Tibetans convicted for sending information abroad

Since the unrest in Tibet in March 2008, as many as 50 Tibetans have been arrested for sending reports, photos or videos abroad, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) said in a report on Monday. In some cases, those arrests resulted in long jail sentences, it said.

The latest conviction, the group said. Involved a netizen called “Dasher” who received a 10-year prison sentence on charges of “separatism” for sending reports and photos of the protests.

“The repression has never stopped since the March 2008 uprising in the Tibetan regions,” RSF said. “This persecution of Tibetans who take risks to send evidence of the human situation abroad is a tragic illustration of the state of exception that reigns in Tibet. We call for their immediate release.”

Dasher, who was arrested on March 13, 2008, was convicted and sentenced by an intermediate court in Lhasa late last month, meaning that two years had elapsed between his detention and trial. The exact date of his trial is not known. He is being held in Lhasa’s Chushur prison, the group said.

RSF’s claims that at least 50 Tibetans have been arrested for sending information out of China have been verified by the India-based Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy. Most of the material was sent via Internet, which is closely monitored by Chinese authorities, RSF said.

Another detainee, Tashi, is a 24-year-old Tibetan from Rata, eastern Tibet, who was arrested in the middle of last month. A Tibetan from the same village told RSF he was accused of “having contact with people abroad and watching political videos online.” He is being held in Nagchu district.

In Sog, Gyaltsing was sentenced to three years in prison in December on charges of “communicating information to contacts outside China” after downloading pictures of exiled Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama. While he is allowed to receive family visits, he is interrogated every week and is often given beatings, RSF said.

Tibetan journalists allege that a re-education campaign in Sog has resulted in the arrest of several Tibetans who refused to comply with the “Love your religion, love your country” campaign, RSF said.

Asked for comment, Taiwan Friends of Tibet chairwoman Chow Mei-li (周美里) told the Taipei Times last night that this shows that the situation in Tibet remains critical.

“The Chinese Internet police monitors content. Now we know they go further — by sentencing. This is a violation of human rights,” she said.

“As cross-strait relations become closer,” Chow said, “the Taiwanese government should use every opportunity to protest such activities by the Chinese government.”

For all we know, Taiwanese citizens and their Internet use could also be monitored.

Asked if the Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) administration was likely to criticize Beijing for the repression unveiled on the RSF report, Chow said “it probably won’t.”

A shorter version of this article appeared today in the Taipei Times.

Interview with Cambodian genocide survivor Loung Ung

At the invitation of the Parent Teacher Association at Taipei American School, Cambodian activist Loung Ung, author of First They Killed My Father and Lucky Child, was in Taipei last week to talk about her personal experiences as a child under the Khmer Rouge. She sat down with Taipei Times staff reporter J. Michael Cole on Wednesday to talk about history, trauma and reconciliation.

Taipei Times (TT): Talking about the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) — better known as the “Khmer Rouge Tribunal” — some people have argued that we need prosecution before we can reach the point of true forgiveness for the 2 million people who were massacred in the genocide. Do you agree with this view?

Loung Ung: What’s true forgiveness? Is that even possible? All these standards and all these arguments from people with feelings of justice and true forgiveness, this is verbiage that really isn’t going to be possible. Whether it’s the ECCC or the tribunal, truth and reconciliation or the ICC [International Criminal Court], I don’t think we’re ever going to be able to find a method to give Cambodians true justice and true forgiveness.

It really is about education. This is an opportunity to centralize information and to use it as a tool to educate the next generation. [Cambodian genocide researcher] Khamboly Dy just came out with the historical textbook of the Khmer Rouge era. That was only two years ago and it is now being used in school. When I was at the tribunal last year on Feb. 17 — the opening of the tribunal — I was talking with students who didn’t know anything that was going on.

My full interview with Loung Ung continues here.

Google China unblocks sensitive keyword results

US media reported on Tuesday that search engine Google was rumored to have lifted restrictions on its Chinese search engine at www.google.cn.

“Web sites dealing with subjects such as the Tiananmen Square democracy protests, Tibet and regional independence movements” could be searched and accessed through Google.cn, the Epoch Times newspaper quoted MSNBC as saying.

NBC said that while search results were “erratic” and access to certain Web sites was occasionally denied, the improvement from just six months ago was nevertheless significant.

Performing searches using keywords such as the Tiananmen Square Massacre, the Times said that some photos and related material were accessible.

A search for “Falun Gong” — the spiritual group with ties to the Times — resulted in one image of anti-torture exhibits held by Falun Gong adherents, the Times said. While official Falun Gong Web sites did not show up in search results, a link to Tian Ti Books, which sells Falun Gong books, showed up at the top of the search results, the paper said.

Most of the keywords were in Chinese, the Times said.

Searches conducted by the Taipei Times last night revealed that English searches for Falun Gong returned results for Tian Ti Books, the English Wikipedia page on the organization, various videos and the Web page of the Falun Dafa in Singapore. Searches using Chinese keywords were not as successful, while searches for the Tiananmen Square Massacre or “Incident” in Chinese and English appeared to be censored again.

Searches for key student leaders during the Massacre, including Wang Dan (王丹), provided some results, including a picture of him standing in front of a board reading “Taiwan Foundation for Democracy.” Searches for Taiwanese independence, using both Chinese and English keywords, yielded several results, including blogs.

This story appeared today in the Taipei Times.

What's equally interesting — but was cut from my story, for some reason — is the fact that a Google spokesman on Tuesday denied that Google had stopped censoring search results. What's going on there, an internal battle? 

Reaching out

This morning I attended the “Gaining International Support, Accelerate Taiwan’s Nation Building” conference organized by the World Taiwanese Congress at National Taiwan University Hospital’s convention center in Taipei. With guest speakers including former US diplomat John Tkacik and Nakajima Mineo, and opening remarks by Democratic Progressive Party Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) and Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu (陳菊), I had reasons to hope that the conference would provide new ideas to help Taiwan break out of its isolation and fend off Chinese encroachment.

Turnout was good, with perhaps 100 people showing up. The great majority of them, as always, were elderly Taiwanese, with perhaps 10 percent of attendees below the age of 40. Aside from Tkacik, the only foreigners in the audience were Austin University’s Donald Rogers, American writer Jerome Keating, Monash University’s Bruce Jacobs, and myself. Several Taiwanese-Americans or US-based Taiwanese were in attendance. Media coverage appeared to be limited to Public Television Service, which took some footage of Tsai and Chen.

After brief opening remarks — all in Taiyu, with the exception of Tsai’s, which were a mix of Mandarin and Taiyu — Tkacik gave his presentation, using both English and Mandarin, focusing mostly on history and providing as few anecdotes (by that time, Tsai and Chen had already left). This was followed by a brief question-and-answer session, which, like Tkacik’s presentation, didn’t yield anything groundbreaking. After a short break, Nakajima took the podium and delivered a speech in Japanese, with translation in Taiyu. After about 20 minutes of this, nearly one third of the audience was fast asleep, text messaging on their cell phones or, as Jacobs did to my right, reading newspapers. Nakajima was telling us that China and the US had entered a new cold war and that the turning point was the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989.

By 12:10, Don, Bruce and I had had enough and called it quits. Not before noting, however, that if such conferences can’t manage to captivate people who, like us, are interested about Taiwan and care about its fate, then there’s no way they will attract younger generations of Taiwanese upon whom the future of this nation depends. As I’ve mentioned before through my observations of demonstrations, I find it disheartening that there are so few young Taiwanese participating in political events that will affect the fate of their country. If the current leadership sticks to geriatric events such as the one I attended today, however, there’s very little hope younger Taiwanese will get involved. Putting them to sleep on a Saturday after a long week at school or at work won’t do it.

And for an event that supposedly focuses on gaining international support for Taiwan, focusing on the past, rehashing the same platitudes over and over again — and doing this in a language that next to no foreigners understand (with no simultaneous interpretation at hand) — will hardly make that come true.

The intentions were good, undoubtedly, and there were lots of good people in the room. But it was disappointing and somewhat depressing. At some point the old leaders will have to pass on the torch and help awaken young minds to the cause. Discussing the future, using engaging venues and speakers, and making the whole effort energetic — that’s what Taiwan needs. Youth need to be brought in, not excluded, and the old guard must start listening to the younger generation, something to which, I am told, there is a lot of resistance in the Taiwanese-American community and, I’m sure, in Taiwan as well.

China shows signs of neo-fascism

With its strong emphasis on technology, the military, strong single-party leadership and a collective national identity that refuses to recognize pluralism, China is displaying increasing — and worrying — symptoms of fascism. From the military parade surrounding the 60th anniversary of the birth of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on Oct. 1 to forced relocation and assimilation programs targeting ethnic minority groups such as the Uighurs, China is in many ways reminding us of the fascist states that reared their ugly heads in the first half of the previous century.

In some ways, it is difficult to apply that term to the rising dragon, primarily because of some marked differences from its predecessors. For one, fascist states tended to be short-lived and led by strong — and often charismatic — rulers. China, even if we take 1949 as its starting point, has a long history and its leaders, with the possible exception of former premier Zhou Enlai (周恩來), are not known for their charisma.

China’s embrace of capitalism in the early 1990s has also masked its fascistic tendencies, because “unrestrained capitalism” was one of the principal targets of fascism. The fact that the PRC finds its roots in communism and class conflict — both of which fascism traditionally opposed — can also mislead the observer.

Still, today’s China arguably represents fascism 2.0, neo- fascism or “fascism with Chinese characteristics.”

One of the most peremptory signs of fascism is the state’s negation of individualism and the idea that citizens draw their identity and raison d’etre from the state. Evidence of this emerged earlier this week when Chinese Vice Sports Minister Yu Zaiqing (于再清) chided 18-year-old Olympic champion short track speedskater Zhou Yang (周洋) for thanking her parents — but not her country — after winning gold at the Vancouver Winter Games last month.

“It’s OK to thank your parents, but first you should thank the motherland. You should put the motherland first, not only thank your parents,” Yu told the Southern Metropolis Daily.

This article, published today in the Taipei Times, continues here.

It’s a crude, crude world out there

The global economy needs it. Nations laid their foundations upon it. It has yielded untold riches. But it has also proven a ruinous curse: wars have been declared over it; tyrants and corporate greed have thrived on it; and lives and nature have been ravaged — often irreparably — by it. Oil.

It’s running out, quicker than we thought, New York Times Magazine contributing reporter Peter Maass argues in Crude World: The Violent Twilight of Oil. But after reading his expose of the evils, intended or otherwise, of the oil industry, this development might not be such a bad thing.

In this highly entertaining investigation, Maass, whose previous book was about war in the Balkans, takes us from the palatial oil ministries of the Middle East to the heart of darkness in Equatorial Guinea, with stops in the war-ravaged streets of Iraq, the militia-infested jungles of the Niger Delta, a cut-throat, spy-infested hotel in Baku, Azerbaijan, and the environmental catastrophe in Ecuador’s Oriente.

No less fascinating are the individuals we meet who are caught in the unforgiving wheels of the oil industry. We meet jet-setting star attractions like Saudi Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi, who reassures an audience in Washington that Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves are plentiful; and Matthew Simon, a former adviser to former US president George W. Bush who would very much be part of the oil nomenklatura were it not for his belief that “the American dream and the world as we know it are on the verge of falling apart” because Naimi is wrong. Guerrilla leaders, crusading lawyers, oil executives from all the best-known oil giants and ordinary soldiers, all get sucked in by the folly of oil, and Maass provides us an intimate portrait of their motivations. The full spectrum of emotions, from greed to fear, alienation to desire, inhabit this bizarre world; appropriately, they are used as titles for each section. (Interestingly, almost every person we meet is male, which, from a sociological perspective, says a lot about the oil sector.)

This book review, published today in the Taipei Times, continues here.

Beijing sees culture as a weapon

Addressing the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) on Wednesday, Jia Qinglin (賈慶林), the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) No. 4 official and chairman of the CPPCC national committee, reaffirmed his government’s commitment to the “peaceful” development of cross-strait relations.

“We will constantly increase contacts with political parties, organizations, social groups, influential figures from all walks of life and the general public in Taiwan,” he told the more than 2,000 delegates at the Great Hall of the People.

Then came a comment that should make us pause both for the strategy that it highlights as for the lack of understanding of Taiwan that it elicits: “All this [growing exchanges] greatly enhanced the acceptance of the Chinese nation and Chinese culture by our Taiwan[ese] compatriots.”

Chinese officials have made no secret of the fact that they see Chinese culture as a weapon by which to persuade Taiwanese to agree to annexation. After many years of seeing Taiwan allegedly “drift” from its Chinese cultural heritage — efforts that accelerated during the administration of former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) — Beijing is now seizing the opportunity created by the presidency of Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) to impose a Chinese cultural template on Taiwan. Given the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) acquiescence in this endeavor, and Ma’s repeated references to Chinese culture, the situation is somewhat reminiscent of Taiwan during the era of White Terror, when symbols of Taiwaneseness, including the language, were barred from the media and Chinese — as opposed to Taiwanese — history was taught in the nation’s schools.

As contact between the two sides accelerates and the creative industries cross-pollinate (this will likely be mostly one way, given China’s greater financial resources and censorship at home), the assault on Taiwanese consciousness through cultural means will only intensify. By dint of repetition and subtle changes here and there (on television, in schoolbooks and academic forums), the Chinese plan could succeed in eroding Taiwanese cultural identity — at least to a certain extent.

Other countries with a powerful neighbor, such as Canada vis-a-vis the US, have often raised the specter of a culture threat, mostly through the flooding of their domestic markets by films, music, literature and McDonald’s. Under such circumstances, however, if there is a threat, it is an indirect one in that no conscious effort is being made by Washington to shape minds through cultural bombardment.

In Taiwan’s case, however, it has become rather clear that cultural influence is no mere collateral — it is, in fact, the tip of a missile aimed straight at the heart.

This effort at cultural transformation to achieve political objectives, however, is of limited effectiveness and will be less likely to achieve its ultimate aims if the strategy becomes too transparent (external factors, such as the Chinese military threat, will also undermine such a strategy).

Comments such as those by Jia, to the effect that cross-strait exchanges highlight “the acceptance of the Chinese nation and Chinese culture by ... Taiwan[ese] compatriots,” underscore the political elements of China’s cultural strategy and are an example of the transparency that could throw Beijing’s plans off track. That is so because of the false assumptions that buttress those efforts.

The willingness of Taiwanese to engage in more discussions with Chinese, to watch Chinese movies, attend Chinese art expositions (or gaze at pandas) is simply natural curiosity. By no means does this signify, however, that by doing so Taiwanese accept the so-called Chinese nation — by which Beijing means “one China” — or see it as their culture. Quebecers, for example, may show a great deal of interest in a French troupe performing in Quebec City (or Hollywood movies, for that matter), but this does not mean that they “accept” France, or the US, as the seat of their culture.

A better analogy, perhaps, would be that of a Palestinian interested in learning more about Israelis living across the fence by attending discussion groups involving the two people. However high his interest might be, it remains purely academic and under no circumstances would it imply the acceptance that Palestinian land belongs to some Greater Israel.

If Beijing subscribes to the belief that interest in seeing things Chinese means acceptance of its dominion over Taiwan, it is in for a very unpleasant surprise.

Slips like that made by Jia on Wednesday are not infrequent and should serve as a warning to Taiwanese that for Beijing, nothing is sacred, or off limit, in its pursuit of unification.

This article was published today in the Taipei Times.

Overinterpreting signals

In an entry on Feb. 26 I speculated on the possibilities behind a decision by an international wire agency to hold, for about three weeks, a story with implications for the Taiwan Strait. Based on the information that I had received at the time, I listed some possibilities based on the assumption that the news would be political in nature.

As it turns out, my assumptions were flawed, likely influenced by the fact that local by-elections would be held in Taiwan the following day. This was a classic case of looking at an object from too narrow a focus, or of looking at everything from a very specific lens, which in some cases will either mislead the observer or constrain his ability to explore other possibilities (I should have known better, as this though-mode is something that I criticized in my book about Canadian security intelligence and is proof that no one is immune from that intellectual trap).

This said, the “big news” were not as “big” as I believed they would be, nor will its implications for Taiwan be as ominous as I led readers to believe. Last night, The Associated Press’ Peter Enav and Debby Wu filed a story about the role of a Taiwanese firm, as well as possible shortcomings by Taiwanese authorities in matters related to nonproliferation, in the transshipment of transducers to Iran, a story that AP broke back in January. This time around, however, the story provides far more specifics, including the names of the firms involved. It’s a good read and an important story.

I still haven’t been able to determine why AP chose to hold the story for that long, however, or to release it a mere 24 hours after the election (this could be a pure coincidence).

A lesson learned, and my apologies to my readers for the alarmism.

Same subject, different takes

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won three of the four local by-elections today, including wins in traditionally Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) strongholds. It also increased its vote percentage in all four elections. Even in Hualien County, a KMT base, defeated DPP candidate Hsiao Bi-khim (left, holding bouquet) managed to raise the party’s share of votes from 29 percent to a record 41 percent (it’s probably a good thing that Hsiao didn’t win in Hualien; she is far too talented and connected to be locked down in local politics in Hualien, and her skills can be put to better use for the party at the central level).

As of this writing, two wire agencies — Reuters and The Associated Press — have reported on the vote. It is interesting to see how differently the agencies can report the news. First, here’s AP’s:

Taiwan’s ruling party suffered its third major electoral setback in two months Saturday, losing three of four by-elections despite the president's efforts to boost his sagging public support. The main opposition [DPP] won legislative seats in Hsinchu, Taoyuan and Chiayi counties, the Central Election Commission said. The ruling [KMT] won one seat in Hualien … The DPP’s strong showing is sure to boost its morale, allowing it to hit harder at President Ma Ying-jeou, especially his signature policy of forging closer economic ties with rival China.

Now here’s Reuters’; see if you can tell the difference:

Taiwan’s anti-China opposition party picked up two extra seats in legislative by-elections on Saturday, handing another loss to the ruling party that has pursued a detente with Beijing. The [DPP], which advocates Taiwan’s formal independence, won three of four seats, including one they held before, following months of popular discontent with the [KMT]. Sustained strength of the opposition could be a drag on Taiwan stocks, as investors might fear a freeze in recent moves towards greater trade a economic cooperation between Taiwan and China.

Aside from the “rival China,” AP remains neutral in its reporting and sticks to the facts. Reuters, however, gratuitously dramatizes the whole thing and shows its biases: The DPP is “anti-China” (a lie, except for the really deep-green, perhaps) while the KMT has “pursued détente.” In other words, the DPP is irrational, a “troublemaker” and “against” something, while the KMT is pragmatic and stands for “peace.” Then the wins are portrayed as a threat to the stock exchange and the proposed economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) between Taiwan and China. In other words, investors should “fear” wins by the DPP because the latter is supposedly bad for the economy.

In its first report, Kyodo, the Japanese news agency, also stuck to the facts, with a slight (and far less overt) spin in favor of the DPP.

It is said that beauty lies in the eye of the beholder; so does journalistic neutrality, it would appear.

Something big is coming

Independent sources have informed me that a well-known international wire agency has been sitting on a “big” Taiwan/China story “for weeks” and that it may be on the brink of making it public. The reasons for the delay, I was told, were “a request from China” as well as fears that making it public now would have an impact on this weekend’s by-elections in Taiwan. The news could be released by Sunday, I was told. One source said the story behind the news embargo was possibly as fascinating as the breaking news itself.

While a source told me that in recent months “bits” of news have pointed toward this development, it is, at this point, difficult to conjecture on what this might be. Still, based on what has been made available to me, it is possible to make a few observations:

(a) if the news is being held at the request of Chinese authorities, it means that the “feared consequences” of releasing it prior to the elections would be deleterious to the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) candidates. Otherwise, if it cast the KMT in a positive light (at least with pan-green voters), Beijing would have expedited the release and lifted the embargo so that its beneficial impact were felt before people cast their vote;

(b) tell-tale signs over the past months; the possibilities include (in increasing “controversy” order):

- The opening of Straits Exchange Foundation-Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait offices on both sides, though this isn’t highly controversial and would only have a marginal impact on the elections;

- A visit by senior provincial Chinese leaders. On Feb. 24, Xinhua news agency reported that the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office had announced that an undisclosed number of such officials would soon be dispatched to Taiwan. Again, there is a precedent for this and the controversy level or potential of a negative impact on the election’s outcome is minimal;

- A visit to Taiwan by a senior Chinese Communist Party official, or by a senior KMT official to China. One the Chinese side, Premier Wen Jiabao — who has expressed his desire of visiting Taiwan one day — comes to mind;

And, as our most controversial candidates because President Ma Ying-jeou has said that both would not occur in his first term:

- A summit meeting, possibly in a neutral location, between Chinese President Hu Jintao and Taiwanese President Ma.

- The beginning of negotiations on a cross-strait “peace agreement.”

Other developments that I have discarded because they would potentially have a positive impact on KMT candidates’ chances of getting elected include an announcement by Beijing that it will de-target or dismantle the 1,500 ballistic missiles it aims at Taiwan; allowing Taiwan’s participation at the WHO; and (highly unlikely) a delay in economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) negotiations.

Stay tuned. This could be a very interesting weekend.

Ma ‘error’ throws Taiwan back two decades

The Presidential Office last week quickly corrected an “error” made after a meeting between President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and US Representative James Sensenbrenner Jr. The “error” came in a post- meeting press release that quoted Ma as referring to the two sides of the Taiwan Strait as “nations.” It was later changed to “two areas” on the Presidential Office Web site.

The following day, Presidential Office Spokesman Wang Yu-chi (王郁琦) told reporters that Ma would never make such a “mistake” and reaffirmed the administration’s adherence to the Republic of China (ROC) Constitution, which, when taken literally — as Wang did — signifies that China is an “area” of the ROC. Wang also underscored that Taipei does not recognize the sovereignty of the Chinese Communist Party.

The use of “areas” to describe Taiwan and China, he said, reflected the longstanding “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait and was followed by the administrations of former presidents Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) and Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁).

This last characterization, however, masks a far more complex shift in Taiwan that began in 1991 with what authors Bruce Jacobs and I-hao Ben Liu describe in their paper “Lee Teng-hui and the Idea of Taiwan” as the recognition by the ROC on Taiwan “that it did not control the Chinese mainland.” In other words, Lee sought to fix Taiwan as the limit of the ROC’s jurisdiction. This would lead to six constitutional amendments under Lee, changes to the final clause of the first phase of the National Unification Guidelines (國家統一綱領) and the termination of the Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of National Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion (動員勘亂時期臨時條款).

My analysis, published today in the Taipei Times, continues here.

After the Eastern storm

Some took issue with the lack of French content. Others focused on the small glitch at the end of the ceremony, when one of the legs forming the Olympic torch failed to rise. A few have complained about the fact that the other torch — the one displayed outside — is surrounded by barbed wire and inaccessible to the general public.

For this author, it was the exploitation of Aborigines: Even though they were given prominent position during the opening ceremony of the Vancouver Winter Olympics, Canada’s natives continue to be treated as second-rate citizens by the Canadian government and remain largely impoverished.

Case in point: Of the 206 athletes who are representing Canada in the Games, only one — snowboarder Caroline Calve from Quebec — is an Aborigine. If the Canadian team were truly representative of Canada’s ethnic fabric, there would be seven or eight Aborigines on the team (about 4 percent of the population identify as Aboriginal). Canada will also have only one Aborigine — Colette Bourgonje — at the Paralympic Winter Games next month.

That some of the “authentic” First Nations Olympic souvenirs were found to have been manufactured in China, Italy and Thailand, when one in four children in First Nations communities lives in poverty (the highest rate is in British Columbia), also underscores the handicap that Canada’s Aborigines face today.

That said, artistic director David Atkins gave us an eyeful on Feb. 12, turning BC Place in Vancouver into a dreamlike scene that blended actors, dancers, an unprecedented use of projectors, as well as poetry and music. For many, the highlights were the wonderful narration by Canadian actor Donald Sutherland and K.D. Lang’s haunting rendition of the great Leonard Cohen’s Hallelujah, where the signer stood, alone, among millions of bright stars in the night.

Above all, the ceremony distinguished itself through its focus on the individual and its embrace of difference. Carrying the Olympic flag, for example, were individuals such as Romeo Dallaire, who led UN peacekeeping forces during the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The torch, meanwhile, was carried in by Rick Hansen, a paraplegic athlete. Lang is lesbian. Hockey great Wayne Gretzky did not light the torch alone; he was one among equals.

This was quite the contrast with the opening ceremonies in Beijing in August 2008, where the individual could not be distinguished from the masses and where a child was deemed not pretty enough (she had crooked teeth) to sing before the public and was therefore replaced by a picture-perfect lip-synching stand-in. Beijing gave many a frisson, a spectacular feat that sent a chill down one’s spine. It screamed nationalism unleashed, the setting in motion of a wheel that crushed the individual on its road to glory. And criticism of the ceremony — at least domestically — was silenced.

In the end, Atkins’ work was far more moving for its centering on the individual and its humility in design. It was much more intimate and drew the spectator in rather than keep him at bay. However grandiose Zhang Yimou’s (張藝謀) Beijing feat may have been, it was difficult to connect emotionally with his work. It was exclusive rather than inclusive, meant to intimidate rather than to inspire.

Ultimately, Vancouver showed maturity and confidence, something that was lacking in Beijing — and continues to be lacking today. Humility can be strength where muscular fanfare is a sign of weakness.

This article appeared on Feb. 24 in the Taipei Times.

Su Chi out, Hu Wei-jen in

State-owned Central News Agency called it a “surprise,” but it was anything but. National Security Council (NSC) Secretary-General Su Chi (蘇起) announced his resignation today, stating “health” and “family” reasons. Of course, his role in the US-beef debacle late last year, added to immediate voting considerations for the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), are the main reasons why he is leaving his post. As I argued in an analysis last month, though a close confidant to President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), Su’s image as NSC chief had become toxic for the administration. With calls for his resignation mounting, it no longer was a question of if, but when.

The timing, just one day before the nation goes on an 11-day Lunar New Year holiday, was perfect, as the story will be quickly forgotten and the blow to the image of the Ma administration will be minimal.

With Su’s resignation already approved by his former high-school buddy Ma, in comes Hu Wei-jen (胡為真) to replace him. Hu, a retired diplomat with 35 years of experience, was a first deputy director of the National Security Bureau, NSC vice chairman under former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and served as the nation’s envoy to Germany and Singapore. He resigned from his post in Singapore in 2007 in protest at the Chen administration’s “de-sinification” campaign.

“Since we are all clearly Chinese, I do not approve of some of the policies [adopted by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration],” he famously said upon his resignation.

After leaving Singapore, Hu went to Harvard University, where he served as a visiting scholar.

Hu’s critics said he had a tendency to put his personal views above his political duties, which explains why his tenure under the DPP government was not a smooth one. Based on his comments, it is clear that he is of the old KMT mentality of adherence to the Republic of China and that people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are “Chinese.” In that respect at least, this will ensure continuity at the NSC, because this was also Su’s position. As Su fell out of favor with the US — which many sources in Washington confirmed — Hu’s presence at Harvard may have given US officials some time to get to know him. In other words, he might be “acceptable” to US officials who no longer wanted anything to do with Su.

We can also expect that Hu will play a less controversial, “back-seat” role at the NSC, as it has proven clear that Su’s publicity-attracting role caused Ma headaches and undermined the party’s image. His influence on Ma will certainly be less than Su’s, especially with King Pu-tsung (金溥聰) serving as KMT secretary-general, who was brought in fix the party’s image and address disunity.

For pan-green supporters who wanted Su to remain at the NSC because his presence made Ma’s life more difficult (and therefore further discredited the KMT), his stepping down might not be welcome. But we can look at it differently and breathe in relief, as this removes from the top echelon of government an official who had questionable ties with the Chinese Communist Party and who was a dangerous influence on the president. It does not appear that Hu’s ties with Beijing are as close as Su’s.

Here’s a little bit of background. Hu is the son of Army general Hu Zongnan (胡宗南), the “Eagle of the North-West,” who was one of Chiang Kai-shek’s (蔣介石) commanders. Historical documents show that Hu’s confidential secretary tipped off the Communist leadership before an attack on Yenan in the spring of 1947, giving them plenty of time to flee ahead of the operation. In their biography of Mao Zedong (毛澤東), Jung Chang and John Halliday claim that Hu father was a Communist “sleeper” who “engineered repeated disasters that cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of KMT soldiers” (quoted in Fenby, 337). After the publication of their book, Hu Wei-jen asked Jung and Halliday to rewrite the part about his father.

Presidential Office explains reasons behind foreign media snub at ECFA briefing

The Presidential Office on Tuesday commented on why foreign media had not been allowed to attend a briefing by Ma on the ECFA.

In an e-mail to the Taipei Times, Taiwan Foreign Correspondents’ Club (TFCC) president Robin Kwong (鄺彥暉) said that after receiving a complaint letter from the TFCC, the Presidential Office told him that the meeting was intended as a “gathering between the president and the local journalists’ association” and was not a press event.

“It was therefore not open to not just foreign media, but also local media who were not members of the journalists’ association [btb Association of Taiwan Journalists],” Kwong said.

As a last-minute solution, foreign media were allowed to watch the event on a video link at the Presidential Office press room.

Kwong said the Presidential Office was focusing on improving its communication on ECFA-related matters with the domestic audience after being criticized for its handling of the US beef issue in recent months.

“If the president [is] going to talk about an issue as important as [an] ECFA, then it is no longer just a social gathering,” Kwong told the Presidential Office, adding that the TFCC was “especially concerned” because Tuesday’s briefing was not just a one-off event, but a regular monthly briefing.

“The Presidential Office’s response was that they would not change the arrangements for yesterday [Tuesday], but that President Ma would hold a similar briefing with the TFCC in early April,” Kwong said.

This section of a longer article on ECFA appeared today in the Taipei Times.

Presidential Office snubs foreign media on ECFA briefings

The Taiwan Foreign Correspondent’s Club (TFCC) yesterday lodged a protest with the Presidential Office after being informed that foreign reporters would not be allowed to attend Ma’s briefing. The directive is expected to apply to all subsequent monthly briefings. The TFCC was told that foreign correspondents would be able to watch in real time from the Presidential Office press room.

TFCC president Robin Kwong said he only learned of yesterday’s briefing a day earlier.

In a letter to the Presidential Office, Kwong wrote that the decision “set a regrettable and unhealthy precedent for future interactions between the Presidential Office and foreign press,” adding that ECFA negotiations “will have repercussions for those living beyond [Taiwan, who] have as much a right to know about what is happening as those primarily served by the local media.”

The arrangements for yesterday’s press conference were “unacceptable” and the TFCC would be “deeply outraged” if this were to become a template for future briefings on ECFA, Kwong said. (The above appeared in the Taipei Times yesterday.)

I communicated this with Reporters Without Borders Asia, which responded by calling it a "disturbing development."

What is the Ma administration afraid of? Why should foreign media, by virtue of their not being invited to the briefings, not be allowed to ask questions? For an administration that claims that it's main problem in selling the ECFA is poor communication, excluding foreign media is an incomprehensible move. This decision also lends credence to claims by Freedom House and other observers that press freedoms under the Ma administration have suffered, so much so that while attending a dinner at the official residence of Canada's de facto ambassador to Taiwan on Tuesday night, many guests asked me to comment on freedom of the press in Taiwan and whether it was true that the environment is becoming less friendly to journalists — and that was before the foregoing news were publicized!

Interestingly, state-owned CNA wrote that: “At Ma’s press conference, which drew large numbers of local and foreign reporters, he directed most of his comments to local farmers and workers, detailing reasons why Taiwan needs to sign a trade pact China,” which obviously isn’t right (italics added).

Kwong's full letter, a copy of which I received as a TFCC member:

February 9, 2010

The Presidential Office

To Spokesperson Tony Wang:

The Taiwan Foreign Correspondents Club would like to register its protest over President Ma Ying-jeou's plan to hold regular monthly press conferences on Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) that are open only to local media. We believe this would set a regrettable and unhealthy precedent for future interactions between the Presidential Office and foreign press.

ECFA is a matter of interest to those beyond Taiwan. What your government decides to sign with the People's Republic of China will have repercussions for those living beyond this island and they have as much a right to know about what is happening as those primarily served by the local media.

Even within Taiwan, public opinion of ECFA will hinge on how the agreement is viewed internationally. It would be in Taiwan's best interest if the leaders and businessmen of other countries are kept well informed of ECFA, and foreign press is crucial in this regard.

We find your arrangements for this afternoon's press conference unacceptable and would be deeply outraged should it become a template for future press conferences on ECFA. We see no reason why foreign media should be excluded from asking questions of the President, nor why we should not be allowed to attend the press conference.

We also find your argument that we could always just watch the event from a CCTV feed in the press room disingenuous, considering the fact that neither the Presidential Office nor the Government Information Office even bothered to notify foreign press of this event in advance.

The Club, which represents the majority of foreign media in Taiwan, therefore urges your office to reconsider the decision to bar foreign reporters from tomorrow's and future press conferences. This simply does not befit a government that has been lauded for its respect for the freedom of the press.

Yours sincerely,

Robin Kwong
President, Taiwan Foreign Correspondent's Club

University off PRC’s approval list after Dalai Lama honored

Amid clear warnings by Beijing that US President Barack Obama should avoid meeting the Dalai Lama at the White House later this month, another development involving the exiled Tibetan leader has gone unnoticed. On Sept. 30, the University of Calgary awarded an honorary degree of laws — the university’s highest honor — to the Dalai Lama.

Three months later, the University of Calgary was dropped from the Chinese Ministry of Education’s accreditation list of universities for Chinese students desiring to study abroad, the Calgary Herald newspaper reported on Thursday.

The Hotline for Overseas Studies Service Center in Beijing had the following advice for Chinese students: “If you don’t already go to that school, it is better not to go because you will face risks.”

The hotline recommends Chinese students choose their university only from among those on the list.

While an operator at the center told the Herald that degrees for Chinese students who are already studying at the University of Calgary would be certified by the ministry, she said that “the policy might change” in coming years.

Asked by the Herald why Beijing had blacklisted the university, a spokeswoman at the Chinese Consulate in Calgary said the university “should know.” The Herald also reported that in April, Chinese consulate officials had met representatives of the university to express their opposition to the Dalai Lama visiting the campus.

The spiritual leader did not go to the campus.

“We have offended our Chinese partners by the very fact of bringing in the Dalai Lama, and we have work to resolve that issue,” university spokesperson Colleen Turner told the Canadian Broadcasting Corp (CBC) on Thursday.

The university knew its decision to give the Dalai Lama an honorary degree could “anger” Beijing, she said.

University officials were trying to determine what the ministry’s decision would mean for current Chinese students and alumni and their chances of finding employment once they returned to China.

About 600 students from China and Hong Kong are enrolled at the University of Calgary. On average, tuition for foreign students is three times higher than for local students.

One Chinese student, who only gave her name as “Jessie,” told CBC she was afraid she would not be able to find a job when she returns home.

“I’m international and I’m paying triple the tuition, and that’s a lot of money, and my parents are the ones paying for that,” the third-year student said.

“I just don’t want to waste all that money because they work really hard to support me,” she said.

She said she knew the Chinese government would react harshly to the Dalai Lama’s visit.

This article was published today in the Taipei Times.

Book Review: A tale of two city-states

At first glance, Hong Kong and Singapore could be twins, but the manner in which the authorities handled political dissent led to very different results. What happened?

It has often been said that democracy is not endemic to Asia, or that its development is inevitably stunted by so-called “Asian values” or “Chinese characteristics.” Opponents of this view, meanwhile, argue that modernization leads to democratization as an increasing number of groups and individuals are empowered and therefore become more prone to challenge the authorities. This has led to the belief — and hope — that modernity, oft-defined as the adoption of capitalism, will transform a state from within and initiate the process of democratization.

If this were the case then China, of all countries, would be expected to be the next country on the democracy waiting list. And yet, there are hardly any signs that it is about to do that. How do we explain this?

As “most similar cases,” two Asian city-states — Singapore and Hong Kong — allow us to experiment with the impact of modernity on post-colonial regimes with a tradition of “soft authoritarianism.” By following the emergence of contention alongside rapid economic development in the city-states and how the authorities responded to that challenge, we can establish whether democratization is a teleological phenomenon — in other words, that modernity/capitalism inevitably leads to democracy — or if other preconditions are necessary for this transformation to occur.

This is what Stephan Ortmann, assistant professor of comparative politics at Fern University in Hagen, Germany, undertakes in Politics and Change in Singapore and Hong Kong. To this end, Ortmann presents a detailed analysis of the ruling elites in Singapore and Hong Kong, as well as the oppositional groups that have challenged their authority.

My review of Ortmann's book, published today in the Taipei Times, continues here.

Fear, lawsuits and self-censorship

Last year, a retired intelligence officer and a journalist co-authored a book about foreign espionage in Canada. In one section of the book, the authors indirectly referred to a locally based organization that lobbied for a certain foreign government. They claimed that this organization may have received money from that foreign government’s intelligence agencies to pressure Ottawa into supporting a bill that condemned another government for crimes committed in a war more than half a century ago.

Soon after the book was published, some local newspapers carried reviews of it and a former member of parliament (MP) linked it on his blog. Eventually, said organization filed lawsuits against the authors, their publisher, the newspapers that carried the review and the owner of the newspapers, as well as the former MP.

My opinion piece, published today in the Taipei Times, continues here.

Taiwan’s Air Force buys choppers from Eurocopter

Washington-based weekly Defense News reported on Tuesday that the Taiwan Air Force had selected the Eurocopter EC225 helicopter, a medium-lift helicopter, for search and rescue operations. The US$111 million contract for three helicopters, which is to be signed in the next few days, was awarded in December and includes an option for a total of 20 helicopters, Defense News reported.

US-based Sikorsky Aircraft Corp, a subsidiary of United Technology Corp, was also a bidder for the deal with its S-92 Helibus medium-lift helicopter.

Eurocopter is a subsidiary of European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS), which is headquartered in the Netherlands.

Through its many subsidiaries, EADS produces civilian aircraft (Airbus), satellite technology (Astrium) and various weapons systems, from missiles to combat aircraft.

The military deal is the first made by a European defense company since the sale of Mirage 2000 aircraft and Lafayette-class frigates in the early 1990s.

Since then, European firms have shied away from major military sales to Taiwan for fear of compromising lucrative sales in the Chinese market.

According to its Web site, Eurocopter recorded a turnover of 4.6 billion euros (US$6.38 billion) globally, of which 896 million euros was in Asia. This marked a turnover growth of 58 percent for Eurocopter in the Asia-Pacific region.

Eurocopter is also in a partnership with the Aviation Industry of China in the development of EC175/Z15 helicopters.

China’s Maritime Surveillance Agency also possesses EC225 helicopters.

The news comes in the wake of an announcement by Washington of a US$6.4 billion arms package to Taiwan last month, to which Beijing retaliated with the suspension of military contacts and the threat of sanctions against US firms involved in the deal — including Sikorsky, which manufactures the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters included in the package.

At press time, Beijing had yet to respond to the announcement of the Eurocopter sale.

This story appeared today in the Taipei Times.

I didn't have enough room to add this to the Taipei Times story, but it should be noted that Eurocopter had already sold helicopters to Taiwan, namely to the National Police Agency's Civil Defense Headquarters. By not directly selling to the military, however, Eurocopter may have avoided drawing Beijing's ire. It will be interesting to see how Beijing reacts, as this one is definitely a sale to the Taiwanese military. I am also awaiting comments from the EADS branch office in Taipei and Eurocopter representatives in Singapore and the Netherlands.

Wendell Minnick of Defense News, who broke the story from Singapore, where he is covering the air show, also told me on Thursday that many people were confused by the news, believing that Eurocopter winning the bid meant that Taiwan would not be purchasing Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. These are two unrelated purchases; the Eusocopter is a search-and-rescue helicopter bought by the Air Force, while the UH-60s are being bought by the Taiwanese Army.

Arms sale will not affect ECFA talks

Despite Beijing’s shrill response to the announcement on Friday that the US would submit for congressional approval about US$6.4 billion in weapons to Taiwan — a reaction that includes the suspension of military-to-military exchanges and sanctions targeted at US firms, among others — one aspect of the triangular relationship is unlikely to be affected: cross-strait negotiations on an economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA).

Some analysts have suggested that China is expected to punish Taiwan over the arms announcement by suspending economic exchanges. Raymond Wu, managing director of the Taipei-based political risk consultancy e-telligence, told Reuters’ Ralph Jennings that the signing of an ECFA, which Taipei hopes to achieve sometime in the middle of this year, could be pushed back as far as 2011.

This is highly unlikely, however. First of all, prior to the arms sale announcement, Beijing had already stated the possibility that there could be delays in the signing of an ECFA, which tells us that differences over the nuts and bolts of the agreement, rather than external factors such as weapons sales, could affect the timeline.

Secondly, Beijing has focused its wrath on Washington over the arms deal, mostly because punishing Taiwan would be counterproductive. Beijing has been trying to win the hearts and minds of Taiwanese; lashing out at it would quickly undermine whatever gains it has made in that department.

Third, Beijing does not want to make the life of the increasingly unpopular President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) more difficult than it already is. Ma’s administration has been very accommodating to Beijing’s desires, and despite the occasional bump in the road, Ma is seen by Beijing as an ally, or at least as someone who will facilitate its ultimate objective of annexing Taiwan.

Finally, delaying or nixing an ECFA would go against Beijing’s long-term ambitions of unification. Notwithstanding the economic nature of the agreement, Chinese leaders have long stated — and done so publicly — that an ECFA is a means to an end, and that the end is political: unification. By tying Taiwan’s economy to that of China, Beijing is maximizing the likelihood that it will succeed in achieving “peaceful” unification. Killing that instrument over an arms sale that only superficially alters the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait is therefore not an option for Beijing, however “angry” it is.