China's newest problem?

“Through this blessed jihad in Yunnan, the Turkestan Islamic Party warns China one more time … Our aim is to target the most critical points related to the Olympics. We will try to attack Chinese central cities severely using the tactics that have never been employed.” Thus spoke Commander Seyfullah, the purported leader of the Turkistan Islamic Party, after claiming responsibility in a video last week for three bus bombings in Yunnan earlier this month, along with previous attacks in Shanghai, Wenzhou and Guangzhou.

While there is little information about Seyfullah, the Turkistan Islamic Party is an offshoot of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which intelligence sources say was based in Afghanistan before the US invasion in 2001 and whose leader was killed in 2003. Analysts claim that members of the Turkistan Islamic Party (the group as a whole reportedly has no more than 100 members) may have received training at al-Qaeda bases in Pakistan’s North Western Frontier Province and/or Tribal Areas abutting Afghanistan. Based on the little information available about him to date, Seyfullah appears to be mimicking the tactics of terror group leaders such as the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, with a reliance on recordings to instill fear and attract retaliation — the more indiscriminate the better.

Since the release of the Seyfullah video, Chinese authorities have gone to great lengths to discredit the claims of responsibility, ascribing the blasts to a lone disgruntled gambler and an oil fire. While the credibility of both Seyfullah and Chinese media remains equally in doubt, what really matters is that a “terrorist” organization is seeking to lure Chinese authorities at a time when it is most sensitive, with the Olympic Games just around the corner.

In "Much suffering in store for Uighurs," published today in the Taipei Times, I explore the ramifications this new development will have for ethnic Uighur Chinese.

Canada’s child soldier

I have long meant to write about the Omar Khadr case, but somehow never got around to doing it, perhaps because I didn’t know which angle to approach the subject from. With demonstrations in major Canadian cities planned for this week and after calls by some readers that I tackle the subject, it is perhaps time that I make a few comments. What also prompted me to write about this was the revelation, a few weeks ago, that a Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) official had interrogated Khadr at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 2003. It wasn’t the visit itself that grabbed me, but rather the callousness allegedly displayed by the official as the young Khadr displayed wounds, mental and physical, that bore all the hallmarks of torture. As a former intelligence officer at CSIS, I could not remain indifferent.

First, a bit of history. The Toronto-born son of Ahmed Said Khadr, an alleged al-Qaeda financier, Omar was raised in Afghanistan and in 2002 — then aged 15 — was captured by US forces following a firefight in Ayub Kheyl. Omar has been accused of lobbing a grenade that killed a US soldier, though information subsequently released puts that into doubt and fails to provide any evidence of his involvement. Still, Omar his since been held at Guantanamo Bay — the only Western citizen left at the base and the youngest detainee — on accusations of war crimes and supporting terrorism. Despite the lack of evidence and the uniqueness of the case, the Canadian government has refused to seek his extradition, a decision that has earned Ottawa widespread condemnation from rights activists and many Canadians. (For a full account of the case, readers are encouraged to turn to Michelle Shephard’s Guantanamo’s Child: The untold story of Omar Khadr.)

Three things stand out in the case against Khadr, and all three support the claim that he should, at minimum, be repatriated to Canada.

First, by their nature, military trials are stacked against the defendants and make it nigh impossible for them to challenge the accusations against them. As we have seen, the evidence against Khadr is less than airtight, but absent the means to mount an appropriate defense (to which we can add his young age), Khadr has been unable to make his case — a phenomenon that has become all too frequent in the “war on terrorism,” not only in the US but elsewhere, including Canada (e.g., Security Certificates, or the seventeen individuals arrested in Toronto in 2006).

Second, Khadr was a minor when he was captured and should therefore have been treated as such. By failing to treat him — at the very least — as a child soldier, the US, and by rebound the Canadian government, is violating UN conventions, but has relied on the exceptional clause of “terrorism” — which has no legal basis — to defy international law and the Geneva Convention. A case could also be made that as a result of his upbringing in Afghanistan among sympathizers of al-Qaeda, the young Khadr was not acting of his own free will, or that he had been “brainwashed,” two elements that argue in favor of his being treated as a child soldier rather than a soldier, a militant, a “terrorist,” or a war criminal.

Third is the nature of the accusations against him. Regardless of whether Khadr threw the grenade or not, or participated in battle or not, by international law attacking invading or occupying military forces does not constitute a war crime, nor does it imply supporting terrorism. While countries such as Israel and the US (among others) often refer to attacks against their military as “terrorism” (e.g., Palestinians resisting occupying forces, Hezbollah defending Lebanese territory or Iraqi insurgents targeting US forces), by definition terrorism only applies to indiscriminate use of massive violence against undefended civilian targets to bring about political change. Lobbing a grenade at US special forces obviously does not meet those criterion.

Another element that mitigates against the case is evidence that Khadr has been subjected to torture, which, if true, would break other conventions. Khadr’s best chance in that regard would have been for visiting Canadian officials to raise the matter with their masters in Ottawa. However, based on my previous experience at CSIS, there is little doubt that the officer who interrogated him in 2003 had been desensitized enough by his professional environment (a subject of Smokescreen, my book on CSIS published earlier this year) as to have prevented the empathy needed to raise the matter with CSIS headquarters, Foreign Affairs or the Prime Minister’s Office. In fact, a combination of hatred, racism, emotional isolationism and ideological brainwashing likely made it impossible for the agent to care. Cry as he might and profound though his wounds may have been, Khadr was facing an individual who was unable to make the necessary emotional connection. Khadr was the enemy, a case number, a dehumanized being, or “scum,” as I often heard targets referred to.

Sadly, in spite of all these factors, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper maintains that Ottawa will not request that Khadr be sent back to Canada, where he would have a better chance of getting a fair (or fairer) trial. By failing to do so, the Canadian government is complicit in a series of crimes committed by the US government and gives ammunition to those who argue that Canada should be a target of terrorism. Not only are Canadian troops in Afghanistan becoming increasingly active militarily and therefore seen as occupying forces, or agents of US imperialism, but Ottawa cannot even be bothered to care for its own — especially when the latter are Muslim.

Meeting the velociraptor

The man comes with some heavy baggage. US ambassador to Indonesia from 1986 to 1989, undersecretary of defense for policy from 1989 to 1993, deputy secretary of defense from 2001 until 2005 and president of the World bank from 2005 until 2007, Paul Wolfowitz — now at the American Enterprise Institute conservative think tank and chairman of the US-Taiwan Business Council — has had a long, eventful career in the US government. He is perhaps better known as a prominent neoconservative and principal architect of the disastrous US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Wolfowitz was in Taipei this week to give a speech to the American Chamber of Commerce, which the media was invited to cover. One could be of two minds about attending a speech by an individual who has played such a prominent role in the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq — or, for that matter, for having fleshed out, over the past fifteen years or so, a US policy underpinned by military preemption and hegemonistic ambitions that has resulted in the loss of so many lives worldwide. Still, others would argue that Wolfowitz, as he himself describes himself, is a “true friend of Taiwan,” having played a role, among others, in the George H.W. Bush administration’s decision to sell Taipei F-16 aircraft in the early 1990s, as well as remaining a proponent of providing Taiwan with the military capabilities it needs to defend itself. From Taiwan’s point of view, one could therefore twist the old saying by pointing out that he may be a neocon, but he’s our (Taiwan’s) neocon.

One interesting fact about Wolfowitz’s speech was the total absence of security at the Shangri-la Hotel. Anyone could just have walked in, grabbed a sandwich and a seat in the “media” section, or come within touching distance of the man during the question-and-answer session following his speech. No credentials or business cards were asked of us. While Mr. Wolfowitz is no longer a government official, one would nevertheless assume that his responsibility in the Iraq War and close involvement on defense matters would warrant a modicum of security. My suspicion is that when in Taiwan, Wolfowitz and other US officials, active or retired, feel they are “among friends.” The same probably couldn’t be said of any country with a Muslim population.

Now, to the speech. After an unfortunate slip in his opening remark, where he said that the American Chamber of Commerce was looking forward to promoting relations between the US and China, Wolfowitz was all praise for Taiwan’s accomplishments, first on the economic side as one of the “Asian Tigers” and later as it embarked on the road to democracy — two successes that he claims have also had an impact in China as well as on the international stage. Taiwan’s democratization, he said, put the lie to the old belief that there is such a thing as “Asian values,” often a shorthand for the antidemocratic, authoritarian style of government epitomized by, but not limited to, Singapore. Wolfowitz also lauded the ability of Taiwanese to turn challenges into opportunities, which he said could be a byproduct of their country’s having the (mis)fortune of being located in a region of great strategic importance. Taiwanese always worry, they always need to fix something, he said, which perhaps makes them a nation of “warriors,” or “worriers.”

Throughout his speech and the question-and-answer session that followed, Wolfowitz made clear his view that the administration of Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) opening to China and conflict resolution drive across the Taiwan Strait had “lowered the temperature” and was a good thing, while hinting that the previous administration of Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) — whom he didn’t specifically name — may have created “unnecessary” problems. In the end, he said, closer ties between Taipei and Beijing are in the US’ interest, adding, however, that China’s military posture in the wake of warmer cross-strait ties remained an unknown and would play a significant role in how the US-China relationship develops.

Amid the new developments in the region, Wolfowitz said, Taiwan should strive to turn itself into a regional economic hub, much as Ireland did in the late 1980s. “If you set your mind to it, a lot of things can be done,” he said. He also looked favorably upon Taiwan’s revamping the rules on business investment in China and called on Taipei to move away from restrictions on sensitive technological investment, such as in the semiconductor sector.

His position on Taiwan gaining access to multilateral organizations was somewhat vague, although he seemed in favor of Taiwan joining the World Health Assembly, the decision-making body of the World Health Organization. Nevertheless, his emphasis on creating more international space for Taiwan did not seem to imply that joining official organizations was necessarily a prerequisite. Rather, he said that educating the world about Taiwan could be “a form of security expenditure.”

Regarding the likelihood that the US would move to strike a free-trade deal with Taiwan, he said he was pessimistic about the next congress’s willingness to move in that direction, given that regardless of which presidential candidate came into office, the composition of congress would not be as favorable to FTAs (in other words, Republicans are good for trade, while the Democrats aren’t).

Given his close past involvement in defense matters, it came as no surprise that the majority of questions asked by the media focused on that sector, especially the uncertainty that has surrounded the US$11 billion arms package to Taiwan. While distancing himself from comments by Admiral Timothy Keating, head of US Pacific Command (PACOM), last week that seemed to confirm that Washington had indeterminable “frozen” arms sales to Taiwan and adding that in his opinion Keating was in no position to officially represent Washington decisionmaking on the matter, Wolfowitz said that President Bush is a man who sticks to his commitments and that he would be surprised if, before his term expires, Bush did not honor that pledge. Asked about the impact of a longer-term “freeze,” Wolfowitz said he would not speculate on something that is unlikely to occur. (According to a source well-connected to the defense industry, nearly half of the items included in the arms package have either been delivered or will soon.) In other words, beyond US strategic interests in the region, congressional pressure, and notwithstanding the commitments included in the Taiwan Relations Act, Wolfowitz was saying that whether the full package of weapons gets delivered or not was contingent on whether Bush and the executive would stick to their word. (Depending on how it is played by the media, this remark could make waves in Beijing and Washington, as it either dares Bush to live up to his reputation or hints that the arms package will indeed pass before the end of Bush’s term.)

All in all, there wasn’t much to Wolfowitz’s speech that hadn’t been said already, and he kept the tough questions on defense at arm’s length by emphasizing that he no longer is a government official. Whether his new role in Taiwan affairs will be to Taiwan’s benefit or not remains to be seen, but my fear is that his track record will not go unnoticed in Beijing, which could over-interpret his role as meaning that the neocons are consolidating their grip on the Taiwan issue while reaching the conclusion that his appointment is part of a US grand strategy to encircle China in its own backyard. Whether Beijing would be right to believe this or not, labels do stick — especially when they were affixed at great human cost.

A different way in?

Repeated attempts by Taiwan to gain access to the UN and the WHO have all been shot down, and despite “thawing” relations between Taipei and Beijing (the principal reason behind Taiwan’s repeated failures at the UN) it is unlikely that situation will change any time soon. Beyond participation, as a full member or observer, at various UN bodies, Taiwanese reporters have also been barred entry, as UN media accreditation is contingent on UN membership, which in turn has as a precondition official statehood recognized by the international community. What this means is that at such events as the World Health Assembly in Geneva in May, Taiwanese reporters are not allowed to enter the building to report on deliberations — even when the topic under discussion might be Taiwan’s application to join the body, or its diplomatic allies’ call that Taiwan’s application be considered.

Continuing to seek entry via regular channels, or awaiting media accreditation from an organization that is beholden to Beijing, will not bring Taiwanese the advantages they seek, and will leave it in the dark. A new strategy is therefore in order.

In "Acting with ingenuity at the UN," published today in the Taipei Times, I propose an alternative that could give Taiwanese media a way in.

The Associated Press’ take on China

Language, language, how it shapes our perception of reality, especially when it is used by supposed “reliable” news organizations. I came upon a beautiful series of pictures taken in Taiwan yesterday of members of the country’s Amnesty International branch arranging their bodies to spell out 自由 “ziyou,” or “freedom,” in denunciation of human rights violations in China (see cover of the Taipei Times, July 13, 2008).

What readers of the Taipei Times will not see, however, is the original AP photo caption, which read “… as they denounce the Chinese government for allegedly violating human rights” (italics added).

“Allegedly? There is nothing “alleged” about human rights violations in China; rather, they are known and widespread. This is either sloppy journalism on AP’s part or an unconscionable attempt to demonstrate so-called journalistic neutrality to a degree that blinds it to reality. Did AP reporters in Rwanda in 1994 refer to an “alleged” genocide? Was a Palestinian family “allegedly” killed by an Israeli tank shell? Were Israelis eating at a pizzeria “allegedly” killed when a Palestinian suicide bomber detonated himself at the entrance of the restaurant? Why the special treatment for China, as it arrests its citizens, executes more prisoners in a year than anyone else and murders demonstrators and dissidents?

Such language is dangerous, as it could numb the mind to the amplitude of Beijing’s repression of its people. By dint of using terms that question the validity of what is (or should) otherwise be universally agreed upon, less-informed readers could eventually reach the conclusion that Chinese do not face human rights violations, at which point Beijing wins, and the people lose.

Or perhaps newspapers should add caveats of their own when the use AP wire stories. “A rose is a rose is a rose,” Ms. Stein told the allegedly credible AP.

The great disconnect

The reports we see every night about the G8 summit in Hokkaido, Japan, could not be more aggravating. As the planet heats up and everybody from the middle class down feels the pain of rising food, oil and commodity prices, the leaders of the world’s richest countries are carousing with each other and feasting on meals that select Japanese chefs have reportedly been practicing for six months. One such meal probably contains more calories than a poor child in Africa will absorb in a week. And yet, those leaders have the gall to pretend to be seeking solutions to the world’s most pressing problems. While we swallow advice on how to reduce gas consumption, cut down on meals, remove ties in the office and forsake the car for the city bus or the bicycle, G8 leaders and their spouses are flown from all over the world for meetings that appear more hedonistic than constructive, and from whose outcome we can expect very little results. Continued ...

Bush and Fukuda in La-la Land

US President George W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda officially announced yesterday that they would attend the opening ceremonies of the Olympic Games in Beijing on August 8. The reason the two leaders gave for deciding to attend, despite pressure that they refrain from doing so, were somewhat interchangeable — they did not want to “offend” the Chinese people (note the parroting of the oft-used term by Chinese officials) and China had made “some progress, at least in the talks with [Tibetan spiritual leader] the Dalai Lama and “they’re now making an effort.”

What an odd thing to say, given that the same day representatives of the Dalai Lama who have been in talks with Beijing since the deadly crackdown in March were expressing frustration at how little progress has been made, with Chinese officials seen as stonewalling and lacking serious commitment to the process.

Maybe Bush and Fukuda had their geography wrong and meant other developments, such as media freedom, which Beijing had committed to when it made its bid to host the Games.

Not according to the latest Human Rights Watch report on the matter, which says that media control in China has become worse in the past year and that Beijing has failed to lift restrictions on foreign correspondents — especially in the wake of the protests in Tibet in March. From January last year through April this year, more than 200 cases of officials interfering with reporting by foreign correspondents have been reported, HRW said, citing the Beijing-based Foreign Correspondents Club of China.

So things have not improved for foreign correspondents. What about Chinese dissidents and rights activists? As recently as the Sichuan earthquake, a number of activists were locked up for seeking to gain access to “restricted” areas or for criticizing how the government has handled the matter. Some were thrown in jail for trying to help families or for pointing out that a disproportionate number of victims were children who were crushed when the unsafe buildings (mostly schools) they were in at the time of the quake collapsed. Even as the Chinese government was applauded globally for its supposed “openness” during the emergency, it continued to harass and jail individuals who sought to tell a different story.

The search for the “improvements” and “efforts” continues.

As there are no perceivable signs of improvement on the Sudan/Darfur issue, perhaps the positive developments lie in the Taiwan Strait, where since Taiwan’s Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government came to power on May 20, tensions have lowered, culminating with the July 4 cross-strait charter flights and the arrival in Taiwan of hundreds of Chinese tourists. Surely Bush and Fukuda are elated at the possibility of peace in one of the world’s hottest “hot spots” for the past half-century, with the two sides finally talking to each other and committing to rapprochement.

But the problem is, that commitment appears to be one-sided. As Taipei gives and gives and gives, distancing itself from its traditional allies to please Beijing and opening its civilian airports — some critical to its military — to Chinese aircraft, Beijing has not done anything which would indicate that it is abandoning its plan to annex Taiwan, by force if necessary. In other words, despite Taiwan’s overtures, Beijing has retained the part of its policy on Taiwan that Washington has long characterized as a red line that cannot be crossed. In fact, not only has China not relinquished the military option, but it has continued to modernize its forces, conducted military drills involving civilian aircraft and airborne paratroopers that bore an ominous resemblance to an operation designed to occupy an airport and, as late as last week, it was reportedly deploying modern versions of Russia-made surface-to-air missiles that now brought Taiwanese airspace within range.

Tibet? Strike. Media freedom? Strike. Human rights? Strike. Sudan? Strike. Taiwan? Strike. Which begs the question: What improvements were Bush and Fukuda referring to? Either the leaders have the worst national security teams in the history of international relations, or, more likely, they simply chose to ignore reality to please Beijing, as everybody else does. Soon enough, other world leaders who in the past months have faced pressure from various groups to shun the Games in light of Beijing’s irresponsible behavior domestically and abroad, will have to decide where they want to be on August 8. Chances are, most will be in Beijing, cheering for the wolves in disguise.

Taipei’s deflecting strategy

With the Taiwanese stock exchange in a freefall and signs that Beijing may not be as indulgent on Taiwan as its negotiators had hoped, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is in a bind. A little more than one month into the presidency, Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and his Cabinet have proven incapable — or unwilling — to implement policies that under such circumstances could appease an increasingly restive population. While the global economic downturn, which is hitting Taiwan hard, cannot be blamed on the KMT government, the latter should nevertheless do more than simply call on Taiwanese to have “faith” — faith that things will get better, that the surge in Chinese tourists coming to Taiwan starting on July 4 will help improve the economy, and that better relations with Beijing will somehow make things right.

But in politics, faith is a dangerous commodity which can get depleted very rapidly — especially when people start losing millions of NT dollars in the stock market and when ordinary families start feeling the brunt of rising commodity prices and see that no action is being taken to help assuage the pain.

Seemingly without a clear strategy and uncomfortably dependent on the vagaries of the regime in Beijing, chances are that the full set of promises the KMT made during the presidential election will soon sound like a rhyme meant to put children to sleep. When that awakening occurs, and when discontent with the administration starts taking a shape other than dropping popularity polls, the government will either have to shift gear — and do so rapidly — or deflect attention elsewhere.

In an article titled "The oldest political trick in the book," published today in the Taipei Times, I explore the KMT’s possible use of that tactic, its historical precedents, and what this may mean for the nation’s future diplomacy.

Terrorism against Iran gets a boost

Renown investigative reporter Seymour Hersh has an important piece in this week’s edition of The New Yorker magazine titled “Preparing the Battlefield,” in which he exposes a recent increase in clandestine operations by the CIA and US special forces in Iran. While it is a long, rich piece of reporting that deserves to be read in its entirety, three main items stand out:

(a) While a Presidential Finding granting increased budgets for covert operations against the regime in Tehran ostensibly aims to legalize — and therefore provide appropriate oversight for — the activities of the CIA, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), which falls under the military, is not bound by the limitations set in the Findings and therefore falls outside its ambit, which pauses serious questions about accountability and represents nothing less than a break in the chain of command.

(b) Preparations for the Findings and the extra budget it set aside were made around the same time as — and in spite of — findings in a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that downplayed the threat of the Iranian nuclear program, which the US and much of the international community suspect may conceal a weapons program. In other words, the conclusions reached in the NIE — a consensus view of the US intelligence community — were either insufficient to effect a change in policy, or, as was the case with the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, were simply ignored by the White House and the presidential advisers who are calling for military intervention against Iran.

(c) Part of the clandestine operations include funding organizations that oppose the Islamic regime in Iran, some of which, analysts say, are comprised of extreme Sunni elements with proven ties — brace yourselves — to al-Qaeda and who have committed acts of terrorism not only in Iran but also Turkey, a US ally and a member of NATO. Washington's paying one faction against another risks alienating regional allies of the US and, ironically, could very likely bring Baghdad and Tehran closer together.

Hersh’s piece is worrying, to say the least, as it shows how opponents to what increasingly looks like an inexorable march to war against Tehran within the US defense establishment (and in Israel) have been cast aside, much as happened during the Vietnam War and, more recently, in the Iraq fiaso. What’s also alarming is the fact that, in the words of one source interviewed by Hersh, regardless of which presidential candidate wins in the November elections, ongoing covert operations would continue for another year, with no apparent means to stop them.

Sarkozy tells half the story

French President Nicolas Sarkozy found himself in Israel this week, where he sought to bolster is credentials with Jerusalem. While his call for the creation of a Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as a shared capital, is laudable, as was his criticism of the illegal Israeli settlements, his comments are certainly no longer original, as many world leaders have voiced similar views. In fact, it is not even risqué to say these things anymore, as such headline-grabbing catchphrases have reached the point of abstraction and never include the more important detail of making the call a reality. In other words, absent a commitment to a date, calls for the creation of a Palestinian state are just empty rhetoric and only legitimize the Process — e.g. “peace talks — which is soaked in the blood of two peoples and has led nowhere, except deeper into reciprocal violence.

Were Sarkozy’s failings limited to that, he could be forgiven for his lack of imagination or risk-taking. Sadly, however, other comments made during his visit belie his biases. For one, while he claims to support the creation of a Palestinian state, he could not refrain from stating that France is a “staunch supporter” of Israel (where are the staunch supporters of Palestine?) and that Palestinians themselves must fight terrorism, as if terrorism were only committed by one side in the conflict. Again, this shows Sarkozy’s — and many others’ — failure, or refusal, to understand that terrorism is not solely the remit of sub-state groups but that professional armies, too, can engage in the method, as the Israel Defense Force certainly has, what with its indiscriminate attacks on civilian neighborhoods, collective punishment, use of banned weapons, and assassinations. A more balanced comment would have stated that both sides, Palestinians and Israelis, must be committed to combating terrorism used in their respective names. But, as always, the word terrorism is only tagged to Muslims, while professional armies are merely acting in self-defense, defending democracy and so on.

Then Sarkozy met with the parents of Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier (who has French nationality) who was abducted by Gaza militants two years ago. “Gilad,” Sarkozy said (note the first-name basis), “must be released,” adding that “one does not build peace by holding hostages.” True though this comment may be, Sarkozy simply cannot not be aware of the hundreds of Palestinians and Lebanese abducted by Israeli security forces, many of whom have been held incommunicado, with no means to defend themselves in the court of law, for years in Israeli jails (which played a major, if rarely discussed, role in Hezbollah’s abduction of Israeli soldiers in July 2006, prompting Israel’s massive attack on Lebanon). By failing to mention this, Sarkozy was giving the impression that Palestinians alone engage in abductions and are therefore solely responsible for undermining peace. Here again, a more even-handed — and certainly more helpful — comment would have been to clearly state that both sides in the conflict have engaged in such activities and to call such conduct illegal.

But fairness was not on Sarkozy’s mind during his Jerusalem visit — political points were, as he is only the second French president to have visited the country in 12 years. Still, as he continues his tour of the region and makes his obligatory visit to the West Bank, Palestinian leaders will be all politeness, silent in their knowledge that the man in the spotlight is not even a true friend.

The incredible shrinking Ma

All those international reporters who during the presidential campaign swooned at the “charismatic” and “charming” Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) must be wondering nowadays what happened to the photogenic politician. Where in diyu (“hell”), indeed, has he been? No only has he made precious few public appearances since his inauguration on May 20, but when he did, it was a gaunt-looking Ma who gazed back at the camera, a shadow of his former media-hungry self. And in a marked departure from his whirlwind of a predecessor, who like him or hate him could not be faulted for lack of energy, Ma has limited his activities to hedonistic attendances at exhibitions, trade shows and visits to friends down south. In everything he has done and said since he took the helm, he has given the impression that he is part of a plan to steer well clear of anything that could spark controversy.

As the country faces floods, rising commodity prices and attendant discontent, and while top officials engage in crucial negotiations with officials in Beijing, our president is on cruise control and has failed to give any indication that he is on top of things.

Perhaps Ma contents himself with delegating on the domestic front — such as on the devastating floods in central Taiwan a few weeks ago — which, in his view, may not be overly important. Aloof though this position may be, he may be of the opinion that such matters are not the remit of a president and that more crucial issues, such as foreign policy, are what heads of state should occupy themselves with. He certainly would not be the first leader to hold such a belief — to wit, former US president George H.W. Bush, who to a large extent lost the presidency because of his inattention to and lack of interest in domestic matters.

If Ma, like Bush, were foreign-policy oriented, then surely the Diaoyutai (釣魚台) islands incident would have prompted him to jump on stage and take the lead — especially after government officials utter the “W” word during official deliberations on a minor incident involving a longstanding ally. In a cascade of events since the collision at sea last Tuesday, recriminations have been made, Taiwan’s representative to Japan has been recalled, the Japanese flag has been stamped upon in public and relations between Taipei and Tokyo may have reached their lowest point in decades. Surely, amid all this, a national leader would intervene and call for calm, if not pick up the phone and contact his counterpart in Tokyo.

And yet, nothing. Here Ma has been offered a chance to make up for the damage he did to Taiwan-Japan relations when he failed to acknowledge the Japanese delegation during his inaugural speech, not to mention help avoid a minor incident from being blown out of proportions. His failure to intervene puts the nation’s very security at risk, as irreparable damage to our relations with a strong ally may be in the making.

If this had happened a year ago, Chen (no softie on the Diaoyutais) would have been all over TV mending fences. So would former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝). This time around, Ma cannot hide behind a supposed constitutional clause that bars him from doing his job. He must grab the wheel and show leadership. If he doesn’t, some may begin to wonder if he might not be nothing more than a mannequin, with a puppeteer hiding backstage.

What’s behind the Diaoyutais Incident?

During his presidential campaign, Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) always emphasized how, if elected, he would strive to achieve better relations with Beijing and the US. Now that he has been elected, the first half of his promise appears to be underway while the second remains to be determined. But what about countries? Surely, any self-respecting country would seek to improve relations with as many governments as possible.


Sadly, it would appear that Japan is of little importance to the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) administration. First, its large delegation was snubbed in Ma’s inaugural speech and now, following the collision between a Taiwanese fishing boat and a Japanese patrol boat off the Diaoyutai islands, what should have been a minor incident is being turned, somewhere, into a disproportionate row, with Taiwan’s representative to Japan being recalled on Saturday. This is not to mention, of course, the abominably irresponsible —and dangerous — remark by Premier Liu Chao-shiuan (劉兆玄) that he could not rule out going to war against Japan over the contested islands, words that, even if discredited by their sheer idiocy, will nevertheless be picked up in Tokyo and cannot but strain relations. Allies do not use such language when talking about one another; China did — still does — over Taiwan, but then again, we’re supposed to be friends now.

All of this points out to a two-pronged strategy of rapprochement with Beijing and distancing from Japan. A new regional divide may be in the process of being created, and the ramifications for Taiwan’s sovereignty are serious.

The danger in alienating Tokyo (aside from the risk of losing an ally who has made assisting Taiwan in case of a military invasion by China part and parcel of its security arrangement with Washington) is that it risks creating unnecessary complications with the US, whose Asia-Pacific security strategy finds its center of gravity in Japan. A Taiwan that, through its rhetoric as much as its actions, integrates the Chinese circle at the expense of other allies will have direct repercussions on Japan’s sense of security and wariness vis-à-vis Beijing’s intentions. Forced to choose between Taiwan and Japan, the US would undoubtedly choose the latter, which would risk pushing Taipei ever deeper into China’s embrace. Without US help, security guarantees for Taiwan would be nil, and its sources of weapons procurement would dry up. Without these, and absent a diversity of strong allies, formal or nominal, Taipei would no longer be in a position of strength to negotiate with Beijing. Nor could it defend itself if those negotiations failed.

These events also dovetail with the almost complete disappearance of President Ma from public view, which lends credence, as I have argued before, to the theory that he serves as a front for unelected officials, for a select few whose objectives certainly do not coincide with the interests of Taiwanese and of the millions who voted for the KMT in March. When an international incident such as the Diaoyutai one occurs, and when such an incident risks being blown out of proportion, any president would intervene and make public statements or get on the phone with his counterpart in the other country. Ma hasn’t. Images of Taiwanese stepping on the Japanese flag in anger — behavior of a type rarely seen in Taiwan — is also strikingly reminiscent of state-managed “spontaneous” demonstrations in China, as occurs whenever a Japanese prime minister visits the Yasukuni shrine or when the US “mistakenly” bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. Might not these demonstrations also have been stage-managed to exacerbate tensions and, with help from pro-KMT media, create a public consciousness of adversity toward Japan?

It may be too soon to make such assertions. Perhaps all of this is just coincidence and incompetence. Even if this were the case (and let us hope that it is) diplomacy involves as much error and unintended consequences as it does well-crafted policy. It would be disheartening if an unfortunate, albeit not uncommon, incident at sea prompted a divide between Taiwan and a country that has been a staunch ally in the past fifty years.

Why Tehran won't budge

Whether economic sanctions against states are a useful instrument to compel governments is a question that remains to be answered. A frequent criticism is that unless sanctions are surgically implemented to target specific individuals or firms, they usually do not have much of an impact on a regime and rather the deleterious consequences are felt by the population, as happened in Iraq in the 1990s. In Iran’s case, the sanctions put in place by the UN, the US and the EU have largely failed to dissuade Tehran to abandon its sensitive nuclear program, which certain states believe serves as a front for a nuclear weapons program. Even news of a second round of US-EU sanctions, which would go beyond those already put in place through the UN, appear not to be overly worrying to Tehran.

Why? Three reasons come to mind.

First, the more heated the war of words becomes between Tehran, Washington and Jerusalem, the higher the price of crude, which in recent months has proven a windfall for Tehran’s coffers. Just last week, comments by Israeli Transport Minister Shaul Mofaz to the effect that an Israeli attack against the Iranian nuclear program was virtually “unavoidable” drove up oil prices by nearly 9 percent to a record US$139 a barrel. Consequently, the more the US (John McCain, Hillary Clinton, conservative think-tanks) and Israel (Mofaz, Ehud Olmert, AIPAC) threaten war against Iran, the higher Tehran’s ability to mitigate the impact of economic sanctions becomes. It’s simple. As a major oil producer—the world’s fourth-largest — Iran stands to gain from high oil prices, let alone record-high ones like the one we have experienced in recent weeks.

The second reason why the sanctions probably won’t work is that despite its isolation, Tehran still has important allies — mainly Russia and China. As news broke out on Tuesday of a possible new round of US-EU sanctions, Tehran was withdrawing assets from European banks. It would not be too far-fetched to imagine that it will move them to Chinese or Russian financial institutions instead. As long as the international community remains at odds over Iran, or as long as some states like China and Russia refuse, for various reasons, to follow the US’ lead, countries like Iran will have the means to weather economic sanctions.

The third, less obvious reason, is that Iran’s position is becoming increasingly untenable, so much so that some decision-makers may have reached the conclusion that conflict is not only inevitable but desirable. It would not be the first time that a government has appeared to act irrationally (Japan before World War II, or North Korea, readily come to mind) in the face of seemingly insurmountable odds; in fact, when a government comes to see a status quo as untenable, its threat perception and assessment of cost and consequences becomes distorted. While, from the outside, its chosen path seems only to lead to unavoidable defeat or destruction (again, Japan pre-WWII, or Palestinian militants versus Israel), for the actors anything other than the status quo is desirable. In Iran’s case, this could mean that war with Israel and the US would be better than an agreement that forces it to abandon its nuclear work but leaves the Middle East unchanged, which is likely what would happen if peace came under Israeli and US terms (and explains why the Israeli-Palestinian “peace process” has availed to nothing, as it always reflected Israeli, rather than Palestinian, or more equitable, conditions). Also at play are the ramifications of a Shiite resurgence in neighboring Iraq following the US invasion in 2003, which cannot but give Tehran hope of greater regional clout.

Given this situation, the international community can impose any set of sanctions it wants and the end result will be the same. Unless leaders come up with a new Middle East that distributes power more evenly and looks less like a proto Israeli-US empire (or aUS-led Sunni axis), war with Iran at some point will be a likely, if not inevitable, scenario. Mofaz may have made his comment for different reasons, but deep down he was right. It is, perhaps, unavoidable.

Israel's war on academics

Stephen M. Walt and John J. Mearsheimer’s The Israel Lobby is an extremely important and cannily argued exposition of the war that has been waged against academics in the US and elsewhere — including, to name a few, the late Edward Said, Ilan Pappe, Tony Judt, Norman Finkelstein, Robert Fisk and Michael Scheuer — who have dared question the uncritical support that Western governments have given Israel as it continues its oppression of Palestinians (and Lebanese). While some of the individuals mentioned above (Pappe, Finkelstein) have seen their careers affected because of their views, Said, Scheuer, Fisk, Walt and Mearsheimer, for their part, have been accused of being ant-Semitic, in what often was more an emotional response that precluded rational thinking than a well-formulated counterargument.

Finkelstein’s recent brush with Israeli authorities, which resulted in about 24 hours of interrogation by Shin Bet at Ben Gurion Airport and his deportation from Israel — and barred entry for 10 years — serves as the epitome of the treatment reserved academics who tell truth to power. Finkelstein, a Jewish-American born to a Holocaust survivor and known for his books The Holocaust Industry and Beyond Chutzpah, has repeatedly accused Israel of exploiting memories of the Holocaust and the stigma of anti-Semitism to conduct its own widespread repression of a people. Far from being anti-Israel, Finkelstein has long been a proponent of a two-state solution respecting the 1967 borders. More recently, he has come in contact with the Lebanese Hezbollah, partly out of sympathy and partly to better understand the organization and the people it represents — in other words, her did so out of academic interest. Still, Shin Bet used his meetings with Hezbollah to tag him as a security risk and deny him entry.

As the Ha’aretz newspaper put it in a strong editorial on May 17: “True, the right to enter Israel is not guaranteed to noncitizens, but the right of Israeli citizens to hear unusual views is one that should be fought for. It is not for the government to decide which views should be heard here and which ones should not.” It continued: “… the decision is all the more surprising when one recalls the ease with which right-wing activists from the Meir Kahane camp — the kind whose activities pose a security threat that no longer requires further proof — are able to enter the country.” In other words, Finkelstein was being punished for his views and surely the repercussion will be felt back in the US. What is Ironic is that by punishing academics for wanting to learn more about its enemies, Israel is shooting itself in the foot and denying itself intelligence of the kind that its overrated intelligence agencies will never be able to gather.

In Canada, immediately after Liberal Party leader Stéphane Dion had announced the appointment, in federal by-elections in 2007, of Jocelyn Coulon, a former columnist for the La Presse and Le Devoir newspapers in Montreal, to represent the party in the Outremont riding, B’Nai Brith, a Jewish lobby group, attacked Coulon (former director of the Lester B. Pearson Peacekeeping Center in Montreal, where I took a course in 2001 and got to know him very well), for his alleged “anti-Israel” and “anti-US” views as well as calls for an end to the isolation of Hamas. Although the riding is only 10 percent Jewish, the Liberal Party has a long history of reliance on this powerful bloc, and B’Nai Brith’s calls that his nomination be revoked — added to the bad publicity that this generated — cannot but have had an impact on the election results, in which Mr. Coulon was defeated by the New Democrat candidate.

My own experience, as a Canadian who worked in security intelligence and now as a writer/academic, has been similar. At the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), where I worked as an analyst from 2003-2005, my views on Israel and Canada’s unquestioning support for its policies often went against the organizational paradigm, and on more than one occasion I was told, in no uncertain terms, that my career as an intelligence officer would suffer if I continued to criticize that support. The callousness of some Israeli agents I met in the course of my work, or the manner in which they completely overestimated the Palestinian or Hezbollah threat, was nothing less than shocking. As such, the official and tacit Israeli lobby is also very much alive in Canada, a subject I touch on in my book Smokescreen.

Since I moved to Taiwan, I have published some articles on Israel, which for some reason many like to see as facing a threat similar to Taiwan’s — a false analogy that I have sought to dispel on a number of occasions. There, too, far away from Western circles, the attacks came, more often than not in the form of character assassination rather than arguments worthy of the name.

It took great courage, I am sure, for Messrs. Walt and Mearsheimer to write their article, and then turn it into a book. But it is a worthy polemic which, if heeded not only in the US but elsewhere, would ironically help ensure that Israel faces the prospects of a better, safer future, which its people certainly deserve — only not at the expense of Palestinians, Lebanese and academic freedom.

Setting the record straight

Some readers have reacted to my piece “Why are we sending aid to China?” published in the Taipei Times on May 23 by calling me “heartless,” “callous,” “cruel” and a “demagogue,” with one going as far as accusing the Times in an online forum of being “pro Japanese right-wing” (which is certainly news to its editorial staff). While expected when writing about such a sensitive issue as to whether donors should send money to earthquake-hit Sichuan Province, I believe the criticism leveled at me stems for the most part from a misreading of my argument (for those, that is, who bothered to read beyond the headline) and an (understandably) emotional response that obviates rational reasoning.

First of all, as I clearly state in my article, humanitarian assistance remains a noble and crucial act, one that helps to transcend political divides. Unlike what some of my critics have written — quite invidiously, I must add — at no point do I advocate withholding humanitarian assistance to China. Rather, I question whether countries should be sending money to the world’s fourth-largest economy, which, at US$1.3 trillion, also happens to have the largest foreign reserves and, given its splashy preparations for the Beijing Olympics, faces no shortage of money (not to mention its active military force of 2.255 million individuals who can be mobilized to deal with the crisis). Sadly, some readers seem to confuse humanitarian assistance with financial assistance, which thought they might be part of the same overall package, are in fact two distinct items. I believe Sichuan Province does need outside help, but that help should come in the form of expertise, rescue teams and whatever materiel is required to deal with the immediate emergency in order to prevent further deaths from malnutrition and disease.

Other criticism of my piece has focused on politics, accusing me of exploiting tensions in the Taiwan Strait to encourage hatred for Chinese or taking a sadistic pleasure in the suffering of Chinese. Again, nothing could be further from the truth, as my argument proposes a responsibilization of the central government in Beijing that, in the long term, would better serve ordinary Chinese in neglected provinces that happen to lie outside the booming coastal areas. Absent a fundamental change in how Beijing sees and treats its people, a temporary response funded by outside donors will only be that — temporary — and is an invitation for disasters of equal magnitude in future. Advocating a solution that (a) encourages immediate, albeit non-financial, help by foreign countries; and (b) would ensure that, through responsible investment by Beijing in infrastructure that meets safety standards, no such preventable catastrophe recurs, is hardly “callous” or a sign that I am “anti-Chinese.”

One writer takes the argument one step further and claims that ordinary Chinese will take note of Taiwan’s generosity and that this acknowledgement would somehow convince Beijing to abandon its hostility toward Taiwan. First of all, the view that US$65 million in financial aid by Taipei would sway Beijing is ludicrous, as is the contention, made by the same author, that a more positive public opinion on Taiwan would bring about a change in Beijing’s cross-strait policies. Despite the author’s claim, when it comes to a sensitive issue such as Taiwan, the effect of public opinion on Beijing’s stance has been, is, and will remain next to nil. If all it took was for Taipei to give Beijing US$65 million to resolve the Taiwan Strait crisis, the former would have done that years or decades ago. To think that peace can be bought like this bespeaks a total lack of understanding of Beijing’s motivations and the conflict in general.

Those who accuse me of politicizing aid to China also commit the same error pundits have made for years about the Taiwan Strait — they neglect to take into consideration the fact that it is Beijing, not Taipei, that threatens force, conducts annual simulations of an invasion of the other’s territory, passed a law in 2005 making it “legal” to use military force against the other should it unilaterally declare or move toward independence, points increasingly accurate 1,400 missiles at it (adding about 100 a year) at its opponent, isolates it diplomatically and economically and seizes every occasion to humiliate its people, athletes, medical experts and diplomats. Have those critics ever accused Chinese of being “callous” or “heartless” for not criticizing their government about policies that could result in as many, if not more, casualties in Taiwan, or who fail to criticize Beijing for slaughtering Tibetans, or force-relocating hundreds of thousands of Chinese Muslims?

Not that, despite all this, Taiwan should not extend a helping hand to ordinary Chinese who have nothing to do with Beijing’s intolerance vis-à-vis Taiwan. In the name of humanity, it should, and the expertise it gained from its own devastating earthquake in 1999 (during which, we must note, Beijing did Taiwan great harm by forcing all humanitarian aid to be channeled through China before reaching Taiwan, costing precious time) could be decisive in saving lives in Sichuan. All I argue is that it might not be in Taiwan’s (and ordinary Chinese’s) interest to send money to Sichuan; and yet, my critics accuse me of encouraging those in Taiwan who supposedly revel at the suffering of Chinese (I have yet to find such a person) and seeking to “increase” or “maintain” tensions in the Taiwan Strait, as if Beijing weren’t the instigator and its actions didn’t matter in the equation. In fact, my reference to the Chinese military threat wasn’t even about politics. If ever there was politicization, it was made by my critics, not me. Rather — and I believe my article was clear on this — what I highlighted was the allocation of resources and how all the money used in threatening Taiwan could be better spent helping Chinese in need now and in future.

On a personal note, I did not spend C$6,000 of my own money in 2001 to obtain a diploma in humanitarian assistance only to adopt the belief that aid should be withheld because of politics. In fact, it is partly because of that diploma that I think it was incumbent on me to question whether there might not be ways to maximize the effectiveness of humanitarian aid while pressuring governments to deal more responsibly toward their own people.

Asia's grand chessboard

“The thing you have to understand,” a senior official at the Indian Ministry of External Affairs said of China and India, “is that both of us think that the future belongs to us. We can’t both be right.” Nothing could be truer of the future struggle for power in Asia — except, perhaps, that in addition to India and China, Japan, which until recently had been the principal modernizer in the region, will also seek to regain its position of leadership. In Rivals, Bill Emmott, a former reporter for the Economist in Japan and, until 2006, the editor in chief of the magazine, shows us that no other region will have as fundamental an impact, or play as crucial a role, on the international scene than Asia in the coming decades.

Continued ...

Is financial help to China helpful?

The devastation caused by the powerful earthquake that hit Sichuan Province last week is undoubtedly shocking, and the unprecedented access that Chinese authorities have given to media (as opposed to foreign humanitarian workers, who have been barred from going in deep) has brought us images that would move even the most jaded of observers. Schools have been leveled, burying students. Upwards of 5 million people are now homeless and at least 50,000 people are believed to have died. As is often the case following a natural catastrophe, the region surrounding the affected country shifts into donor mode and starts sending help, both material and financial. In Taiwan, televised pledges have been organized; the government has offered NT$2 billion (US$65 million) while banks have offered more, as have former vice-president Annette Lu (呂秀蓮) and President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), among others. Aid organizations have begun collecting money at street corners, and starting this week, whenever one buys a 本日 coffee (coffee of the day) at Starbucks, NT$10 will be donated to China.

There is no doubt that China needs help — but not in the form of money, of which it has plenty. Yes, schools and hospitals need to be rebuilt, but given the high rate of schools/hospitals versus, say, office buildings that were crushed, it is evident that, through neglect or corruption, they had not been built as per safety norms. Furthermore, as I argue in "Why are we sending aid to China?", published today in the Taipei Times, providing financial aid to China deresponsibilizes the government in Beijing and ensures that it will not face the pressure it should be facing from disgruntled citizens in the hard-hit, poorer areas of the country.

If money is to be sent, I would encourage people to do so for Myanmar, where the devastation caused by Cyclone Nargis has far exceeded that seen in China and whose government, despite its criminal neglect, has by no means the state coffers that Beijing does (see event, organized by the Taiwanese Red Cross, on the left).

Far from being callous in the face of human suffering, I advocate humanitarian assistance that will not only help those in need immediately, but also in the longer term by compelling their governments to distribute wealth in a more equitable fashion to ensure that infrastructures everywhere meet safety standards.

Criminals, terrorists all too human

I had the great pleasure yesterday morning of attending a lecture by Chin Ko-lin, the reputed scholar of all things criminal from Rutgers University in New Jersey and author of, among other works, Heijin (“black gold”), about the interaction of organized crime, business and politics in Taiwan. Mr. Chin was briefly in Taiwan before heading for Southeast Asia do conduct research on the sex trade in the region for his upcoming book (to be published by Cornell University press later this year).

After giving a brief overview of what turned him on, about two decades ago, to the underworld and providing an update on the crime situation in Taiwan and East Asia, Mr. Chin fielded questions from the audience, about two dozen journalists and members of the media who had gathered at café Ting Ting Cui Yu on Anhe Road.

What had particularly piqued my curiosity during his enlightening presentation was the access he had been given from members of various criminal organizations (prostitutes, “snakeheads,” movers, gang leaders and so on) in Taiwan, China, the US and elsewhere. What intrigued me even more was the fact that many of the individuals he interviewed were aware that he had received a grant from the US government to conduct his research, which anyone with an instinct for self-preservation would have construed as proof that Mr. Chin was an agent, or tool, of the US government.

My questions to him, therefore, were (a) how he had managed to win the trust of individuals who, most assuredly, stood to gain nothing from having their modus operandi and structure published in an open-source publication accessible to all; (b) did any of them suspect he might be working undercover for the police; and (c) whether the need to maintain access to the underworld might not have had an impact on his freedom to write what he wants. After all, what good would it be to him if, by publishing a book or a report, he ended up “burning” his sources (e.g., they get arrested), news of which, given the interconnectedness of criminal groups, would quickly spread? The analogy I used while formulating the latter question was the following: Let’s say that I travel to Beirut, Lebanon, to write a book about Hezbollah — what it is, its leadership, structure, and how it operates. Then, once my book is published (and has been read by various intelligence agencies), I decide to write a second book, this time about, say, the Palestinian Hamas, or Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), two organizations that, according to intelligence, are believed to have contacts, at some level, with Hezbollah, in similar fashion to how the Bamboo Union, for example, would have ties with other organizations in China.

According to Mr. Chin, while there was some danger involved in his penetration of the criminal world, criminals were quite eager to discuss their trade, which reminded me of what I had been told during training as an intelligence officer a few years ago: Human beings, no matter what they do, like to talk — about themselves. In other words, regardless of the nature of one’s work, a flattered ego often trumps the need for secrecy. Mr. Chin also pointed out that he relied heavily on individuals in situ — contacts, family, etc, who could put him in touch with other participants in the long criminal chain. Speaking the language — the local dialect, even — was primordial.

Ultimately, however, the main reason why criminals accepted to discuss their activities and lowered their guard, as it were, in a way that prima facie would seem counterintuitive, was that the very nature of crime syndicates — who does what, how and where — is in constant flux, with no congealed or even predetermined channels of operation. From the drug trade to human trafficking, the cargo is moved around in extemporary fashion rather than following predetermined routes. For example, a woman who “bought” her way to the US (at a cost today of about US$82,000) could be smuggled from Fujian Province to, say, Bangkok, Thailand, where she will remain in a safe house until the next leg of her journey opens up. It could be 24 hours before she is moved, or a week. The next transit point on her way to the US is changeable, too, and often unknown to the movers themselves until an opportunity shows up (a bit like how packets of information choose different routes, sometimes even splitting, as they travel from query point to destination on the World Wide Web).

This ongoing systemic reconfiguration — the result of the fluidity of transit points and the need to stay one step ahead of and adapt to law enforcement — means that by the time a study or a book is published, the structure of the organization will have changed dramatically, to such an extent that it will be of little use to police. As such, the seemingly inherent danger in sharing information with the likes of Mr. Chin is much lower than one would think, and will rarely result in the dismantlement of a criminal organization or even the arrest of a single individual. Egos can be flattered, principles of criminality can be discussed in academia, but the insiders, or “sources,” run very little risk (of arrest, or of being seen as traitors by the organizations they belong to) in talking about themselves.

While Mr. Chin’s presentation pertained to the criminal world, intelligence agencies dealing with non-state actors and terrorist organizations could also take away a few lessons from this. First, sources may be more willing to talk about themselves and their organizations than is generally assumed because, as with criminal organizations, of the constantly changing nature and structure of terrorist organizations. Given the inherent slowness of paperwork-heavy governmental organizations and the targeting and warranting process that precedes an investigation (which we could equate with the time it takes before a manuscript is turned into a book), sources can probably assume that by the time a government agency actually acts on whatever information he or she has provided, the terrorist group will have mutated to such an extent as to be virtually unrecognizable from what it looked like at the time the information was provided. This is even truer for sources who, like Khaled Sheikh Mohammed of al-Qaeda, have been in detention for years and whose picture of the structure of the organization they belonged to before their capture will bear little resemblance to what it is today.

As such, just as with law enforcement, intelligence agencies targeting sub-state groups with loose structures, such as al-Qaeda, will have to rethink how they gather information about them and find ways to drastically accelerate the process through which collection of information translates into action. Under the current system, by the time, say, a warrant for a wiretap has been approved, the individual whose line is to be monitored may very well have moved on to something different.

Special advisers: good or bad?

President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) was all but forced to abandon the use of special advisers after a sustained campaign by the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) succeeded in portraying the positions as part of an expensive and ultimately unnecessary scheme to enrich close friends of the president. Accurate or not, those allegations led to the end of special advisers … until Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) of the KMT was elected president in March. In a short article published in the Taipei Times today, I explore some of the potential dangers that lie in a KMT-led resurrection of special advisers. Readers can access the full article by clicking here.

The CCP's thirst for survival

Following the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, predictions that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was next became in fashion. While the “pessimists” have made careers predicting chaos, fissiparous dissolution or a military takeover in China, the “optimists” have argued that a democratic spring is just around the corner. In most instances, those prognostications were predicated on a monolithic CPP that is little more than a Chinese version of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation, David Shambaugh, director of the China Policy program at George Washington University, argues that the CCP has been anything but complacent since the fall of the Soviet Union and that, above all, its principal objective has been to ensure its survival ...

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