The dangerous politics of ethnicity

Little did I know when I sat down to write an article about the dangers of using the “ethnic” card in cross-strait relations that, days later, vice chairman of China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) Zhang Mingqing (張銘清), in Taiwan for a visit, would be “pushed” to the ground by demonstrators during a visit at a Confucian temple in Tainan. Reacting to the incident, Beijing officials said Zhang, who shortly afterwards announced he would cut short his visit to Taiwan and return to China today, was “violently attacked by some extremists, seriously violating his safety and dignity” and expressed “strong indignation and condemnation at this type of uncivilized behavior,” demanding “severe punishment of the culprits.”

Leaving aside the fact that the “uncivilized behavior” the Chinese spokesperson was deploring occurs on a state-sanctioned daily basis throughout China and involves acts of violence that go far beyond shoving, it remains that such incidents (and I do not condone, in any way, shape or form the use of violence to achieve political ends) could play into the hands of demagogues on either side of the Taiwan Strait who seek to turn the conflict into one of “ethnicity,” with China and “Chinese compatriots in Taiwan” — in other words Taiwanese who are in favor of “unification” — on one side, and Taiwanese who oppose it on the other.

As I argue in "Danger in playing ethnicity card," published today in the Taipei Times, this road can only lead to catastrophe and, somewhere down the road, could in the extreme invite a military attack against Taiwan, under the guise of the Chinese military seeking to help its “ethnic” kin and/or restore order, for which there are many historical precedents worldwide.

However minor the incident (it wasn’t the “violent attack” the Chinese spokesperson claimed it was) involving Zhang on Tuesday, the pan-green camp and Taiwanese across the political spectrum should quickly condemn the use of violence and thereby retain the moral high ground. Some could argue that the Chinese, what with their constant threat of invasion, military exercises simulating an assault on Taiwan, firing of missiles off the waters of Taiwan in 1996 and unflagging repression of Taiwanese, had it coming. But violence can only breed more violence and takes us down a dangerous path — one that encourages the reliance on, and feeds off, the “ethnic” card.

PRC spooks back in Taiwan

In July this year, Taiwan’s Government Information Office (GIO) announced, among other policy relaxations, the resumption of the posting of Xinhua News Agency and People’s Daily correspondents in Taiwan, the “first step in implementing President Ma Ying-jeou’s [馬英九] policy to normalize the process for correspondents from the two sides of the Taiwan Strait to carry out newsgathering activities in each other’s territories.”

Queried on the matter on July 17, Mainland Affairs Council Vice Chairman Johnnason Liu (劉德勳) said that Xinhua reporters had not been suspended from Taiwan in 2005 because of “hostile” reporting on Taiwan following China’s enactment of the Anti-Secession Law, but rather because their reporting was “extremely divergent from the actual facts.”

But the situation now, Liu said, is “slightly different,” likely a reference to the rapprochement between the Ma administration and Beijing, adding that “the executive agencies cannot request the media to do reporting or to make guarantees for their reports, [as] this is an absolute precondition of media freedom.” Absolutely.

The problem, however, lies less with whether Xinhua, as a state-owned news agency, will provide skewed reporting on Taiwan (it will), and more with the fact that it serves as a cover for Chinese intelligence officers — something any intelligence agency with counter-intelligence capabilities will tell you. In fact, according to an unnamed Western intelligence service with a solid reputation for its counter-intelligence efforts against the People’s Republic of China (PRC), officials always assume that any new Xinhua reporter posted to the country either works for or colludes with Chinese intelligence. Given the situation in the Taiwan Strait, there is no reason to assume that the function of Xinhua in Taiwan would be any different.

As per new regulations, Chinese correspondents will be given one-time permits valid for three months that can be extended once for three months after getting approval by government agencies concerned. Chinese correspondents already posted in Taiwan will also be able to apply for an extension if the requirement arises. GIO Minister Vanessa Shih (史亞平) also said that to make the application process more convenient for Chinese correspondents, renewable entry and exit permits valid for one year will be issued.

With a greater influx of Chinese coming to Taiwan following the Ma administration’s new policies, the return of Xinhua reporters (and perhaps, starting next year, the arrival of Chinese students at Taiwan’s universities), Beijing finds itself in a far better position to collect intelligence on Taiwan’s defense, command-and-control, communication, emergency preparedness, media and civilian infrastructure. We can also expect Xinhua to establish list of names from the opposition and to be present at any anti-Ma demonstrations organized by the pan-green camp, including the one planned for Oct. 25.

“Reciprocity” and media “freedom” are a deceit, as they continue to be conspicuously absent on China’s part. Through this measure, however, the Ma administration has ensured, by design or omission, that names and pictures of various opposition figures in Taiwan will be circulated in Beijing’s vast intelligence apparatus.

Perhaps we’d better find out who they are and what they look like…

A world transformed: Why Taiwan gets its weapons

Less than a month ago, with the US Congress set to go into recess, very few but the overly optimistic would have ventured that Taiwan would get the go-ahead from Washington to buy the series of weapons it has long sought to obtain. In fact, most analysts were of the opinion that the “arms freeze” on Taiwan would soon congeal into something long-term, if not permanent.

Then, on October 3, Washington announced that it had given the green light on US$6.5 billion in weapons sales to Taiwan, including AH-64D Apache helicopters, PAC-3 air defense systems, Javelin anti-tank missile systems, submarine-launched Harpoon anti-ship missiles, as well as F-16 and E-2T parts. (Not released, however, were UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters and 66 F-16C/D aircraft.)

Washington’s decision took most by surprise, not the least Beijing, which after months of being led to believe, based on its reading of the signals coming from Washington, that the US had finally agreed to China’s interpretation of the so-called “one China” principle, lashed out in anger, threatening “grave” consequences for US-China relations. (Rather than agree with Beijing on Taiwan's status, the “arms freeze” was more the result of US unwillingness or inability to spark a new arms race in Asia, where its allies must remain weak enough military to require a permanent US military presence, as with Japan and South Korea, or over-the-horizon US capabilities, as with Taiwan. Weapons sales to Taiwan could propel the Chinese authorities into an acceleration of the already rapid modernization of their military, which in turn could force countries in the region to address their new insecurity by purchasing, developing and deploying more arms. Should such a situation obtain, to maintain hegemonic primacy, the US would have no choice but to invest heavily in its military presence in the Asia Pacific in order to retain its comparative advantage. For more on this, see “Hegemonism behind 'arms freeze,'” Taipei Times, Aug. 1.)

While Washington’s about-face may have seemed sudden and out of character for an administration that, since 2003, had shunned Taipei, it makes sense if it is taken in context, which itself has changed dramatically in the past few months. Although there were some, like US-Taiwan Business Council Chairman and former deputy secretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz, who back in July would tell journalists in Taipei that US President George W. Bush had made a promise to Taiwan and that, as a man of his word, he would deliver on that promise — comments that, in other words, hinted at foreknowledge of Washington’s true intentions — it is likelier that the volte-face was the result of a rapid world transformation over the past few months.

Though seemingly isolated from one another, the following factors are nevertheless bound to influence decision-making at the strategic level. They are as follows:

Russia’s invasion of Georgia and the beginning of a new “Cold War”: As I argued in “The wider implications of Georgia” (Taipei Times, Aug. 19), Moscow’s and Beijing’s reaction to US/NATO encirclement, and the opposition to US hegemonism they share with countries like Iran, Syria and Venezuela, is creating a new quasi Cold War, with two main blocs that are, however, less ideologically-driven than during the conflict that from 1949 until 1989 pitted the East against the West. While the divide had been apparent for some time (at the UN Security Council, for example), it took Russia’s intervention in South Ossetia in August to underscore just how wide the chasm had grown. As the world aligns itself into two camps (the West and the “objectors”), Washington is bound to seek to reinforce its regional allies, just as it did during the Cold War. In Asia, this means Japan, India (last month’s landmark nuclear deal is a clear indicator), South Korea — and yes, Taiwan.

North Korea’s change of heart on disarmament: The connection may have appeared tenuous when I raised the possibility in late September (“Beijing’s ‘North Korea’ card no ace, Taipei Times, Sept. 29), but it would now appear, as Defense News Asia chief Wendell Minnick himself pointed out on Oct. 6, that Washington felt it had been let down by Beijing in the North Korea nuclear disarmament talks. The timing is too conspicuous for there not to be a connection. After making his “whatever it takes” pledge to Taiwan in 2001, Bush’s tone changed in 2003, just as the six-party talks with Pyongyang were beginning, for which Washington needed Beijing’s help. Many, as I have, argued that the US’ snub of Taiwan had more to do with its need for Beijing to facilitate the talks than with Washington’s antipathy toward the pro-separatist and “troublemaker” Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). With Pyongyang reneging on disarmament and reopening of the Yongbyon facility, Beijing’s influence on US decision-making may have been severely weakened, and Taiwan may no longer be useful as a bargaining chip. (It remains to be seen what impact the US decision over the weekend to remove North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism, in exchange for the resumption of nuclear inspections, will have on the regional dynamics. If past history is any indication, Pyongyang will comply for a while and then find something else to justify a new round of brinkmanship. Despite this latest development, Beijing’s influence over, and usefulness in the talks with Pyongyang appears to have diminished.)

US presidential election: Regardless of the outcome of next month’s elections, if the Bush administration had left office with an “arms freeze” in place it would have become the baseline for future relations with Beijing, whereas agreeing to the arms sale maintains the status quo and provides the next administration with more flexibility on the China-Taiwan question.

The global economic crisis: For some decision-makers and influential parties in Washington, conflict is a positive development; it distracts the population from fears of a tumbling Wall Street and fuels the defense industry. Faced with the current economic crisis, Washington would be hard pressed to explain to the military-industrial complex why it cannot deliver US$6.5 billion in weapons to its old ally Taiwan. Lobbying by Congress, the defense industry (perhaps even Mr. Wolfowitz, who remains a very influential individual) and states with major defense manufacturers must have shifted into high gear since Wall Street took a hit. At this point in time, if selling weapons to Taiwan means creating jobs and bringing money into the US, Washington will give the okay.

Sino-Taiwanese rapprochement: As the Congressional Research Service (CRS) indicated in a report last week, many in Washington are becoming wary of Taipei’s rapprochement with Beijing since President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) came into office in May. A Taiwan that becomes “Finlandized” (another reference to the Cold War, this time to Finland’s relations with the Soviet Union during the Cold War), or gets too close to Beijing, would be detrimental to US strategic positioning in the Pacific. Though the Ma Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) administration’s peace bid with China is partly of Washington’s making (through overt US favoritism during the elections in March, which put the Democratic Progressive Party at a marked disadvantage), some in the Bush administration have begun to fear that the Frankenstein monster has gotten out of control and needs to be brought back into line. Selling weapons to Taiwan could be such an instrument, as it is sure to rekindle the “status quo” (pardon the oxymoron) in the Taiwan Strait by infuriating Beijing (Ma, meanwhile, would be hard pressed to refuse the weapons at this point).

Washington’s “sudden” decision wasn’t made on a whim, nor is it illogical, however radical a departure it may seem to be from its policy in the past five years. It is, rather, a response to the new strategic realities that have emerged in succession over the past few months. It has, I fear, little to do with preserving Taiwan’s democracy, and much with a grand chessboard, to use Brzezinski’s coinage, that has been dramatically reshuffled.

C$18.1 billion later

The report is out. Every Canadian household is paying C$1,500 to support a military operation that, by any yardstick, is failing fast — or not so fast, given the seven years that the US, Canada and NATO have been in Afghanistan. Kevin Page, the Canadian parliamentary budget officer who inked the report on the cost of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, admits that the C$18.1 price tag expected by 2011 could even be higher, as some agencies have provided what is, at best, inaccurate accounting, while others (which shall remained unnamed because of their unofficial role in Afghanistan) are probably even more opaque.

Inarguably, the US was distracted in Afghanistan by its ill-timed misadventure in Iraq in 2003, but even if that strategic blunder hadn’t occurred, Afghanistan today would likely still be a mess, with a resurgent Taliban, a porous border with tribal areas in Pakistan and poppy cultivation booming. In fact, seven years on, Iraq or not the dire warnings by Pentagon officials that next year could be “even worse” for Afghanistan would not be unfeasible.

The quagmire is not for lack of good intentions — it’s just plain bad planning and atrocious communication within the coalition. No clear end goals have been set, other than “bringing democracy,” “fighting terrorism” and “rebuilding the country” — all noble goals, except that there are no benchmarks to determine success and the one condition that could make the above possible — negotiating with the Taliban — has been ruled out by the US and most other countries. So the catchphrases remain broad objectives that cannot be met, and even on the rare occasions when clear benchmarks were set, as the Department of National Defense and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) established for their Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar, those remained local and were not part of a comprehensive, country-wide effort, which means that whatever objective was met failed to have an influence at the strategic level, where the “rehabilitation” of the country lies.

The bungled intervention and failure to deliver on initial promises has now made matters even worse and embittered a large part of the Afghan population whose hearts and minds the West was so intent on winning in the wake of Sept. 11, 2001. This long string of failures, added to costly mistakes by NATO and the US, has cost countless Afghan lives, given the Taliban time to regroup and turned an insurgency into a regional catastrophe by sucking in Pakistan in a way that al-Qaeda and the Taliban would never have dreamed of seven years ago.

While, compared with the trillion-dollar war the US has waged in Iraq, C$18.1 billion might not seem much, for a country like Canada, whose military is but a tiny fraction of the US’, the bill is a heavy one, especially when one takes into account that Canada’s participation in the Afghan fiasco probably has undermined, as I argue in my book Smokescreen, Canadian security and made it a likelier target for retaliation, either against its troops in Afghanistan or Canadian interests worldwide, including at home. Furthermore, Canada’s image as a peace-loving country, with a rich tradition of peacekeeping, has also been tarnished and given many of its critics ammunition in their accusations that Ottawa is at best a puppet of the US, at worst a willing participant in the US empire.

Close to 100 Canadian soldiers have died serving in Afghanistan. Its security has been undermined. Afghanistan is still a mess and will remain so by 2011, when Ottawa has said it will bring the troops back home (as might many others, which means that the only thing the Taliban has to do is wait another two years before it can fill the vacuum left by departing troops). Had Canadians known how things would turn out, few are those who would have accepted to foot the bill with their taxes.

But it’s not too late to set clear goals and do what the coalition should have done years ago — negotiate. Only by doing this would the West have a shadow of a chance to turn things around, avoid further misery and, perhaps, make 2011 a year by which real progress can be observed. Only by doing this and setting clear goals can the C$1,500 that every Canadian household will have paid (not to mention the lives lost on both sides) be an investment rather than a waste.

Could the Republicans wag the dog?

Global markets tumbled again yesterday after the US House of Representatives shot down the US President George W. Bush administrations’ US$700 billion bailout plan in a rare show of unity among Republicans and Democrats. For weeks now, we have been hearing rumors of a recession, and in the last few days analysts have begun referring to the financial crisis as the worst since the Great Depression of 1929. The world is now holding its breath to see whether the US Fed will submit a revised bailout scheme — hopefully one that, unlike its stillborn predecessor, isn’t so skewed in favor of the wealthy.

What will make matters more complex are the US presidential elections on Nov. 4, which could very well lead to ostensibly “irrational” behavior in the House as Republicans and Democrats seek an advantage over one another on the last leg of the campaign. With the Democrats standing to gain as many as 30 seats in the House — a clear repudiation of the Bush administration, if ever there was one — some Republicans could stoop to a new low in already acrimonious relations between the two parties and seek to create conditions that would advantage the Republicans. Ironically, doing this could well involve behavior that would further undercut the economy (yes, US politics have gotten this dirty)..

Now what would this be? What is the area in which the Republicans believe they have the upper hand over the Democrats, that could rescue their dwindling fortunes?

During his campaign, Republican candidate Senator John McCain has repeatedly argued that his party is stronger on foreign policy and that, conversely, the Democrats under Senator Barack Obama lack experience in diplomacy, are mere “amateurs,” or that they are “soft” on terror and “rogue regimes” like Iran and North Korea.

What, therefore, could reinvigorate the Republican Party and put it back in the race than some crisis involving North Korea (which has already provided the gunpowder by threatening to pull out of the nuclear disarmament talks), Iran (the likeliest candidate), Venezuela or even a “resurgent” Russia weeks before Americans hit the polls? Nothing would work better to distract frazzled Americans worrying about their jobs and their retirement packages, or bolster the country’s slumbering industry, than a new conflict. History is replete with examples of countries going to war after the economy had soured, both as a means to deflect domestic criticism but also because, sadly, war is good for business. Behind the scenes, things could therefore be done to precipitate conflict, or other countries’ policies interpreted in a way that would provide a more “irritable” or less patient Washington with a casus belli.

The Great Depression culminated in World War II, and the stock markets only dropped (ashamedly) after hostilities had come to an end. Ever since, numerous other conflicts that on the surface seemed the result of political brinkmanship turned out to have been partly engineered by, or in response to, market forces, as William Engdahl convincingly argues in his revealing A Century of War. Such a scenario would be especially likely if, whatever comes next, a bailout package were seen by the Wall Street-Washington nexus as not meeting the needs of the corporate superrich (in other words, one favored by the Democrats), in which case some influential individuals (in and outside government, or straddling both worlds, as is frequent in Washington circles) could pull strings and engineer a convenient crisis.

Watch for the headlines in the coming weeks. Should financial instability prevail, trouble abroad could emerge, right on cue.

Beijing's 'North Korea' card no ace

A problem that haunts many “experts” in academia and government is that, by virtue of their expertise on a subject, they tend to lose sight of the bigger picture, as if events in one area could somehow operate in a vacuum and separately from external factors. So ingrained is specialization in academia and intelligence agencies, where topics (“terrorism,” “counter-proliferation,” “China” and so on) are put into boxes, that school often feel compelled to offer courses on regional analysis, as if to remind students that connections exist between the principal subject under observation and the rest of the world.

It was with such thoughts in mind that I wrote "Beijing's 'North Korea' card no ace," published today in the Taipei Times. In my article, I make a case for the influence the six-party North Korean disarmament talks has had on Washington’s and Japan’s policies on Taiwan, and how Pyongyang’s apparent decision to end the talks are resume nuclear work could impact on Washington’s and Tokyo’s approach to the Taiwan Strait. I also take another step back and look at the possible implications of rising tensions between Washington and Moscow (a party to the North Korean talks), the election of conservative Taro Aso as Japanese prime minister and the November elections in the US — all of which point to the conclusion that the era of diplomacy in Northeast Asia may soon come to an end, which is certain to have implications, beneficial or detrimental, for Taiwan.

They still don’t get al-Qaeda

Top US counterterrorism officials on Monday once again demonstrated how little they understand “terrorism” as a tool or the various organizations that fall under its descriptive umbrella. Seven years have elapsed since al-Qaeda struck at the heart of the United States and about twice as much since the organization first popped up on intelligence agencies’ radar screens, which should have given intelligence "experts" plenty of time to understand the phenomenon and its root causes. And yet...

Dell Dailey, the US State Department’s coordinator for counterterrorism, claims that after years of killing civilians in acts of terror, al-Qaeda is losing its appeal and now faces a possible implosion. He points out that vastly more Muslims than Westerners are killed by al-Qaeda suicide and car bombs — especially in Iraq, where, we are told, local tribes have turned against al-Qaeda in the past two years.

Sadly for Dailey, his understanding of al-Qaeda is flawed on at least two fundamental aspects. First, since Sept. 11, 2001, al-Qaeda has undergone an important transformation and is no longer the vertical, corporate-like organization that it was in the 1990s and early 2000s. Rather, it has turned into a lateral organization with little hierarchy or even structure. In fact, so loose has it become that referring to it as an organization is probably misleading. In the past five years or so, al-Qaeda has instead transformed into a philosophy, an ideology that does not require top-down decisionmaking to resist the opponent.

What this means, of course, is that while “resisting Western encroachment” is al-Qaeda’s overarching ideology, al-Qaeda-ism has become localized. Resistance in, say, Pakistan, differs markedly from resistance in Morocco, or Algeria or the Philippines, where the guiding ideology becomes mixed with very local sets of grievances, political objectives, economics and so on. To claim that al-Qaeda is “imploding” or losing its appeal worldwide is to put all those countries that are facing “Islamic” insurgencies — which includes the Philippines, Thailand, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Bosnia, Russia, China, Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, to name some — in the same basket.

Dailey’s second mistake stems from the Bush administration’s blunders in Iraq and the fabricated truths it relied on post-facto to justify the illegal invasion of the country. Every day, US official refer to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), as if Iraq were a new front in the US’ war against Osama bin Laden and his organization. The truth is, AQI isn’t an extension of OBL’s war against the West; it is Sunni resistance to US occupation by groups and individuals who subscribe to al-Qaeda-ism, with its own set of local variables. By claiming that al-Qaeda is active in Iraq, the US is merely trying to justify the invasion as part of the “war on terror” and to legitimize the claim, made before the invasion, that there existed an Iraqi-AQ connection. OBL and his henchmen may have issued videotapes calling on Sunnis in Iraq to resist the US, but this was mere rhetoric. The resistance is very local, and no one is calling the shots from some AQ Central in Pakistan or Afghanistan.

These two flaws — which certainly are not Dailey’s alone but remain widespread within the intelligence community — then make it possible for US Undersecretary of State James Glassman to miss the point altogether, when he says that he is “skeptical” al-Qaeda is changing its ways in a matter that would make it resemble other “terrorist” organizations such as Hamas and the Lebanese Hezbollah, which combine local services, governance, schools and politics with extremism. In Glassman’s view, al-Qaeda is a “cult of death” and ergo it is unlikely to turn into an organization with popular appeal. Of course, were he cognizant of the fact that AQ is not, as we have seen, a monolithic organization, he would have realized that rather than being fixed and imploding, AQ is, by virtue of its many local iterations, the very epitome of transformation, which could easily include forms that resemble Hezbollah and Hamas, also movements of resistance that have “matured” into political parties.

This therefore makes Glassman’s prediction that an al-Qaeda than can adapt would be a far more dangerous al-Qaeda a moot point. It already is.

Ironically, as the State Department “experts” were exposing their lack of understanding of AQ, US intelligence was once again making the now-familiar claim that al-Qaeda had “regenerated” its leadership and continued to represent the greatest threat to the US.

From claims of “implosion” to “regeneration,” those in charge of fighting terrorism remain as blind as they were on that pristine morning in September seven years ago.

Where Tsai Ing-wen should not go [UPDATED]

The opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) announced yesterday that its chairwoman, Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), would embark on a three-day visit to the US today. Her schedule includes a speech at her alma mater, Cornell University, and meetings with representatives of the Democratic and Republican parties. While in Washington, Tsai will also be paying a visit to the Heritage Foundation.

The Heritage Foundation is part of a small circle of right-wing conservative US think tanks that includes the Project for a New American Century and the American Enterprise Institute, all of which are connected, financially and ideologically, to the likes of Margaret Thatcher, Richard Pearle, William Kristol, Paul Wolfowitz and Dick Cheney, and serve the interests of big oil, the US defense industry, and US hegemony, while restlessly attacking multilateralism and the UN. (Among other things, the Heritage Foundation supported the Contras in Nicaragua and sees former US president Ronald Reagan as something akin to the Second Coming. It is also part of the same circle that advocated war in Iraq and would welcome one against Iran.)

Sadly for Taiwan, for historical reasons the majority of its allies or supporters in the US have come from that side of the establishment, likely a leftover of the US military’s close ties to the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government under Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) during the Cold War. As I have written before, the repercussion of this unholy alliance, or Faustian deal, for Taiwan is that it gives credence to Beijing’s contention that Washington supports Taiwan not because it believes in its sovereign right to exist as a democratic nation, but rather because Taiwan (much like Georgia, come to think of it) serves Washington's purpose in its strategy to encircle China and perpetuate US empire. By failing to establish strong links with the other side of the US establishment — or other countries — Taiwan has put itself into a straightjacket, with only two options to choose from: (a) support from right-wing US conservatives whose institutional reasons for supporting Taiwan are less than honorable (allowing, in all fairness, for a few individual exceptions) and have far more to do with maintaining or strengthening US hegemony; or (b) find itself defenseless and in no position to stand up to China.

This is doubly ironic as the DPP, a party that advocates democracy and freedom and which is rooted in the long struggle against tyranny, willingly continues to seek help and advice from the Heritage Foundation and its likes, as Tsai’s visit this week demonstrates. By embracing the conservative establishment so early in her tenure as chairwoman, Tsai will be giving ammunition to those in China who, rightly or wrongly, see the DPP not as a voice for Taiwanese freedom, but rather as an instrument, or an outpost, of US empire, much like the “democracies,” like Israel, that Washington arms and protects.

UPDATE: It is unfortunate that Tsai currently finds herself in the US, as President Ma Ying-Jeou (馬英九) has basically admitted he will not be able to deliver on any of his “6-3-3” economic goals — annual 6 percent GDP growth, average national per capita income of US$30,000 by 2016 and less than 3 percent unemployment — anytime soon. In fact, he said he would need eight years — or two terms, which he assumes he will get — to realize those objectives.

Tsai and the DPP leadership should be screaming murder right now and leading Taiwanese into opposition to the KMT’s policy of deception.

Book Review: Those who helped break the oppressors’ back

For many who, for one reason or another, choose to make it their home, Taiwan is part opportunity and part love affair. From its weather, natural beauty, history, culture, food and wonderful people to the cross-strait reflection of what it chose not to be, Taiwan is a muse that over the years has transformed many a transitory visitor into a permanent friend fully committed to protecting it from the many ills — environmental, political — that threaten its existence. While the principal threat to Taiwan today is China’s designs upon it and Beijing’s political isolation of Taiwan on the international scene, not so long ago enemy No. 1 was at home, under the form of the Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) and Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) regimes, both supported financially, politically and militarily by the US in their repression of Taiwanese as part of Washington’s crusade against communism.

Then as now, many expatriates who came to Taiwan chose not to remain silent and did what they could to help give Taiwanese a voice. A Borrowed Voice: Taiwan human rights through international networks, 1960-1980, which I review in today’s issue of the Taipei Times, is their story. Readers can access the full article, titled "Those who helped break the oppressors' back," by clicking here (Features pages are now available in .pdf for original print format).

Why the US does not want a nuclear Iran

While almost every day we are told that the US, the UN and the West in general oppose a nuclear Iran because of the belief that Tehran could use enrichment to turn a peaceful nuclear energy plan into a nuclear weapons program, or that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is defying the international community on the matter because he is irrational, seeks confrontation or wants to “destroy” Israel,* the real reasons why the West opposes Iran’s nuclear ambitions rather lie in economics. In fact, we must look back to the 1970s to find the seeds of the current crisis, when powerful US and British oil and banking interests launched a campaign to increase the price of oil while, through funding to environmental groups and security think tanks, seeking to discredit nuclear energy as a safe, clean source of energy and creating fears of nuclear proliferation (the bid worked, as our continued reliance on the black gold shows us). Later on, Western powers used the UN Security Council to block certain states from going nuclear while allowing allies to pass the threshold, even when those states were not signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), such as Israel and India.

When it comes to oil-rich Iran, the US and its allies have argued that it makes no sense — aside from nuclear weapons ambitions — for Tehran to seek nuclear energy precisely because it has so much oil. What this rationalization fails to consider, however, is that Iran, just like any other country, seeks to maximize its oil profits by exporting it rather than reserving it for domestic consumption, all the more so when prices are so high. If Iran managed to produce enough nuclear fuel to feed its reactors, a mere 1-gigawatt reactor would produce enough power to accommodate an industrial city of 1 million people. Add a few of those and Iran could soon be self-sufficient and therefore in a position to export more oil and use the money to develop its infrastructure.

But this the US will not allow. Why? Because it has long been Washington’s policy (and before it, London’s) to keep oil-producing states in the Middle East relatively weak so that they will never be able to challenge Western interests. While Tehran’s supposed intransigence on the issue is used by the West and its media mouthpieces to explain the lack of progress in talks and the attendant series of economic sanctions, the truth is that the West does not want a nuclear Iran and will continue to move the goal posts to stall the process indefinitely (this would explain the US’ refusal to even consider closely monitored minimal uranium enrichment in Iran as an alternative to full-cycle enrichment, while Western support for the proposal that Russia provide Iran with nuclear fuel now looks dead in the water, given the strained relations between the West and Russia following the latter’s invasion of Georgia earlier this month).

“Lack of transparence” on Tehran’s part is currently the reason given to justify sanctions and Western opposition. However, even if tomorrow Tehran were to become the epitome of transparency, nuclear power would still remain beyond its reach and new reasons would be found to account for the lack of developments, from enmity with Israel to support for terrorism (Hezbollah, Hamas) to meddling in Iraq or Afghanistan and so on.

As in the past, a lot can be explained by looking at who’s behind declarations and which institutions are funding whom in the battle of ideas. From think tanks to oil companies to big banks to publishing houses, many have an interest in ensuring that Iran remains relatively weak.

* Ahmadinejad’s supposed calls for the “destruction” of Israel are hotly contested and are probably more the result of mistranslation or manipulation than a heartfelt wish for the Jewish state’s destruction, which in any case would inevitably result in the annihilation of Iran by either Israel (which has nuclear weapons) or the US. Ahmadinejad and his cabinet do not have a death wish, nor is Ahmadinejad in a position where he can make unilateral decisions that would affect the future of his state. Ahmadinejad is a populist in the same mold as Mohammed Mossadegh, whom the US and British intelligence helped overthrow in 1953 (again mostly over oil).

Now the real games begin

Despite the unfortunate stabbing of a US national on day one, a few questions about possibly under-aged Chinese divers and the occasional pro-Tibet demonstrations and subsequent arrests, it could be said that Beijing successfully weathered the Olympic storm that, as many had claimed, would take the Chinese leadership to the mat. None of Beijing’s predictions of Uighur or Tibetan “terrorists” attacking Olympic venues materialized, while the world’s response to its failure to allow the media to act freely and for protests to be held at a predetermined venue was conspicuous in its meekness.

Maybe the twin security-charm offensive paid dividends, managing to hold dangerous elements at bay while dazzling the world with proof of China’s economic development. All in all, Beijing must be delighted with the outcome.

But as the air clears of canon powder and the athletes start returning home, China finds itself with challenges of Olympian proportions — the interplay between a cooling economy and continued social discontent. Reports have it that during the Games, the upper echelons of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) met daily to discuss the economy and that a meeting is scheduled next month to discuss means to address growing unemployment and an exports sector — the core of its economy — that is threatened by a global economic slowdown.

Locked in a feedback loop with threats to the economy is people’s resistance to forced evictions, corruption and environmental catastrophes, none of which will have disappeared despite the illusion of modernity the Games may have created. In fact, cognizant of the amount of money Beijing spent on the event, people all over China whose needs for employment and security are not met may be justified in turning their criticism of the CPP up one notch — especially if, as analysts have predicted, the economy takes a turn for the worst.

Expect to see the first showdowns in parts of China where the twin factors of a weak economy and ethnic tensions are prevalent. Xinjiang, where most minority Muslim Uighurs reside and which remains one of the poorest provinces in the country (it falls in the “impoverished” category in Business Week’s survey of Chinese per capita income), could soon turn into the greatest threat to China’s stability. In fact, last week Chinese authorities were hinting at the need to deal swiftly with what they perceive as an existential threat to China in Xinjiang (separatism), which for Uighurs could mean mass preventive detentions and, in the extreme, more bloodshed.

The Olympics were all about illusion and reality-defying human feats of determination. But ultimately this was a bubble, and once that bubble has deflated, reality quickly creeps in to fill the vacuum. While Beijing staked its international reputation on them, it will soon realize that well-coordinated ceremonies that leave the audience breathless did not immunize it from having to address pressing socioeconomic challenges.

Despite the image of modernity and unity that China sought to broadcast to the world by hosting the Games and the tremendous financial expenditure that went into ensuring such an outcome, China is no better off today and it continues to face the very challenge it faced before the Games opened earlier this month, that of maintaining social stability.

This time around, however, the restraints on its behavior created by the world’s attention in the lead-up to the Games no longer exist and carrots and sticks will not as readily dissuade the CCP from choosing the path of violence to deal with domestic problems.

Beggars and choosers

In light of his track record on the US-led “war on terrorism” and conservative policies in general, it is rather unusual for me to defend Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper. By further involving Canadian troops in the deadly Afghan quagmire and bending over backwards to display Ottawa’s subservience to the US and Israel, Harper and his Cabinet have damaged Canada’s hard-earned image abroad as a peace-loving, law-abiding country worthy of emulation.

One area where Harper deserves some praise, however, is in his policies vis-à-vis China, with whom he has taken a “strong” stance on human rights — at least when compared with his position on allied human rights violators, such as the US and Israel. Harper’s criticism of Beijing’s track record on human rights culminated (or so it seems) with his decision not to attend the Olympic Games in Beijing, which many world leaders had also threatened to boycott amid a crackdown by Chinese security forces in Tibet this summer. While most heads of state have since come back on that decision and ended up attending the Olympics, Harper chose not to, claiming, if perhaps unconvincingly, that he had a “busy” schedule. Given the magnitude of the event and the fact that we have known for years that the Games would be held in August this year, it would have been easy for Harper to make time for Beijing. His decision not to do so cannot but have been meant to send a political message to Beijing.

While the leadership in Beijing has its hands full ensuring the success of the Olympics, the attack on Harper came from unexpected quarters — former Canadian prime minister Jean Chretien, who during his long tenure did his utmost to cozy up to China and reap the financial benefits.

Harper’s “snub,” the former leader said from Quebec City, had damaged Sino-Canadian relations, and by breaking the “bridge” ostensibly built between Ottawa and Beijing when the Liberals were in power, he had put Canadian firms seeking to do business in China at a disadvantage. “We are [now] at the bottom of the ladder in terms of having any influence with China,” he said. “Ask any businessman who has been to China [of late] and he will tell you the same thing.”

Chretien then said that “We do business with Saudi Arabia and they’re not a big democracy,” which rather incongruously implies that Harper’s refusal to attend the Games meant the same thing as not wanting to do business with China.

The problem with his salvo, however, is that while Chretien claims to understand how the Chinese think — “You know, they have a collective memory there that is very important” — it is based on a complete misreading of the Chinese leadership, the Chinese business sector, as well as the ability of world leaders to distinguish between politics and business. If trade relations between countries were predicated on warm political relations, then very few countries nowadays would be doing business with the US, or Israel, Russia or Pakistan — or even China, for that matter. In fact, even the absence of official diplomatic relations, as is the idiosyncratic case of Taiwan, has not prevented it from doing business with others, or from other countries to seek trade relations with it.

While Beijing continues to wield the political stick, the fact remains that it is not about to end trade relations with a G8 country over a prime minister’s failure to show up at a sports event. At most, Beijing will bark, perhaps recall an official in retaliation, but the long-term consequences will, as always, be inconsequential, because China just cannot afford to make them bite. Furthermore, while the Chinese private sector is not entirely independent of the Chinese Communist Party, in recent years it has increasingly gained a voice of its own, and if establishing new business partnerships with Canadian firms is in the best interest of the private sector, company chiefs are not about to abandon those for the sake of politics or allow the CCP to dictate business decisions. Chretien’s understanding of the Chinese business sector is at least 30 years out of date and harkens back to a time when the CCP had complete control over every aspect of the country, including international trade.

In the end, it all boils down to this: The hypocrisy that taints relations between the world and China works both ways. While critics of China’s human rights record can be accused of undermining their argument by continuing to do business with it, China suffers from the same myopia and continues to do business with its critics, even with the US and Taiwan. What this means, therefore, is that the argument that Canada could somehow “lose out” in the Chinese market over “undiplomatic” criticism of Beijing’s domestic policies — as Chretien made clear on Tuesday — has no credibility whatsoever, as I am sure “the businessman who has been to China” in recent years would tell us.

At best, this was Chretien playing politics ahead of a possible election call. At worst, this was a former prime minister who couldn’t even be bothered to criticize a gross violator of human rights, even when he knows that doing so carries little risk.

Why South Ossetia matters to Taiwan

As the world holds its breath and awaits confirmation that Russian troops have pulled out of Georgia, it is becoming clear that Europe has entered a new era of big power competition, with Russia trying to salvage what is left of its influence and the US/NATO continuing to fill the vacuum left following the collapse of the Soviet Union. But while the hostilities over South Ossetia seem to have ceased, the underlying factors — US hegemony and Russia’s counterbalancing strategy, oil, separatism — remain and will continue to threaten the region. With the US set to sign a missile defense site deal with Poland on Wednesday and Russia seeking to establish a permanent military base in South Ossetia, the likelihood of a flare-up remains high.

Beyond this are the risks to international stability that Russia’s massive response in Georgia engendered, especially when it comes to Beijing’s stance on the Taiwan issue. In "The wider implications of Georgia," published today in the Taipei Times, I argue that the precedent set by Moscow — an increasingly close ally of the People’s Republic of China — in Georgia could have serious implications for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

The ugly illusion

For those who live far away from China or who do not focus on its domestic politics on a regular basis, China seems to be coterminous with “rise,” an economy growing in the double digits, and the center of gravity of the future. All the media hype about Asia’s “new miracle” — exacerbated in recent weeks by TV and magazine features about its rich history and gigantic cities — could give the uneducated mind the impression that all is well in China.

But it’s all illusion. Away from the media — which Chinese authorities continue to hound, despite promises to open up for the Olympics — is a state that, for some China watchers, barely hangs by a thread and could collapse on its own weight at any moment. Poverty is rampant and discontent widespread, as entire groups of people are uprooted by force or evicted for mega construction projects, millions work in subhuman conditions in factories, and ethnic groups, from Tibetans to Mongols to Uighurs, are crushed under the heel of a state that will not recognize their identity or religious beliefs. All of this the Chinese authorities do not want you to see. Worse, Mao Zedong (毛澤東), responsible for the death of tens of millions of Chinese, remains an icon, his portrait omnipresent in key areas, his crimes beyond scrutiny, a taboo subject, as if even the ills of the past cannot bear scrutiny.

For the more optimistic analysts, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has things under control, but this comes at a price: Repression of dissidents, pervasive censorship, double-speak and propaganda. In other words, a police state. For visitors to China — especially diplomats — CCP minders ensure that the guests are only allowed to see what the state wants them to see (call this the “Gorbachev detour,” after his drive from the airport in 1989 was rerouted so he would not see the demonstrations and, later on, the massacre at Tiananmen Square). As a result, visitors to China usually return home with flattering stories about how well China is doing and how developed it has become. But it's a lie.

Though seemingly innocuous, Beijing’s latest illusion epitomizes everything that is wrong with China.

Her name is Yang Peiyi (杨沛宜), whose voice was heard by hundreds of millions of people all over the world during the Olympic Games opening ceremonies. Perfect looking, the essence of a beautiful Chinese child with an angel-like voice. The problem is that while little Peiyi’s voice moved us, the beautiful child we were fawning over wasn’t her and didn’t sing a single note. As it turns out, during a rehearsal, CCP officials ruled that Peiyi wasn’t good-looking enough for the nation; her lips were crooked and she was a little chubby (pictured right, with Lin Miaoke, her stand-in, on the left). So, like everything else in China, the state served the world an illusion to mask its true self.

When a government deems a talented child unworthy because of her physical appearance (and she is a perfectly fine looking child), there is something terribly wrong with it indeed. And it begs the question: If it can stoop so low, how could we ever believe it when it promises a “peaceful rise,” or “peace” across the Taiwan Strait? Or that it will act responsibly as it sells weapons to murderous regimes, from Sudan to Zimbabwe to Myanmar? Or that, come the next epidemic, it will do what it must to ensure global health? Or do its part on global warming?

In Memoriam: Anthony Russo

There were many occasions during my long struggle to complete Smokescreen, my expose of Canadian security intelligence follies and incompetence, when I almost gave up, believing that the project was either impossible or, worse, that publishing the verboten would land me into trouble with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), my former employer.

But whenever I found myself on the brink of giving up and flushing the manuscript down the toilet, something would happen (call it fate, or just plain luck) that would convince me that I shouldn’t. Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 2006, the arrest of 17 individuals in Toronto in June of that year over an alleged terrorist plot, Canadian soldiers killing and getting killed in Afghanistan, and the long march, inch by inch, to war with Iran — all intensified the chorus inside my head telling me that my book had to see the light of day, that what I had to say as a former intelligence officer and individual of conscience mattered.

Another thing that encouraged me to bring this painful project to fruition was reading Daniel Ellsberg’s book Secrets: A memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers, which depicts the intellectual and emotional journey of an earnest Cold Warrior in Vietnam. After returning from Southeast Asia on a fact-finding mission, Ellsberg went back to work as an analyst for RAND Corporation, a think-tank with ties to the US Air Force, where he had been employed in the early 1960s. Soon afterwards, then-US secretary of defense Robert McNamara commissioned a study of the conduct of the Vietnam War, to which Ellsberg participated. Completed in 1968, the documents came to be known as the Pentagon Papers.

A year later, Ellsberg had become convinced that the Vietnam War not only couldn’t be won, but that it was wrong, and that the entire adventure was built on layer upon of layer of lies to the American public. Over time, and as Ellsberg befriended anti-war protesters, he reached the conclusion that it was his duty, as someone from the "inside," to do everything he could to end the war, risking his career — and the safety of his family — in the process. After failed attempts to gain the ear of sympathetic US senators, Ellsberg’s quest culminated in his decision to leak the Pentagon Papers, all of 7,000 pages, to the New York Times.

One person who helped him in the process, and who also risked his career, was Anthony Russo (pictured right), also at RAND. Soon after the first excerpts were published, the US government took the Times to court in an attempt to embargo publication. The paper ultimately won the case (New York Times Co. v. United States) and publication of the Papers continued, prompting the Nixon administration to target Ellsberg via the FBI, wiretap his conversations, break into his psychiatrist’s office and, in 1973, Ellsberg’s and Russo’s trial. Given the subsequent exposure of gross government misconduct, all charges against the duo were eventually dropped. The rest is history, with Nixon soon forced out of office and the entire Vietnam War discredited.

Anthony Russo, whom Ellsberg called a “courageous collaborator” and who defied the all-powerful defense apparatus and system of silence of which he was part to expose the truth about an unjust war, died in Suffolk on Wednesday. He was 71. His name may have been unknown to most, and his death unnoticed by many, but we all owe him a debt of gratitude. I know I do, as it is people like him who gave me the strength and courage to complete what would become my own version of the Pentagon Papers (minus the classified material) and to keep striving to tell truth to power. May others carry on.

It’s the Cold War all over again

Anyone who has followed (even if only remotely) developments in Eastern Europe in the past few years would have seen it coming. In fact, no sooner had the Iron Curtain crumbled than US policymakers were planting the seeds of a future in Europe that could not but lead to the violence that exploded between Russian and Georgia over the breakaway province of South Ossetia on Friday, which as of Sunday evening had reportedly claimed as many as 2,000 lives — mostly civilians — and forced as many as 30,000 people to leave their homes.

Not that any of this was inevitable, mind you. In fact, there is reason to believe that on their own, ethnic and political tensions within Georgia could likely have been managed, and large-scale violence avoided. What happened, however, is that Georgia became caught in a Cold-War-like battle of influence between the “West” — the US plus NATO — and Russia, which for good reasons has in recent years felt increasingly isolated, following the creeping expansion of NATO into areas, such as Eastern Europe and Central Asia, that historically had been in Russia’s sphere of influence. To which we might add Washington’s plans to implement a nuclear-defense system in Russia’s backyard. US claims that the system only targets “rogue states” like Iran and North Korea has failed to attenuate Moscow’s protestations and prompted it to seek to counterbalance US expansionism by striking alliances with Beijing and Tehran, blocking resolutions at the UN and, as recently as last week, proposing an ominous return to the Cold War by seeking the reinvigorate its ties with Havana, which could include military assistance. Moscow did not even attempt to mask the fact that its most recent overture to its old ally in the Caribbean was in response to NATO/US activity in its neighborhood.

Within this context, it is not surprising that Moscow would interpret the “Velvet Revolution” of 2003 in Georgia as having been backed, if not altogether orchestrated, by the US and its allies (a view shared by the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing). Given Georgia’s strategic location as a major pipeline for Caspian oil to the Mediterranean and the US’ designs on energy sources, it is easy to understand Moscow’s paranoia and why it would construe Georgia’s decade-old move to distance itself from Moscow as an outright land grab by the US. This was highlighted by the US’ and the West’s immediate support for Georgia in the current conflict, while the blame was lain fully on Moscow, which has supported separatists in South Ossetia since a civil war in the early 1990s created the de-facto enclave. A more nuanced reaction by the West could have help mitigate Moscow’s apprehensions.

To demonstrate how a seemingly localized conflict had its roots in (and in turn influences) the international system, Israel, a staunch ally of the US and clearly in the Western camp, was announcing yesterday that it could cease all weapons sales to Georgia lest its continuance prompt Moscow to increase its support for Syria and Iran. Ukraine, meanwhile, which has plans to join NATO, announced on Sunday night that it could prevent Russian warships involved in the Georgia operation from returning to port in the Ukrainian port of Sevastopol.

The current crisis in Georgia is only a symptom of things to come, as the pressure cooker of the post-Cold War system had reached a point where it needed to let out some steam. Sadly for the victims in Georgia, it did not have to come to this. The fall of the Berlin Wall had presented us with a golden opportunity to start anew and erase the long-standing divisions that for half a century had held the world hostage to nuclear war, in which even the most local of conflicts — Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Vietnam, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, to name a few — were subsumed into the ideological/economic clash between the East and the West. While there is no doubt that Russia has retained some of its past imperialist reflexes and, as it fell back on its feet, sought to regain some of what it had “lost” following the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was mostly the US’ thirst for hegemony that prompted countries like Russia, China and Iran to seek to counterbalance it and led to the renewed East/West divide that now appears to be upon us yet again today. As every political scientist in the realist camp would tell you, a unipolar world does not remain so for very long, as other states or groups of state will seek to tie it down a la Gulliver. The US had its uniploar moment, but that could be ending soon.

What does this mean for the future? Chances are that conflicts everywhere will once again be regionalized or internationalized, and thus rendered more difficult to resolve as they are inextricably involved in the power plays between the US/NATO and the Russo-Sino axis, with swing states in between.

It took humanity 18 years. Welcome to the past, to Cold War 2.0.

Right words, wrong person

US President George W. Bush has “deep concerns” about the human rights situation in China, and he intends to say just that during a speech in Bangkok, Thailand, on Thursday, just before he arrives in China for the Olympic Games starting on Friday. “America stands in firm opposition to China’s detention of political dissidents, human rights advocates and religious activists,” Bush is expected to say, based on transcripts of his speech released by the White House on Wednesday. “We speak out for a free press, freedom of assembly and labor rights … because trusting [Chinese] people with greater freedom is the only way for China to develop its full potential.”

This is all nice and well, except for one thing: Bush is the one making the speech. Given his own atrocious track record on respecting human rights both at home and abroad — to wit, the imprisonment of thousands of Muslims, the great majority of whom were innocent, in the US following 9/11, domestic antiterrorism laws that have seriously undermined the liberties and freedoms of US citizens and people transiting through the US, the Guantanamo Bay prison system, the CIA’s extraordinary rendition program, the illegal invasion of Iraq, the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, the normalization of torture — Bush is hardly the right person to lecture the Chinese Community Party (CCP) on freedoms and liberties.

This is not to say that China does not have a huge human rights mess on its hands — it certainly does — and the entire global community should be saying similar things to the CPP leadership. The problem with Bush’s plea it that it will fall on deaf ears, as he has no credibility whatsoever and no one in Beijing will take him seriously, just as Pakistani President (or dictator) Pervez Musharraf, or Uzbek President (or dictator) Islam Karimov, to name just two of the US’ allies in the “war on terror,” continue to ignore Bush’s lectures on democracy while his government continues to give them billions in military aid. It is akin to a mass murderer telling a prison cell mate “Thou shalt not kill,” or a bank robber telling a car thief that the latter’s chosen profession is reprehensible.

The Associated Press may editorialize that Bush’s speech is likely to “anger” China, and Beijing will likely oblige by expressing that “anger” and continue claiming that China’s behavior domestically is no one’s business, but in the end this is all shadow boxing, the games cynics — democratically elected and authoritarian alike — play over the heads of enfeebled populations.

The speech is fine. The lecturer is a fraud.

Condi’s prescription for failure

One can almost feel the static in the air around academics whenever Foreign Affairs magazine is set to publish a major article by a top US government official or renowned expert, a tradition that goes back to George Kennan’s famous "X" article, “The sources of Soviet conduct,” in 1947. Weeks are spent in anticipation, with barrages of e-mails speculating on the expected breakthroughs or enlightened paradigm shifts that are to be found in the piece. Such excitement may have preceded the publication of soon-to-be national security adviser Condoleezza Rice’s article in 2000, and certainly did before she recidivated in the current issue of the influential magazine. Sadly, however, Rice’s “Rethinking the national interest” does very little rethinking and instead advocates more of the same foreign policies that turned the George W. Bush administration into a synonym for calamity.

Readers can access my long response to Rice’s article in "Condoleezza Rice's prescription for a future of disaster and chaos," published today in the Taipei Times.

Taking a step back on the ‘arms freeze’

Followers of developments in the Taiwan Strait have all been in suspense as they wait to see whether the US arms package (which includes the P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft, seen left) sale to Taipei will proceed or not. Absent clear signals from Washington, pundits, in the US and elsewhere, have come up with a number of theories as to why the administration of George W. Bush would choose to go against the spirit of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and “freeze” already approved arms sales to Taiwan, from a desire to appease an increasingly influential China in Washington to fear that the arms package could disrupt ongoing “peace” efforts between Taipei and Beijing. What the great majority of op-ed pieces and talking heads have failed to take into account, however, is US grand strategy, realism as a guiding principle, as well as the history of the US “empire,” which, in Europe as well as in Asia, provides clues as to what may be behind the current “freeze.”

In "Hegemonism behind arms 'freeze,'" published today in the Taipei Times, I attempt to kick-start debate in that direction and argue that US policy on preventing the emergence of multipolarity in the international system is what is preventing the arms sale from materializing. It also provides, I hope, a key to reading future US arms sales to the region.

China's newest problem?

“Through this blessed jihad in Yunnan, the Turkestan Islamic Party warns China one more time … Our aim is to target the most critical points related to the Olympics. We will try to attack Chinese central cities severely using the tactics that have never been employed.” Thus spoke Commander Seyfullah, the purported leader of the Turkistan Islamic Party, after claiming responsibility in a video last week for three bus bombings in Yunnan earlier this month, along with previous attacks in Shanghai, Wenzhou and Guangzhou.

While there is little information about Seyfullah, the Turkistan Islamic Party is an offshoot of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which intelligence sources say was based in Afghanistan before the US invasion in 2001 and whose leader was killed in 2003. Analysts claim that members of the Turkistan Islamic Party (the group as a whole reportedly has no more than 100 members) may have received training at al-Qaeda bases in Pakistan’s North Western Frontier Province and/or Tribal Areas abutting Afghanistan. Based on the little information available about him to date, Seyfullah appears to be mimicking the tactics of terror group leaders such as the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, with a reliance on recordings to instill fear and attract retaliation — the more indiscriminate the better.

Since the release of the Seyfullah video, Chinese authorities have gone to great lengths to discredit the claims of responsibility, ascribing the blasts to a lone disgruntled gambler and an oil fire. While the credibility of both Seyfullah and Chinese media remains equally in doubt, what really matters is that a “terrorist” organization is seeking to lure Chinese authorities at a time when it is most sensitive, with the Olympic Games just around the corner.

In "Much suffering in store for Uighurs," published today in the Taipei Times, I explore the ramifications this new development will have for ethnic Uighur Chinese.