Taiwan: Between the Pivot and a Hard Place

What role, if any, can Taiwan play in the U.S. rebalancing to Asia? And what can Taipei to do increase its chances of being given a role in the fledging regional alliance? 

More than three years have elapsed since then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton posited the idea of a U.S. “pivot,” or “rebalancing,” to Asia in her article for Foreign Policy magazine. To this day, nobody seems to have a clear idea how to define the nature and shape of the endeavor in either quantitative or qualitative terms. An even more difficult question is whether Taiwan could, or will, play a role in the pivot, and if so, what would be the extent of its involvement. 

Although several factors favour a role for Taiwan—its geographical location within the first island chain and a democratic political system, among them—integrating the island-nation into the pivot also involves risks and challenges that are unique to its situation. 

My article, published today on the China Policy Institute Blog at the University of Nottingham, continues here. (Photo by the author.)

Two Ways of Looking at a Spy

The Zhen Xiaojiang spy network sounds like bad news for Taiwan, but the damage to national security might not be as severe as it sounds 

The philosophical questions over what compels individuals to betray their country were once again raised on Jan. 16 when prosecutors unveiled indictments against five Taiwanese and a Chinese citizen on espionage charges. As with other cases over the years, the revelation that members of Taiwan’s armed forces had agreed to spy for Beijing exacerbated the perception that the island-nation’s security apparatus has been thoroughly penetrated, that it is unreliable, and that Taiwanese would sell their country for a dime. 

Given the frequency with which spy cases have been uncovered in the past decade, the alarmists are certainly not entirely unjustified in contending that this is bad news for Taiwan and its security relationship with the U.S., though as I argued elsewhere, we do not want to overstate the matter and need to take the propaganda value of intelligence operations — even those that are discovered — into consideration. 

My article, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here (photo by the author).

Does Taiwan Need a Ko Revolution?

Reforming the system is absolutely necessary. But what can society do if entrenched interests and status quo powers stand in the way of what needs to be done? 

On many occasions since the members of the Sunflower Movement voluntarily exited the Legislative Yuan after a more than three-week occupation in April 2014, I had found myself correcting the perception among a number of foreign journalists and at academic conferences overseas that the dramatic events in the spring constituted a revolution. Though the term “Sunflower Revolution” was repeatedly used, it was a misnomer: It was never the intention of the Sunflowers to overthrow the system, or to replace it with another. Rather, the sole objective was reform of existing institutions. Therefore, notwithstanding the “extreme” nature of their actions, the Sunflowers overwhelmingly agreed that the prevailing political system should continue to exist, though they wanted to see its many flaws remedied, and unaccounted officials expunged. 

We still don’t know to what extent the Sunflower Movement succeeded in achieving its goals. What is clear is that governments can rarely implement in the whole the maximalist requests of civil society; after all, politics is the art of compromise — at least in democratic societies. The controversial services trade agreement that sparked the occupation remains stalled, and an oversight mechanism for future cross-strait negotiations, one of the conditions set by the activists before they vacated the legislature, to is under consideration. 

There were other less easily quantifiable successes. Despite officials claims to the contrary, the Ma administration’s reputation suffered a terrible blow. The drama re-energized civic activism, bringing political awareness among the population to levels unseen in years, and generated substantial interest overseas by making Taiwan exciting and newsworthy. Finally, the occupation undoubtedly had an impact on the Nov. 29 “nine-in-one” local elections, in which the ruling Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) was roundly defeated. 

As I argued in a commentary a few months ago, the next step for the Sunflowers and the young activists the movement inspired is for themselves to enter politics and work from the inside. Since then, it has been encouraging to see a number of them choose to do so. Some of them ran in the Nov. 29 elections, while others started their own party or decided to join an existing political party — in almost every case the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a much more natural ally, given its ideology, than the KMT. 

My article, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here (photo by the author).

The Spies Are Coming! The Spies Are Coming to Taiwan!

Damage assessments following the busting of a spy ring must look not only to the secrets that were stolen, but also to the propaganda value of the exercise 

The optics couldn’t be worse — four Taiwanese military officers, including an Air Force pilot, a lieutenant colonel and a former Army major general, indicted on charges of belonging to a spy ring led by a Chinese intelligence officer. Oh, and the owner of a karaoke club, to boot. The January 16 indictments, which follow the arrest in September last year of Zhen Xiaojiang, the Chinese handler who was also indicted, are but the latest in a string of arrests on espionage charges in recent years. Fifteen cases were uncovered in 2014 alone. Has the Taiwanese security apparatus been completely penetrated by Chinese spies, as some analysts have been arguing? 

Maybe, but the extent to which systems and people have been compromised is anyone’s guess. The People’s Liberation Army is particularly interested in establishing a complete picture of Taiwan’s C4ISR architecture, radar and air defense systems, as well as war preparedness plans, a focus that has been confirmed through the string of arrests over the years, including the latest case. Despite warming ties between Taiwan and China since 2008, espionage efforts against the island-nation never abated; in fact, substantially increased contact between the two sides created a wealth of opportunities for intelligence collection and source recruitment by China. 

My article, published today in The Diplomat, continues here (photo by the author).

破解台海前途歷史必然的迷思

台灣與中國的統一絕非必然。事實上，它已經不再是選項

數十年來，學者和政治人物都費盡心思要為台海兩岸的死結尋求解套方式。至今提出過的一切解決方案，其核心都必定涉及「一個中國」的概念，無論用詞上作何表述。中國的智庫學者，以及台灣的藍、綠兩陣營，在這一點上挖空心思創造出各種詞彙：「一國兩憲」、「九二共識」、「一個中國各自表述」、「大一中」、「憲法一中」、「一國兩制」，諸如此類。他們期望運用這樣的發明創造避免台灣海峽再起戰端。但所有這些提案最大的問題，不只在於「統一是歷史必然」這一基本預設本身就漏洞百出，更在於這種基本預設完全是中國傳聲筒一手炮製出來，既限縮台灣選擇餘地，更把台灣和中國捆綁在一起的迷思。

目前，隨著民主進步黨2016年重回執政的前景看好，部分知識人開始主張民進黨凍結「台獨黨綱」對於台海兩岸的和平穩定至關重要，還有一些人最近更認為，民進黨也必須一併廢除1999年5月8日通過，用以取代台獨黨綱的「台灣前途決議文」。

前任行政院大陸委員會副主委童振源是綠營內部提出這種主張的論者之一。一如先前其他類似的論調，北京當局看來非常樂意大力宣揚這些論者的觀點。

在政治大學任教的童振源認為，民進黨不只應該廢棄「台灣前途決議文」，更要提出一個全新的兩岸交流平台，明文規定民進黨願意接受和中國統一，但必須以中國實現民主化為前提。我們姑且稱它為「兩岸民主統一論」。童振源也警告我們，要是做不到這點，兩岸關係就很有可能急速惡化。

「以『民主』這個字修飾「統一」一詞，完全符合台灣的根本價值與利益，並且讓中國繼續對統一抱有期望。」童振源在《台北時報》近日刊出的對頁評論中寫道。他接著說：

「此外，這也能夠讓統一成為開展中國民主化的積極力量。台灣可以宣佈自己只和人民普選產生的中國政府討論和平民主統一問題，唯有在北京實行民主之後，它和台北才能開會談判和平民主統一事宜，商討統一的具體內容及進行方式。」

童振源的提議有不少缺陷。如果這個提案確實是受到極力促統的《旺報》早先刊登的一篇社論啓發，這甚至還不成問題。更嚴重的是，他的說法和先前許多人如出一轍，把台灣當成了達成特定目的的手段，是通往中國民主化的途徑。他想讓我們相信，一旦這個結果實現（但我不得不說，這個成果十分渺茫，畢竟中國有太多機會向世界其他民主國家汲取民主經驗，卻從來不曾向民主前進一步），台灣自我犧牲，回歸「統一中國」的時候也就到了。倘若認同與國族情感是決定政治體制性質的唯一因素，那我們應當期望比利時人心甘情願地成為法國的一部份，但這再荒唐也不過了。

童振源和他的先進們掉進了同一個陷阱：他也認為統一是歷史必然，只是政治糾紛作梗，一旦爭議獲得解決，統一也就毫無阻礙。他甚至玩起了以「民主」替換「統一」的文字遊戲，但這種手法豈能騙過北京當局？換得的終歸還是同一個結果。

他的論證更要命的缺陷，則是徹底無視台灣人民的意志與期望，彷彿民主化的中國就會不可思議地自動放棄主宰台灣人命運的渴望。回歸統一的中國之後，台灣2300萬人口也就從自己國家裡的多數，成為全中國之下的少數，在全中國14億人口裡面差不多只佔了六十分之一。要假定只佔這麼少數的台灣人還能在統一的中國之下，確保一百多年來不受中國統治的經驗所產生的需求能繼續得到照顧，需要比孤注一擲更強大的信念。實際上，我們甚至可以斷言，民主化的中國比起不民主的中國更不可能照顧台灣人的需求，因為可想而知，實行專制的北京當局提供台灣破格待遇，並且強要中國人民接受是更輕而易舉的。

最後，童振源等人提出的這一類構想，最大的致命傷是根本缺乏可行性。民進黨決不可能向選民提出這種構想而不喪失民意基礎的。問題其實更加嚴峻：「一個中國」對台灣人就是行不通，如此而已。無論是以民主還是其他方式，台灣人對於和中國統一的支持度充其量只有百分之十，剩下的要不就支持獨立，要不就維持「現狀」，而維持現狀本身就是獨立的委婉表述，就算只是事實上的獨立。

長久以來的認同趨勢，加上過去一年發生的諸多事態，包括太陽花運動佔領立法院，以及11月29日九合一選舉結果，都指出了台灣國族主義即使受到中國及世界各國的壓力，仍然持續鞏固強化，而在我看來，這一演變是不可阻擋的。木已成舟、覆水難收，除非中國出兵攻佔，否則台灣會繼續作為一個獨特的政治實體而存在。

那麼，為何至今提出過的幾乎每一套替代模式，始終堅持要以中國統一的必然性為前提？我以為主因還是中國方面的宣傳，宣傳的對象倒不是台灣人民，而是國際社會。毫無疑問，中國共產黨想要製造出不可避免的必然感受，好瓦解台灣人的意志。北京當局對台北市長柯文哲明確示意，只有表態支持九二共識才允許他訪問中國，似乎足以證實這個結論，觀點和童振源相同的淡江大學教授王崑義推斷，這個條件很可能一體適用於其他有意造訪中國的民進黨籍縣市首長。中國是在警告：認同「一個中國」，否則你治理的城市就會被排除，得不到和中國往來的利益。

然而，正如前文所述，這樣的策略看來是失敗的。自我認同、以及統一對獨立支持度的各項關鍵指標都足以證明這個失敗。相形之下，中國的宣傳策略則力圖在國際上孤立台灣，將台灣的選擇限縮到只能戰爭與和平二選一。中共運用「中國統一是歷史必然」的概念，堅持複誦「『台灣問題』不過是一家屋簷下兩兄弟內部鬥爭的延續，而非兩個不同國家深刻歧異與衝突」這樣的謊言。這對於衝突的化解產生了嚴重影響，因為處理這兩種狀況所需的介入調停機制明顯不同。持續錯誤呈現衝突本質的結果（必然性概念強化了台海問題是「國內衝突」而非「國與國衝突」的認知），也就確定了我們要繼續運用錯誤的工具解決問題。

於是我們面臨一個抉擇：要不就改變早已過時的處理台海危機範式，要不就繼續無視台海兩岸衝突的本質，將無效的解決方案強加於台灣人，從而製造出更大的後患。台灣與中國的統一絕非必然，事實上，它已經不再是選項。

中譯 : William Tsai
Original article: http://thinking-taiwan.com/debunking-the-myth-of-inevitability/

Debunking the Myth of Inevitability in the Taiwan Strait

Unification between Taiwan and China is not inevitable; in fact, it is no longer an option 

For decades academics and politicians have sought to find ways to untie the Gordian Knot in the Taiwan Strait. Almost every solution proposed has at its core contained some reference, howsoever worded, to “one China.” Thinkers in China, and within both the green and blue camps in Taiwan, have toyed with variations on the theme — “one China, two constitutions,” “1992 consensus,” “one China, different interpretations,” “greater one China,” “constitutional one China,” “one country, two systems,” and so on. Creativity, they hoped, would help avert war in the Taiwan Strait. The problem with all these proposals is not only that the underlying assumption of unification as an inevitable outcome is deeply flawed, but that it is a myth that was created by Chinese propagandists to limit Taiwan’s options — to lock it in, in fact. 

More recently, with the prospect of a Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) comeback in 2016, some intellectuals have argued that future stability in cross-strait relations will be contingent on the DPP agreeing to freeze its “independence clause.” Others have more recently opined that the party’s “Resolution on Taiwan’s Future,” which after its adoption on May 8, 1999, replaced the “independence clause,” must also go. 

My article, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here (photo by the author).

China’s New Flight Routes Rile Taipei

Beijing no longer has use for President Ma and therefore will not hesitate in the coming year to take what with wants without any consideration for the Taiwanese president’ reputation 

With China’s unexpected announcement on January 12 that four new flight routes running extremely close to Taiwan proper are to be launched on March 5, Beijing may have dispelled any lingering notion that relations across the Taiwan Strait in 2015 will continue to be as “stable” and predictable as they had been over the past six years of the China-friendly Ma Ying-jeou administration. Though sudden, this development is part of a series of signals that lead us to conclude that the era of détente in the Strait, during which Beijing and Taipei engaged in negotiations somewhat as equals, is over. We are now likely entering a period of Chinese unilateralism. 

During the six years since Ma became president in 2008 on a platform that emphasized the need to improve relations with China, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait made good use of the many semi-official bodies and Track-1.5/2 forums at their disposal to negotiate a number of agreements, chief among them the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). Over time, those efforts were supplemented by party-to-party and, in some instances, contact between government officials from the two sides, such as face-to-face meetings between the Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council Minister and his counterpart at the Taiwan Affairs Office. In other words, there has been no lack of communication channels between Taiwan and China, and the opportunities to negotiate various agreements were seemingly limitless. 

Which makes China’s announcement on the air routes — M503, running on a north-south axis west of the centerline of the Taiwan Strait, and the east-west routes W121, W122 and W123 — rather alarming. Judging from Taipei’s reaction, Taiwanese authorities were either not consulted or negotiations on the matter had yet to have concluded. According to Bloomberg News, Taiwan and China had held two rounds of discussions to date. 

My article, published today in The Diplomat, continues here.

Setting the Agenda for 2015

The 2016 presidential elections are approaching fast, and Thinking Taiwan wants to be part of the action by providing in-depth analysis of what is at stake for Taiwan and the region 

What an exciting, and in many ways pivotal, year 2014 was for Taiwan! In the spring, civil society converged on the Legislative Yuan, which for many had come to symbolize political unaccountability, and occupied the building for more than three weeks, sparking a political crisis which will undoubtedly have long-term consequences for politics in the Taiwan Strait. Then in the fall, Taiwanese voters used their ballots to send a clear signal to the ruling Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) that they’d had enough with old practices. Nothing encapsulated that sentiment more than the election on Nov. 29 of Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), a quirky medical practitioner with no political experience and no party affiliation, over the KMT’s Sean Lien (連勝文), who was very much the “establishment” candidate. 

Launched on May 6, Thinking Taiwan couldn’t have seen the light in more interesting times. With the 150-plus articles published since, we have sought to help our readers navigate the complex maze of Taiwan’s domestic politics and relationship with China in a period ebullient with emotions and high in uncertainty. We thank our many contributors from the fields of academia, journalism, politics and civil society, in Taiwan and overseas, for shedding light on those important issues. 

This editorial, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here. (Photo by the author)

Former Taiwanese President Chen Released on Medical Bail

Chen Shui-bian’s temporary release could further complicate Taiwanese politics in the run-up to the 2016 presidential election 

Former Taiwanese president Chen Shui-bian, the outspoken politician who is serving a 20-year prison sentence for embezzlement and money laundering, was temporarily released on medical bail on January 5 in a move that is sure to complicate the island-nation’s already laden political scene. 

Chen, who led the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to victory in the 2000 elections and ended more than a century of uninterrupted rule by the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), stepped down in 2008 after serving two complete terms. Soon after the election of Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT that year, the authorities targeted Chen for investigation on various charges relating to misuse of funds and corruption. 

My article, published today in The Diplomat, continues here.

Calm Down, Taiwan Does Not Seek War with Vietnam

By parroting the remarks of legislators who don’t know what they are talking about, journalists are contributing to Taiwan’s problems 

The following is a classic example of what can go wrong when legislators who know little about military affairs and are ignorant of geopolitics decide to play Henry Kissinger and are taken seriously by journalists who fail to think critically. 

In late December 2014, reports came out that Vietnam, like Taiwan one of the claimants in the South China Sea territorial dispute, was bolstering its military presence on Son Ca Island, which lies a mere 11km from Taiwan-controlled Taiping Island (Itu Aba). The initial news reports on the matter cited Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) legislators Johnny Chiang (江啟臣) and Lin Yu-fang (林郁方), who were using information contained in a Ministry of National Defense (MND) report to the Control Yuan.  

My article, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here. (Photo by the author)

‘Press Areas’ Threaten to Undermine Work of Journalists

New administrative measures unveiled by police on Jan. 1 could make it very difficult for the press to document police misdemeanor during protests 

President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) may have waxed about the need for reconciliation and cooperation during his New Year address, but judging from an announcement the day before, it seems that one of his administration’s resolutions for 2015 is to make it more difficult for journalists in Taiwan to do their work. 

As Taiwanese were preparing to usher in the new year, police on Dec. 31 announced that under new regulations which had been in the making for some time, journalists covering protests will now be required to stay within designated “press areas” (採訪區). According to an exercise held by the Zhongzheng First Precinct on Ketagalan Blvd in Taipei this morning, which journalist Sun Chiong-li (孫窮理) of coolloud attended and whose account is used for this article, the press areas will be delineated using red police tape. “Media liaison” officers wearing pink vests will serve as contact points for journalists seeking to conduct interviews. 

My article, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here. (Photo by the author)