaning and has not traction whatsoever with Beijing. Furthermore, it is invidious to call on both sides to exercise restraint, as the power imbalance in the conflict could not be any starker. Gibbs’ comments create a moral equivalence that simply does not exist. Poor Uighurs. They come to the plate with already two strikes against them: they are a minority group in China, and they are Muslim.

UPDATE 2: The death toll from unrest in Xinjiang now stands at 156, with 1,080 injured. At this writing (Tuesday evening), the Presidential Office in Taipei continued to have “no comment.” This is despicable and unworthy of a democracy. If Taipei will not commit itself morally, Taiwanese must stage protests. However distant Xinjiang may be to them, these developments have implications for their future. Remaining isolated, keeping one’s head in the sand while Beijing massacres a minority group, is just unacceptable. Taiwanese must join hands with Tibetan refugees in Taiwan, Muslims and the few Uighurs who live here and take to the streets. They must condemn Beijing’s actions and equally criticize the Ma administration for its spineless silence.

UPDATE 3: (Warning: picture contains graphic content): Scanning the wire agency database for pictures of the situation in Xinjiang, I came across a series of extremely graphic photos and video grabs that bore the caption “Urumqi Government/Handout via Reuters TV,” which proves that the images have been approved for distribution by the authorities. Without exception, every picture of dead bodies had this caption and thus went through censors. Most pictures of the violence from the state-owned Xinhua news agency (or AP/Xinhua) tend to show the result of Muslim protests against the state — burned buses, overturned cars, defaced buildings.

But how do we explain Beijing’s candidness in allowing for the release of pictures of dead Uighur victims?

There is no doubt that the CCP propaganda machine is blaming the World Uighur Congress for “orchestrating” the violence (see, for example, cover of the Global Times), or that Beijing will claim to be fighting “Uighur, al-Qaeda-linked terrorists.” What does it think it can gain, therefore, by showing dead bodies of Uighurs in Urumqi? Is this, perhaps, meant as a warning against future protests — especially now that the government has given security officials permission to fire their weapons without warning shots? We can expect the bulk of pictures issued will continue to support the “Chinese victim of terrorism” falsehood; however, a few strategically released pictures that are ostensibly helpful the opposition’s cause — Uighurs — could be akin to killing the chicken to scare the monkey.

Historical quirks

With President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) visiting Central America last week, and the military coup in Honduras that saw President Manuel Zelaya exiled to Costa Rica, that part of the world has featured more prominently in Taiwanese media than it usually does. Still, this does not mean that the media — and sometimes the government — will get their facts right.

While doing some fact-checking for an article I was editing last week, I came upon a funny bit of news — on the Presidential Office Web site, of all places. During his remarks ahead of the inauguration of Panaman President Ricardo Martinelli Berrocal on July 1, Ma is quoted by the office’s Web site as having said that “the ROC [Republic of China] and Panama have a longstanding relationship, with diplomatic relations between the countries established back in 1909. This year marks the centennial of the founding of diplomatic ties between the two.”

One-hundredth anniversary of ROC-Panama ties. Wait — that’s impossible, given that the Republic of China was founded on Jan. 1, 1912. In 1909, it would have been the Qing Dynasty, not the ROC, establishing diplomatic relations with Panama. (Even more inaccurate was the same Presidential Office Web site on May 22, 2008, which had Ma saying that “the ROC (Taiwan) and Panama have close relations dating back many years. The two countries established diplomatic ties in 1909.”)

But who cares about such trifles, such little details, when the Ma administration continuously attempts to blur the lines between Taiwan and China at the political, epistemological and cultural level?

Announcement: Book Release

Dear friends of Taiwan,

I am thrilled to announce the release of my book Democracy in Peril: Taiwan’s struggle for survival from Chen Shui-bian to Ma Ying-jeou! More than two years in the making, Democracy in Peril comes at a critical period in Taiwan’s history, and its release could not be more timely. Over the next few weeks, my book will start being available at various bookstores and online. Already, it can be purchased at Amazon.com and barnes&noble.com (links below picture of the book, right), and the e-book can be directly purchased from the publisher at www.iuniverse.com. As bookstores may not have it in stock, you may have to special order it from them. Hopefully, it should also eventually be available at bookstores in Taiwan as well as on www.books.com.tw. I will try to organize a book launch in Taipei at some point. Please spread the word! This nation is worth it and the rest of the world needs to know what's going on.

Book description

Despite the warm reception in world capitals and favorable press coverage the cross-strait policies of Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou have received since he came into office on May 20, 2008, there is something rotten in Taipei. In just one year, the cost of closer relations with Beijing has become increasingly obvious in Taiwan, the small, officially unrecognized democracy of 23 million people, where police brutality, government meddling in the media and political persecution are reawakening the specter of its authoritarian past.

In a timely collection of essays and reportage written during the last 18 months of the Chen Shui-bian administration and Ma’s first year in office, Democracy in Peril offers a history of the present in Taiwan as this vibrant democracy and economic powerhouse strives for international recognition under the constant fear of Chinese invasion. It shows how the greatest threat to the nation’s survival now possibly comes from within, under a government that has proven divisive and whose efforts to improve relations with China could come at an unbearable price — not only to Taiwanese, but to the entire world.

Paperback: 440 pages
Publisher: iUniverse.com (June 25, 2009)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 1440150591
ISBN-13: 978-1440150593
Product Dimensions: 9 x 6 x 0.9 inches
Price: Trade Paperback US$27.95 (e-book US$6.00)

Richard Bush on Beijing’s odd behavior

Richard Bush III, director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington, had an interesting piece in the China Times on June 27 (English version available here), in which he rightly points out that despite cross-strait rapprochement, China continues to modernize its military in a manner that undermines Taiwan’s sense of security, something I have long argued on this blog and elsewhere.

Bush calls it an “intriguing development” that “the People’s Liberation Army’s [PLA] procurement and deployment of equipment that puts Taiwan at risk continue[s] unabated” despite the conciliatory measures launched by President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) since he came into office on May 20 last year. Bush, citing Pentagon sources, puts the number of short- and medium-range missiles China directs at Taiwan at between 1,050 and 1,150 (lower than Taiwanese military assessments of 1,400-plus), a growth rate that, while lower than in previous years (about 100 annually), nevertheless raises the question “what is going on?”

As Bush explains, Beijing’s rationale for upgrading its military and adopting an increasingly aggressive posture vis-à-vis Taiwan was easily explained in the past 15 years, when Taiwan was ruled by governments that pushed for independence. That buildup served as a deterrent should Taiwan declare independence, and in that respect it may have succeeded.

Bush then raises the possibility that China’s continued military development in surface ships, submarines, fourth-generation aircraft and cyber-warfare, among others, may not be intended (at least not solely) for a Taiwan contingency. The Chinese military’s five-year arms acquisition cycle may be responsible for the continued buildup, Bush says, adding that if this was the case, substantial change in posture should be expected in 2011, when the next cycle begins. This could also be the result of institutional forces, Bush argues, in which the PLA continues apace despite changes at the strategic level. This, however, is difficult to imagine, as President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) also doubles as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, which directly controls the armed forces.

A last option, Bush says, is that despite cross-strait détente, the Chinese leadership does not believe that the “threat” of Taiwanese independence has disappeared, with a reversal possible after 2012 if Ma failed to be re-elected. This is an interesting point, as it involves an appreciation by Beijing of the democratic forces that drive policy in Taiwan.

Regardless of the reason(s) why the PLA’s modernization and threatening stance remain unchanged, Bush argues that this is bound to undercut Ma’s policy and undermine Taiwanese confidence in his ability to diminish the Chinese military threat. Ma’s failure to deliver on the economy, coupled with his inability to address the threat of military invasion, could have serious ramifications for his chances to get re-elected in 2012. While the first failure is mostly the fault of the Ma administration, the second is entirely China’s doing, as Ma has done all the right things — sometimes at the expense of Taiwan’s security and democratic voice — to appease Beijing.

With Beijing’s failure to reciprocate on security issues — a “strategic opportunity,” as Bush calls it — the US will have every incentive to continue selling Taiwan the modern weapons it needs to defend itself. Even if the PLA buildup were not aimed at Taiwan, incertitude and the lack of transparence that surrounds the Chinese military will compel both Taipei and Washington to continue, if not accelerate, arms procurement, thus perpetuating the vicious circle that led to an arms buildup in the Taiwan Strait.

This is an encouraging piece by Bush, whose preference for the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) over the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party is no secret, as it acknowledges the limitations, if not possible failure, of the Ma administration’s efforts to create rapprochement with Beijing. It certainly is a refreshing read, amid all the reports by so-called experts and wire agencies that can barely resist shouting “peace in the Taiwan Strait” from the rooftops.

The Associated Press lists Taiwan as “Not Free”

Letter to Laura Ingalls, Press Officer, Freedom House, and Bo Tedards, Director, International Cooperation Department, Taiwan Foundation for Democracy

Dear Ms Ingalls, Mr Tedards,

[…] In January I attended in Taipei Freedom House’s release of its annual Freedom in the World index, where I had a chance to interact with Mr Christopher Walker, director of studies at Freedom House, and Ms Sarah Cook, Asia researcher, among others. In your map, As you know, Taiwan was listed as “Free” for 2008, while China was “Not Free.”

However, in one of its graphics dated June 24, The Associated Press reproduced the map of freedom — sourced Freedom House — in which Taiwan was the same color as China and therefore “Not Free” for 2008, which, despite a recent erosion of democracy and free speech under the administration of President Ma Ying-jeou, obviously contradicts your findings for that year.

It is my intention with this letter to bring this to your attention, as it either misrepresents your organization’s findings or portrays Taiwan as being part of China. On both counts, this is wrong and Freedom House should request that AP correct the error.

Sincerely,
J. Michael Cole
Taipei

Musings on a day off

Thanks to the idiosyncratic Council of Labor Affairs rules that govern us, editors at the Taipei Times have to work two extra days every month to accumulate sufficient hours to be considered full-time employees. What this means for those overworked personnes à tout faire is that every other week, we only get one day off rather than two, like everybody else.

For yours truly, this week was one such weekend, 24 precious hours that are invariably insufficient to recharge one’s batteries after six days of storming the beaches to meet deadlines (those who imagine armies of editors and sub-editors as in the movies or at, say, the New York Times, would be amazed by how few people can manage, often against incredible odds, to put out a 20-page newspaper seven days a week, 365 days a year). What one does on such a day is usually dictated by whatever amount of energy is left, which isn’t much. For me, it usually involves discovering new areas of the criminally underrated city that is Taipei. Ironically, and for reasons that could only possibly be explained by some demon (as George Orwell), it is also the time of the week when I do most of my thinking about Taiwan’s status and meaning within the international community.

After an insufficient amount of sleep (one must make the best use of those 24 hours), I headed for the Shida (Taiwan Normal University) neighborhood for an exquisite lunch of Lebanese/Israeli food ad Sababa, where I had a delicious platter of pita and hummus that would rival any I’ve had in Montreal or Ottawa, two cities that have large Lebanese communities. Sitting on the patio and absorbed in James Cameron’s (the British reporter, not the American moviemaker) highly recommendable memoirs Point of Departure, I delighted in hearing the different languages that were being spoken at the tables — Mandarin, Taiwanese, Russian, Filipino, English and French (ok, that was me on the phone) — which reflects well upon Taipei’s embracing of various cultures.

Braving the sweltering 35 degree Celsius temperature, I then walked over to this charming little store on Xinsheng South Road called Taiouan, which a day earlier had informed me that the book I had ordered, A Taste of Freedom: Memoirs of a Formosa Independence Leader by Peng Ming-min (彭明敏, seen left), had arrived (Peng also has a new Chinese-language book, titled A Perfect Escape, on the same subject, and Taiouan also has a DVD of interviews he gave after his return from exile in 1992). The store is worth visiting, as it holds a fantastic collection of books, maps, CDs, DVDs, T-shirts and paraphernalia on Taiwan, Aborigines and the country’s history. It will definitely be one of the first stores I approach when my book, Democracy in Peril, becomes available (sometime next month).

After my purchase I lingered in the neighborhood, which never fails to remind me of the famous Plateau Mont Royal in Montreal, what with its many bars, cafes, architectural style and on the whole sentiment artistique. I randomly picked a café that, as it turns out, had a very good selection of Belgian beer — something that, for some reason, this neighborhood has in abundance. Inspired by the European-esque, wooden feel to the place, I flipped through Peng’s book, then returned my attention to Cameron, every now and then looking at the world outside the window. Once again, as I have done countless times since moving to Taiwan three-and-a-half years ago, I realized how fortunate I was to live here among this exceptional, accomplished, hard-working, tolerant, welcoming and humble people, in one of those rare places in Asia where democracy and freedom of expression are an applied reality rather than some vague concept.

Looking at the students and young adults wandering the streets, it made me realize, too, how oblivious most seemed to be to the serious challenges their country is facing, as little by little China’s plan to annex Taiwan is progressing, with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government of Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) acting as a facilitator. Two tables behind me, a couple was engaging in an animated argument about the KMT and the leader of the opposition, Democratic Progressive Party Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文). But to me the scene was like a microcosm of reality in Taiwan: Inside, a few worried about the future of this country, while outside everybody went on with their lives as if nothing was wrong.

Reading a passage in Cameron’s book about the Korean War, my thoughts wandered again, this time on the fact that Taiwan’s democratization and liberation from authoritarian rule — coming full circle, as the book by Peng that I had just purchased deals with his arrest and exile from Taiwan under KMT authoritarian rule, let alone the fact that Peng once studied at McGill University in Montreal — was one of the rare examples of a successful peaceful revolution. No one ever picked up arms to challenge the KMT; no lynching or public trials occurred after Martial Law was lifted. Individuals like Peng, Chen Chu (陳菊), Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), Annette Lu (呂秀蓮), Chen Yu-hsi (陳玉璽), Reverend Kao Chun-ming (高俊明), Li Ao (李敖) and Shih Ming-teh (施明德), along with their friends abroad, never made recourse to force to change things; all used the legal system (whatever its worth back then), contacts and dialogue to turn things around, an accomplishment that, though far less known, is arguably equally as important as India’s non-violent campaign under Gandhi to end British colonial rule. I say equally important because it puts the lie to the argument that democracy is impossible in “Chinese civilization” and serves as a guiding light for the 1.3 billion Chinese who to this day continue to live under a regime that brooks no opposition. I wish I could have said more about this in my book, but as is often the case, it is only once a manuscript is with the publisher that one’s best ideas emerge. Maybe not ideas themselves, but rather a certain clarity about them.

I often wonder if that success, peaceful as it was, may not have come at a price, especially now when the old demons seem to be rearing their heads once again. Is it not impossible that by virtue of their tranquility, peaceful revolutions are not as readily acknowledged by the international community, in that they do not leave the indelible mark on global consciousness as, say, the violent overthrow of a dictator like Romania’s Nicolae Ceauşescu? Is democracy achieved through non-violence cheaper than that which was gained at the price of blood, of violence made real by the global media? Is it easier to ignore, or to dispense with, than its murderous, vengeful kind? And perhaps more importantly, are peaceful revolutions quickly forgotten by the authors and their descendants, the significance of their achievements played down by the fact that they provided no sudden gasp of violence? Is this why the world doesn't seem to care about Taiwan’s fate today? Are young Taiwanese today, who seem so apolitical and oblivious to the storm that is gathering around them, less aware of the importance of what happened in the 1970s and 1980s than people of the same age in, say, Guatemala, El Salvador, South Korea or Spain? Are young Taiwanese today interested when an old democracy activist like Peng releases a new book about his life under an authoritarian regime? Do they even know who he is?

So much for a newsperson’s precious one day off. Arvo Pärt is playing in the background. Time to let go, to turn the mind off for a few hours.

China embraces market capitalism? Think again

The Heritage Foundation’s Derek Scissors had a fine piece in the May/June issue of Foreign Affairs magazine (“Deng Undone: The cost of halting market reform in China”), in which he argues that after embracing market reform during the Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) era, China under President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) and Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶) has backtracked on reform, with the state gaining more, rather than relinquishing, control over the private sector.

Scissors’ analysis is told from an economist’s perspective and can be seen as problematic, given that it presumes to give advice to the Chinese leadership after the style of free market capitalism he advocates sparked the global financial crisis that is currently upon us. I might add that my personal views on how countries should run their economies is slightly more socialist than the capitalist style the Heritage Foundation has long embraced.

These differences notwithstanding, Scissors’ piece is quite informative for two principal reasons. First, it exposes the myth that China is continuing reform and gradually embracing capitalism by showing that in recent years some companies that had nominally gone private remained under state control, while others — especially in the largely undefined “sensitive” sectors — have either been pushed behind layers of state controls or altogether renationalized. The intricacies of these developments, from state monopolies to price control mechanisms, state bank lending to protectionism, are beyond the scope of this article and Scissors is far more qualified than me to address them. Suffice it to say that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is showing signs that while it continues to seek economic development, it may be giving more importance to its grip on social and financial institutions than is commonly believed. (As Scissors observed, in 2006 the number of Chinese who owned a business dropped 15 percent to 26 million, while official data showed that during the first nine months of 2007 private companies contributed less than 10 percent of national tax revenues, a figure that reportedly dropped early last year.)

Ironically, the second aspect of Scissors’ article that warrants attention is left largely ignored by the author: The political ramifications of China’s volte-face on economic reform. This matter gains special meaning when it comes to recent moves by the Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) administration and its Chinese counterparts to liberalize cross Taiwan Strait investment. As Scissors points out, state control of private or semiprivate firms means that company heads tend to be CCP officials who are either “retired” or part of a cycle whereby officials alternate between corporate and government positions. Chinese investment in Taiwanese companies, therefore, means that behind the veneer of private-sector investment likely lies the invisible hand of the state.

For the moment, certain sectors, such as telecommunications and defense, remain off-limits to Chinese investment, but we can expect those restrictions to be lifted over time, both as a result of political pressure from China and Taiwanese companies themselves. We have already observed this with the attempt by China Mobile to buy a 12 percent stake in Far EasTone Telecommunications, Taiwan’s second-largest telecommunications operator (China Mobile’s chairman, Wang Jianzhou [王建宙], is a CCP official who has occupied various posts in government). Despite restrictions by the Taiwanese government, board members at Far EasTone have voted in favor of the investment and we can expect the company to soon start pressuring Taipei to lift the restrictions.

Equally, if not more, disturbing was news that the Taiwanese government-owned Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation, which among other things designs the Ching Kuo Indigenous Defense Fighter, is proposing cooperating with the Commercial Aircraft Co of China (COMAC) to co-assemble commercial airplanes. Shareholders of COMAC include, among others, the Chinese central government and the municipal government of Shanghai. The chairman of the board, Zhang Qingwei (张庆伟), is chairman of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense of the People’s Republic of China.

These two examples involve transparent attempts by Chinese-state-owned companies to invest in Taiwan. In light of signs that Beijing is retrenching on market reform and strengthening its grip on the private sector, future investments in Taiwanese companies could be made by Chinese firms that, on paper, may seem to be private but that in reality are very much under the control of the state. The security implications as Chinese investment intensifies (a 12 percent stake in Far EasTone, for example, could just be an opening move) and starts involving a greater number of sectors, the potential for technology transfer, espionage and compromised security will only increase. To ensure national security, Taiwanese will have to be extremely vigilant, even when a prospective Chinese investor is ostensibly a private company. With Chinese state banks dominating the lending market and the CCP spreading its tentacles in various sectors of the Chinese economy, it will be essential to determine where the money comes from, and who’s in charge.

Let’s not be deceived: China has not embraced market capitalism to the extent that its political aspirations would take a backseat.

This article appeared in the July 1 issue of the Taipei Times under the title China's capitalism of compromise .

Touching, but how utterly unjust

In its June 21 edition, the New York Times carried a feature by Simon Romero titled “Adopting Forebears’ Faith and Leaving Peru for Israel,” which describes the story of the more than 400 Peruvian descendants of Jewish pioneers who converted to Judaism in the past decade and relocated to Israel.

Most of the “new” Jews in Iquitos, located deep in the Peruvian jungles, were descendants of Jews from Morocco, Gibraltar, Malta, Britain, France and other countries, who settled in Peru in the late 19th century in search of adventure, many of whom seeking to make a fortune in the rubber trade, which was booming at the time. After the rubber trade collapsed, many left Iquitos, others died from disease, while some married locals and became assimilated, losing touch with their faith.

Toward the end of the 1990s, a revival of sorts occurred and the descendants felt a need to reconnect with their Jewish ancestry. Víctor Edery, a patriarch in Iquitos, began holding religious ceremonies at his home; by the beginning of this decade, the Jews of Iquitos were observing Shabbat every Friday as well as holy days. They learned Hebrew from cassette tapes, and launched a campaign to be officially recognized as Jews and to be allowed to emigrate to Israel.

There was a problem, however: As most of the Jews who settled in Peru in the late 1800s were men, the great majority of descendants today could not claim to have Jewish mothers, which through a strict interpretation of Jewish law means that they cannot be Jews. They nevertheless succeeded in convincing Guillermo Bronstein, the chief rabbi at the largest Ashkenazi synagogue in the capital, Lima, to perform two large conversions. This done, hundreds of new Jews from Iquitos emigrated to the home of their ancestors, Israel.

While it is moving to see individuals reconnect with their past and adopt a faith that suits their spiritual needs, this otherwise touching story masks an ugly injustice in Judaism and Israel: While new converts and descendants of Jews who have lived abroad for more than a century are allowed to move to Israel, the descendants of the estimated 700,000 Palestinians who were forced out of their homes during the Nakba (“catastrophe”) — the birth of Israel — are not allowed to return to their homeland, generation after generation forced to live in desultory conditions in refugee camps throughout the Middle East. According to the UNRWA agency, there are more than 4.6 million Palestinian refugees today, and none has a right of return, while new converts to Judaism in distant Iquitos, Peru, can do so by simply converting. Even more troubling is the fact that some of the Palestinians who saw their entire villages destroyed in a campaign of terror to make way for the birth of Israel are still alive today; none of the descendants covered in Mr. Romero’s feature had any attachment to Israeli/Palestinian soil in 1948. In fact most, if not all, were not even born when it happened. And yet, the latter have a “right of return” conferred by religion.

Moreover, under right-wing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s illegal settlements in the West Bank, which now houses more than 250,000 Israelis, will continue to expand, further encroaching on, and disconnecting people from, Palestinian land. Some such settlements could, one day, conceivably accommodate the newly arrived converts featured in the Times story — a beautiful one at that, were it not for the fact that it comes at the cost of a grievous injustice against a dispossessed people.

Beijing makes itself an ‘indispensable’ ally

Ever since the Agreed Framework, signed in 1994 between the Bill Clinton administration and North Korea, crumbled sometime in 2002, Beijing — Pyongyang’s principal backer — has successfully positioned itself as an indispensable ally in global efforts to denuclearize its neighbor. Throughout the years, China has come to be seen as a convener of the Six Party talks and, given its relations with Pyongyang, as a lever to keep Kim Jong-il’s regime from sparking war in the Korean Peninsula.

China’s involvement in the Six Party talks has conveniently dovetailed with its attempts to reassure its neighbors — and the West — that it is rising peacefully, and that as an emerging power it is ready to act as a responsible stakeholder. At the same time, Beijing has also managed to serve as a buffer and to mitigate international responses to Pyongyang’s long streak of seemingly irrational brinkmanship. For both sides in the conflict, therefore, China has increasingly become an indispensable moderator, a balancing power reining in North Korea when it threatens to act out of bounds and pacifying jittery South Korea, Japan and the US whenever Pyongyang conducted nuclear tests or launched ballistic missiles.

Despite its hardening stance on North Korea in recent weeks and backing of a UN Security Council resolution strengthening a package of sanctions against Pyongyang, the fact remains that China is an ally of North Korea, and the unknowns surrounding the depth of its ties with Kim’s regime may have acted as a deterrent against countries like South Korea, Japan and the US that would perhaps have resorted to force by now to resolve the nuclear impasse. How would China react if North Korea were attacked preemptively? Memories of China’s entry into the Korean War of 1950-1953, added to the high secrecy surrounding Beijing’s relations with Pyongyang, have made a military solution far more problematic.

Give some, get some

Beijing is unlikely to have assumed its role as moderator solely out of altruism; its position has been beneficial to its image, and in the process it has managed to extract concessions in a way that is reminiscent of the gains it made when the Richard Nixon administration sought its help in the Cold War (to isolate the Soviet Union) and the Vietnam War (to stop supporting North Vietnamese), a precedent that should not escape our attention.

Washington, meanwhile, has exacerbated Beijing’s image of itself as an indispensable ally and become unhealthily dependent on Chinese participation in the disarmament talks, often at the expense of regional allies. Nothing underscored this reality more than comments by Stephen Bosworth, the US’ special envoy to North Korea, who has made no secret of his position that China’s leverage on Pyongyang trumps such “annoyances” as Taiwanese independence and the fate of two US journalists kidnapped by the North. Sadly, through Bosworth may have been more blunt than other officials, he isn’t the only one at the US State Department and elsewhere to believe that the West can afford to pay a price to ensure China’s continued role in the North Korea talks.

Long used to a style of diplomacy whereby political gifts come at a price, Beijing has been fully aware of the West’s growing dependence on it regarding North Korea and has used its position to soften Washington’s support for Taiwan, among others, which could explain the George W. Bush administration’s volte-face after 2001, drifting from strong support for Taiwan to nearly unending condemnation of the Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) administration (the timing of Bush’s change of heart on Taiwan and escalating tensions in the Korean Peninsula could not be more obvious).

With North Korea’s isolation intensifying in recent years, China’s trade and investment with it increased by more than 40 percent year-on-year to US$2.793 billion last year, and throughout the nuclear impasse Beijing has continued high-level contacts with its counterparts in Pyongyang while managing most of Pyongyang’s financial transactions (some banks have now stopped doing so). Many experts have not illogically drawn the conclusion that despite close diplomatic relations and economic ties, Beijing has been unable to influence the North’ decisions regarding its nuclear program.

Status quo as a goal

Another, less explored possibility is that Beijing is exploiting its ambiguous relationship with Pyongyang to create some sort of a status quo, whereby the North Korea nuclear issue is never fully resolved, as an end to the conflict would severely diminish Beijing’s ability to bargain with the international community. Consequently, while it has proven amenable to Western policies and UN action on North Korea, Beijing has just as often worked to water down UNSC resolutions or pushed for further Six Party talks, a policy that, while ostensibly rational, has ensured that the North could continue to threaten its neighbors, reactivate its nuclear weapons program and test fire missiles in defiance of international law. That ambiguity, along with doubts that Beijing is fully committed to forcing Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear ambitions, was reinforced around June 10 when reports emerged that Kim’s third son, Kim Jong-un, had visited Beijing and met with Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) and other senior Chinese officials.

It is evident, therefore, that the perpetuation of the status quo is in Beijing’s advantage, as it helps bolster its image of a positive force in the region while it gains concessions from the US and others on core issues such as human rights and, above all, Taiwan. This is not to say that China relishes a nuclear North Korea that could spark a destabilizing war in the Korean Peninsula. But if it manages its neighbor well — not allowing it to spark a war while preventing the international community from disarming it, effectively playing one camp against the other — Pyongyang can be used by Beijing as a precious instrument to buttress the foundations of its rise while achieving its political objectives.

Ironically, over-reliance on China by Japan, South Korea and the US on the North Korean nuclear issue could make it less likely that the problem will be resolved, and more probable that they will end up giving too much to ensure that China continues its “indispensable” role on the matter.

A slightly different version of this article appeared in the Taipei Times on June 25.

Chinese navy gets too close for comfort

A recent collision involving the destroyer USS John S McCain and a Chinese submarine near the Subic Bay off the coast of the Philippines received little press coverage, largely as a result of the US playing down the incident and saying it saw no indication of harassment by Chinese.

The incident occurred on June 11, when a Chinese submarine collided with the destroyer’s sonar array, a device that tracks underwater sounds. While the US Navy has provided little specifics about the exact location of the collision, the incident is believed to have occurred 230km off Subic Bay in the Mindoro Strait, which places it in international waters. Unnamed navy officials did not specify whether the submarine was an attack boat or a ballistic-missile sub.

A few days after the collision, the US Navy confirmed that the McCain had been tracking the Chinese sub, and Chinese officials confirmed that the submarine was Chinese.

While sonar arrays are dragged by a cable than can be as long as 1.6km, the incident has nevertheless raised questions as it occurred in international waters and, in nautical terms, the submarine had come dangerously close to the destroyer.

As the Navy Times reported on June 19, while the collision follows recent incidents involving US and Chinese vessels, it did not appear to be deliberate and was not construed as Chinese harassment. More likely, as John Arquilla, professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School said, the Chinese submarine was stalking the McCain to test its detection abilities and response.

Still, Arquilla said, “We should hear alarm bells go off every time we have incidents of this sort … What I see in this pattern of incidents is a growing capability of the Chinese to use stealthy navy assets to get close to our larger and more visible ships.”

As China’s interpretation of its so-called “Special Economic Zone” is not fixed and tends to spread outwards, this latest incident demonstrates that “accidents” will likely become more common, especially in areas disputed by Taiwan, China, the Philippines and Vietnam, among others. The potential for accidents sparking more serious conflict is therefore growing exponentially, especially as China’s neighbors will likely respond to an increasingly modern and adventurous Chinese navy by modernizing their own naval capabilities and becoming equally more aggressive.

Beyond the problem of contested sea lanes and areas, this incident is the latest in a long list of indicators that the Chinese navy is becoming more capable and daring, even at a significant distance from its littoral waters. (Such experience as it has accumulated off the coast of Somalia as a participant in multinational anti-piracy efforts may already be paying dividends.) It also shows that in a Taiwan Strait contingency, the Chinese navy would be in a position to harass US and/or Japanese battle groups dispatched to the area at an increasing distance from the strait, thus severely compromising those allies’ ability to come to Taiwan’s aid — and perhaps even making them more reluctant to do so.

Aside from displaying Chinese capabilities, incidents such as this one send a signal to Washington that the seas it had long controlled will no longer be navigated unhampered.

Reconsidering China’s ‘peaceful rise’

Those who believe that Beijing intends China’s “rise” to be a “peaceful” one should consider a pair of excellent articles published in the May and current issues of the US Naval Institute’s Proceedings magazine.

The first article, “On the Verge of a Game-Changer” by Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, addresses the substantial amount of technical research and academic publications in China surrounding its program to develop antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs).* With credible intelligence suggesting that Beijing is pursuing an ASBM based on a variant of the DF-21/CSS-5 solid propellant medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), which has a range exceeding 1,500km, China could be on the brink of undermining the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty signed by Washington and Moscow in 1988 preventing both countries from possessing conventional and nuclear ground-launched ballistic (and cruise) missiles with ranges between 500km and 5.5km.

While there is agreement in academic circles that China’s “rise” is largely “peaceful” except for the question of Taiwan, the development of ASBMs putting Japan and the Philippines (and Taiwan, of course) within range implies that Chinese military planners may have other contingencies in mind. In other words, the “peaceful” rise may be little more than propaganda.

The second article, “An Undersea Deterrent?” by Erickson and Michael Chase, addresses the emergence of China’s second-generation of nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) — the Type 094, or Jin-class. Beyond the possibility that they are meant to bolster China’s great power status, SSBNs could be part of a “nuclear dyad” composed of land-based strategic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to enhance the credibility of China’s nuclear deterrent. It would also substantially increase China’s power-projection capabilities outside its territorial waters, which again points to a strategic view that goes well beyond a Taiwan contingency. The article quotes Toshi Yoshihara of the Naval War College as saying that “for at least the next two decades, missile defense … will have no answer to a capable SSBN patrolling the open ocean.”

Both articles are excellent and deserve a close reading, and both point to alarming developments in the Chinese navy that could well spark an arms race in the region, as the authors argue. Of course the ASBM program and the SSBNs could simply be the outcome of Beijing making substantial increases in its military budget in recent years — in other words, large injections of money in the military-industrial complex will inevitably result in research programs and academic debates on the feasibility of various projects. But as has often been observed, once a weapons system is designed, it tends to gain a life of its own and to drive policy, rather than the other way around, which could bode ill for the region.

* Besides differences in launch mechanisms (e.g., cruise missiles never leave the atmosphere as they home in on a target, doing so more like an aircraft) and targeting, the principal distinguishing factor between the two means of delivery is that ballistic missiles such as the ASBMs discussed in this article are almost impossible to intercept. The implication is that to protect itself from a ballistic missile attack, an opponent must target the source; in the present case, this would involve striking launchers on Chinese territory, which could quickly lead to escalation.

Toshi Yoshihara also has an interesting piece on the Chinese navy in the current issue of The Diplomat.

Israel and Taiwan: Two US allies — different worlds

Not so long ago, when Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) of the Democratic Progressive Party was president of Taiwan, Washington berated him for seeking UN membership for Taiwan or holding referendums on the matter. By acting with dignity and democratically, Chen was somehow endangering the peace in the Taiwan Strait, acting provocatively and threatening the precious “status quo.”

Fast-forward to Monday this week, when the leader of another US democratic ally — this time Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — delivered a major policy speech that for all intents and purposes scuttled any chance of peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Finally “bowing” to pressure from US President Barack Obama, Netanyahu did for the first time mention the words “Palestinian state,” but as one Israeli writer put it, he uttered those words “like a rotten tooth pulled from its socket without anesthesia.”

In his speech, the hardline Netanyahu also abandoned previous peace strategies, made no reference to Muslims’ connection to the land, and refused to freeze Israel’s illegal settlements in the West Bank. He also avoided mention of an Arab initiative that would grant recognition to Israel in exchange for a full Israeli withdrawal from land it captured in the war of 1967. His request that Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state also killed any chance of right of return for Palestinian refugees who have live abroad — often in refugee camps — since they (or their ancestors) were expelled at the creation of the State of Israel in 1948.

His conditions for a Palestinian state, meanwhile, included ironclad security guarantees, full disarmament in Palestine, no Palestinian control of airspace, no right to form military alliances, and Israeli sovereignty over all of Jerusalem — all of which would make it impossible for Palestine to be a viable state.

Netanyahu’s tone, journalist Akiva Eldar wrote in the Israeli Ha’aretz newspaper, was “degrading and disrespectful … that’s not how one brings down a wall of enmity between two nations, that’s not how trust is built.”

And yet, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said yesterday that Netanyahu’s speech was “a big step forward,” while Obama said he saw “positive movement.” German Chancellor Angela Merkel, meanwhile, called it a “first, important step in the right direction toward realizing a two-state solution,” former US president Bill Clinton saw Netanyahu’s speech as “opening moves,” while the EU dubbed it “a step in the right direction.” All of a sudden, Gertrude Stein’s rose no longer was a rose.

To be fair, many still insisted that Israeli should freeze its settlements. But that is beside the point. Rather than be cause for optimism, Netanyahu’s speech spelled disaster and may have been made to ward off pressure from Obama. In other words, Netanyahu remains a hardline who yields to the whims of the Israeli religious right-wing. Palestinians and pretty much the rest of the Arab world saw through this and will reasonably treat the speech for what it was — empty rhetoric. Violence will eventually resume, and Palestinians will once again be blamed for snubbing yet another “peace” initiative by an Israeli leader.

It is ironic that in their criticism of Chen, the US and the West — which all endeavored to frustrate his efforts to join the UN or hold referendums — never once qualified their criticism with calls on China to stop threatening Taiwan with 1,400 missiles and military maneuvers, or block it from joining multilateral organizations. Chen exercised democracy and was reviled for doing so. Netanyahu undoes years of peace efforts and is hailed as taking a step in the right direction. Chen was a “troublemaker,” an “extremist” who threatened peace in the Taiwan Strait yet never departed from democratic norms or relied on force to achieve his political aims. Netanyahu, who never shied from unleashing the might of his military, is taking “big steps forward” by aborting peace and seeking, quite undemocratically, we must add, to turn Israel into an exclusionary “Jewish state” based on “race” and/or religion.

Granted, Israel and Taiwan are a poor analogy at best, and the challenges they face to their survival as nations are substantially different. But both, in Washington’s book, are supposedly on the “right” side, our side, and both are supplied with billions of dollars in US weaponry. Why, then, the different treatment?

A slightly different version of this article appeared in the Taipei Times on June 22 under the title “An unenlightened double standard.”