Taiwan's Master Plan to Defeat China in a War

The surest way Taiwan can defeat China in a major war is to make sure that it never happens 

A consensus seems to have developed among a large number of defense analysts in recent years arguing that despite the balance of power having shifted in China’s favor, Beijing has no intention to use its military to invade Taiwan and thus resolve the Taiwan “question” once and for all. Doing so would be too costly, some argue, while others contend that Beijing can accomplish unification by creating enough economic dependence and incentives to convince Taiwanese over time of the “inevitability” of a “reunited” China. 

Although these factors certainly militate against the desire to go to war over the island-nation, we cannot altogether discount the probability that the Chinese military would be called into action, especially if the rationale for launching an attack were framed in terms of a defensive war—China being “forced” to take action because of changing and “untenable” circumstances in its environment. 

My article, published today in The National Interest, continues here.

Black Island: Two Years of Activism in Taiwan is Out!

Long before the student-led Sunflower Movement stormed the legislature in Taipei on March 18, 2014, sparking the most serious political crisis in Taiwan’s modern history, journalist J. Michael Cole was chronicling the rise of civic activism in this young democracy and warning us of the coming troubles. In this long-awaited collection of essays, the author takes us to the heart of this extraordinary recrudescence of activism and shows that there was nothing ‘spontaneous’ about the Sunflower Movement. With on-site observations and unique access to the protagonists, Black Island brings you to the frontlines of civil unrest — the police shields, pro-Beijing gangsters, victims of injustice, callous government officials and the idealists who are fighting back — and explains why the rise of civil society will change the face of politics in Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait for years to come. 

The book comes in three sections — The Long Road to 318; Article 972 and the Rise of Christian Evangelicals-Yes, in Taiwan; and Game Changer: The Sunflowers Take Action — and collects most of my writing on activism published since the end of 2012 through March 2015, all of it updated and re-edited. It also includes a long introduction that puts everything in context.

Black Island is now available on Amazon.com. Stay tuned for updates on book events in Taiwan, and join the Facebook page for updates and extra material!

Unstoppable: China's Secret Plan to Subvert Taiwan

A convoluted network of Chinese companies and organizations is involved in Beijing's "onion layer" strategy against Taiwan and the world 

Mao Zedong reportedly once said that warfare is 70 percent political. Arguably, no conflict in recent times has adhered to this concept more faithfully than China’s ongoing campaign to “reunite” Taiwan with the “Mainland.” While analysts have tended to focus on the threat which an increasingly powerful People’s Liberation Army (PLA) poses to the democratic island-nation, the political warfare component of Beijing’s “reunification” strategy has received much less attention, perhaps because cross-strait symposia on tea and culture are far less “newsworthy” than the latest missile boat or combat aircraft. 

Given Beijing’s preference for “nonkinetic” solutions to the impasse (war would be costly and unpredictable), it makes perfect sense that its leadership would explore alternative means by which to win the war in the Taiwan Strait. Political warfare (or the “Three Warfares,” 三战), targeting both Taiwan and its supporters in the international community, is a favored instrument. There has been a growing number of interactions between Taiwan and China since 2008. And what with rapidly expanding cross-strait travel, academic exchanges and investment, the opportunities for China to engage in political warfare have increased exponentially. 

My article, published today in The National Interest, continues here.

The Big Bad Blue Lying Machine is Back

An incident involving an academic’s invented quotes from a closed-door meeting between the DPP chairperson and a US official sets a new standard for crassness 

How time flies! Less than a year from now, Taiwanese will have elected a new person to lead the country, concluding eight long years of the Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) presidency. The idea hasn’t completely sunk in yet, but election season — and the complete, all-consuming madness that comes with it — is right around the corner. In fact, the madness part of the electoral cycle has already begun. 

The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) may still be struggling to find a viable candidate for the January 16 election, but this hasn’t prevented the big machine behind it from shifting into high gear to undermine its opponent, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文). And given what’s at stake and the high likelihood that Tsai could win this time around, the nastiness of the 2012 elections could feel like a walk in the park compared with what lies ahead. 

My article, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here.

Is Taiwan out of Vogue in Washington DC?

We don’t hear much about Taiwan in Washington nowadays. But not for the reasons that Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman gives us 

After delivering remarks at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on February 27, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy R. Sherman was asked a rather simple question by one of the journalists present: Why don’t we hear much about Taiwan in Washington, D.C. nowadays?  

John Zang, a journalist with CTiTV in Taiwan, had good reasons to ask. After all, in Sherman’s entire presentation, which focused on the situation in Northeast Asia, Taiwan was only mentioned once. And in that one passing reference, her formulation — “our friendship with the people of Taiwan” — deftly skirted the possibility of Taiwan existing as a nation or state, or the fact that U.S. relations with the “people of Taiwan” are rather more substantial than mere friendship. 

My article, published today in The Diplomat, continues here.

Independent Candidates: How Independent Can They Afford to Be?

Unless it wants to be the eternal outsider, the ‘third force’ in Taiwanese politics must agree to form strategic coalitions within the system 

The decision by a number of social activists and academics in recent months to step over the line and dirty their hands in the muck of electoral politics is a healthy development in Taiwan’s contemporary history. In the past few weeks, two new parties — the New Power Party (NPP) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) — have come into being, promising to shake up a political environment that without doubt has ossified over the years. By bringing fresh faces and ideas to the political arena, new independent parties bring hopes of rejuvenation to the nation. But how independent can this third force really be? 

The decision to form a new party already tells us a few things about the state of mind of its creators and points to a disagreement (usually along ideological lines) with existing parties and the system of which they are part. The goal is therefore to propose something new, to promote a specific issue (e.g., environmentalism), or to change the system from within. 

My article, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here (photo by the author).

Contesting Nationalisms in the Taiwan Strait

Much of the irreconcilable differences between Taiwan and China are the result of different types of nationalism, the ‘blood’ versus the ‘civic’ 

“The degree of shared or conflicting understandings of what the nation is,” writes Stephen M. Saideman, “has significant implications not just for whether a country will go to war but with whom” (Nationalism and War, John A. Hall & Sinisa Malesevic, eds., Cambridge UP, p. 342). Though Saideman does not once mention China in his chapter, could just as well have been discussing Beijing’s irredentist designs on Taiwan. Conflicting understandings of what the nation is, as he writes, is at the heart of the decades-long conflict in the Taiwan Strait, one that, despite the recent rapprochement, will not be resolved anytime soon. 

Although academic literature often draws a direct link between nationalism and war, I would argue that in the context of the Taiwan Strait, misunderstanding the other side’s nationalism (or a conflicting understanding, to quote Saideman) is even more likely to drag the two countries — and perhaps the region — into war. 

My article, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here. (Photo by the author)

China Demolishes the Taiwan ('92) Consensus

Chinese President Xi Jinping doesn't think that the 1992 consensus, the framework that has facilitated 'peace and stability' in the Taiwan Strait over the years, is good enough anymore

After decades of high tensions between Taipei and Beijing and the looming shadow of a devastating war between the United States and China, relations in the Taiwan Strait underwent a major transformation in 2008 with the election of Ma Ying-jeou and the return to power of the Kuomintang (KMT).

Over the seven years that followed Ma’s victory, Taipei and Beijing made substantial strides in liberalizing their interactions, signing 21 bilateral agreements, opening the floodgates of tourism and investment, and facilitating academic exchanges. Amid the cross-strait summits and handshakes, the international community breathed a sigh of relief, optimistic that the old tinderbox could soon be shelved—as long as we ignored, that is, the mounting apprehensions of a segment of Taiwanese society, which saw behind the rapprochement evidence of Beijing’s machinations to bring about “one China.”

[...] Given what has been achieved under the Consensus, it would be logical to assume that Beijing would seek its continuation. However, recent comments by Chinese President and CCP Chairman Xi Jinping, as well as articles appearing in official Chinese media, indicate that the Consensus no longer suffices.

My article, published today in The National Interest, continues here.

Xi, the PLA, and the State of Perpetual Conflict

What if the leadership in Beijing saw advantages in not resolving the Taiwan ‘issue’?

Continuing a long tradition set by his predecessors, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) on Wednesday warned against “independence forces” in Taiwan, calling them “the biggest threat to cross-strait peace and stability” in the Taiwan Strait.

Xi, who made the remarks at this year’s Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), was not saying anything we’ve not heard before: The Taiwan independence movement “poisons” stable cross-strait relations and threatens to “divide” the Great Chinese Nation.

One peculiar characteristic of that rhetoric is that regardless of who runs the government in Taipei — Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) or Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) — Beijing keeps repeating it. That is not by accident. By sustaining the notion of “Taiwan independence” forces threatening peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, Beijing ensures that Taiwan and China remain in a state of perpetual conflict.

My article, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here.

KMT Reform? We’ll Believe It When We See It

A former KMT spokesman argues in an influential foreign publication that the KMT is in the ‘throes of reform’. That would be wonderful, but don’t hold your breath 

A recent article in Foreign Policy magazine penned by Charles Chen (陳以信) has caused a bit of a sensation among some Taiwan watchers for its seemingly candid assessment of the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) failures and need to reform. Chen, who until recently was the KMT spokesman and has now been elevated to the position of spokesman for the Presidential Office, is absolutely right when he argues that the party needs to change. Sadly, he gets just about everything else wrong. 

Published on Feb. 17, Chen’s article, titled “How Taiwan’s Ruling but Reeling Kuomintang Can Win the Future,” sparked an odd reaction among some Taiwan specialists who saw in the piece the germs of true reform within the KMT, which since Jan. 17 has been headed by Eric Chu (朱立倫). A number of those experts, who up until then had been scathing critics of the KMT, regarded the article as a groundbreaking admission of mistakes by the party, a “wow” moment even. Undoubtedly there are many others overseas who will likely reach similar conclusions. 

However, if we pay close attention to the language used in the article, it becomes clear that Mr. Chen’s blueprint for reform is not quite what it seems. 

My article, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here. (Photo by the author)

The Sky Isn’t Falling Over Taiwan

Overly bleak pictures of Taiwan’s willingness and ability to defend its way of life are not only misleading, they play right into Beijing’s political warfare strategy 

This cannot be repeated often enough: Although the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is now the most powerful military in the Taiwan Strait, and despite the fact that the capability gap continues to widen in China’s favor, Beijing would much prefer to “win” Taiwan without having to fire a single bullet in anger than plunge into the fog of war, what with all the messiness and unpredictability of armed combat. 

Although it is generally recognized that winning without fighting is a major aspect of Chinese strategy honed over centuries, many people — defense analysts among them — seem to develop severe amnesia when it comes to the question of Chinese designs upon Taiwan, the island-nation Beijing hopes to annex, “by force if necessary.” 

Undoubtedly, in the past two decades or so the PLA has acquired and modernized capabilities that would ostensibly play a role in a Taiwan contingency, and it has held a number of military exercises (some of them high profile) simulating an amphibious assault on Taiwan. 

However, for every drill practicing an attack against the island, armies of soldiers engage in silent, non-kinetic operations to whittle down perceptions of Taiwan’s ability to defend itself — and most importantly perhaps, to erode the willingness of Taipei’s allies to come to its defense should the PLA be activated at some point. 

My article, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here (photo by the author).

Prison Hostage Situation in Taiwan Turns Deadly … and Political

A botched prison break in Kaohsiung turns into a political melodrama with a tragic conclusion 

A dramatic hostage-taking situation at a prison in southern Taiwan took a tragic turn early in the morning of February 12 when the six hostage-takers, all inmates at the jail, failed in their bid to escape and turned the guns they had stolen from the prison’s armory on themselves. 

The situation at Kaohsiung Prison began a little before 4 p.m. on February 11 when the six inmates, led by Cheng Li-te, a member of the Bamboo Union triad who is serving a 28-year sentence for murder, pretended they were ill and were sent to the infirmary. Soon thereafter, they reportedly used scissors to take three prison officials hostage and were then able to break into the armory, where they seized four assault rifles, six handguns, and more than 200 rounds of ammunition. 

My article, published today in The Diplomat, continues here. (Photo by the author.)

Let 118 Sunflowers Bloom

A total of 118 people, including Lin Fei-fan and Chen Wei-ting, will be prosecuted for the 318 and 323 occupation and a smaller incident on 411 

If we could be 100% certain that the court system in Taiwan can act independently, it would perhaps be less tempting to suspect that the Taipei District Prosecutors’ Office’s announcement on the morning of Feb. 10 that 118 individuals, including student leaders Lin Fei-fan (林飛帆) and Chen Wei-ting (陳為廷), will be prosecuted for various “crimes” committed during the occupation of the Legislative Yuan (“318”), of the Executive Yuan (“324”) and a small protest outside a police station (“411”) last year was politically motivated. 

Sadly, our faith in the court system is justifiably shaky, and this encourages speculation that the indictments, and the timing of the announcement, may provide needed distraction for the embattled Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), which faces numerous crises at the moment, including the recent arrest of Tainan City Council Speaker Lee Chuan-chiao (李全教) for bribery in the Dec. 25, 2014, council elections, the possibility that the reprehensible Legislator Alex Tsai (蔡正元) will be unseated by the Appendectomy Project on Feb. 14, and corruption investigations that could very well implicate former Taipei mayor Hau Lung-bin (郝龍斌), who has presidential ambitions, and President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九). 

My article, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here (photo by the author).

Chinese Students Go Ballistic at Model UN Event

Proud and nationalistic Chinese students are increasingly vocal overseas. Often, though not always, they get away with bullying others on key issues 

A delegation of Chinese students at the Harvard Model United Nations held Jan. 29 to Feb. 1 made a dreadful discovery when they cracked open this year’s conference handbook. What they saw was so offensive that they made a scene, and several members of the group ended up being expelled from a meeting. Two words were at the heart of the kerfuffle: Taiwan and country. 

There is something about Taiwan that brings out the very worst in many a Chinese student overseas. Time and again, young Chinese have gone haywire at academic settings whenever someone dared to argue that Taiwan may actually be a country rather than a province of China, as Beijing claims. When that happens, they just snap. They scream, storm out, threaten, gang up on others, and intimidate whoever stands in their way, including school authorities. 

My article, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here. (Photo by the author)

Taiwan: Between the Pivot and a Hard Place

What role, if any, can Taiwan play in the U.S. rebalancing to Asia? And what can Taipei to do increase its chances of being given a role in the fledging regional alliance? 

More than three years have elapsed since then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton posited the idea of a U.S. “pivot,” or “rebalancing,” to Asia in her article for Foreign Policy magazine. To this day, nobody seems to have a clear idea how to define the nature and shape of the endeavor in either quantitative or qualitative terms. An even more difficult question is whether Taiwan could, or will, play a role in the pivot, and if so, what would be the extent of its involvement. 

Although several factors favour a role for Taiwan—its geographical location within the first island chain and a democratic political system, among them—integrating the island-nation into the pivot also involves risks and challenges that are unique to its situation. 

My article, published today on the China Policy Institute Blog at the University of Nottingham, continues here. (Photo by the author.)

Two Ways of Looking at a Spy

The Zhen Xiaojiang spy network sounds like bad news for Taiwan, but the damage to national security might not be as severe as it sounds 

The philosophical questions over what compels individuals to betray their country were once again raised on Jan. 16 when prosecutors unveiled indictments against five Taiwanese and a Chinese citizen on espionage charges. As with other cases over the years, the revelation that members of Taiwan’s armed forces had agreed to spy for Beijing exacerbated the perception that the island-nation’s security apparatus has been thoroughly penetrated, that it is unreliable, and that Taiwanese would sell their country for a dime. 

Given the frequency with which spy cases have been uncovered in the past decade, the alarmists are certainly not entirely unjustified in contending that this is bad news for Taiwan and its security relationship with the U.S., though as I argued elsewhere, we do not want to overstate the matter and need to take the propaganda value of intelligence operations — even those that are discovered — into consideration. 

My article, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here (photo by the author).

Does Taiwan Need a Ko Revolution?

Reforming the system is absolutely necessary. But what can society do if entrenched interests and status quo powers stand in the way of what needs to be done? 

On many occasions since the members of the Sunflower Movement voluntarily exited the Legislative Yuan after a more than three-week occupation in April 2014, I had found myself correcting the perception among a number of foreign journalists and at academic conferences overseas that the dramatic events in the spring constituted a revolution. Though the term “Sunflower Revolution” was repeatedly used, it was a misnomer: It was never the intention of the Sunflowers to overthrow the system, or to replace it with another. Rather, the sole objective was reform of existing institutions. Therefore, notwithstanding the “extreme” nature of their actions, the Sunflowers overwhelmingly agreed that the prevailing political system should continue to exist, though they wanted to see its many flaws remedied, and unaccounted officials expunged. 

We still don’t know to what extent the Sunflower Movement succeeded in achieving its goals. What is clear is that governments can rarely implement in the whole the maximalist requests of civil society; after all, politics is the art of compromise — at least in democratic societies. The controversial services trade agreement that sparked the occupation remains stalled, and an oversight mechanism for future cross-strait negotiations, one of the conditions set by the activists before they vacated the legislature, to is under consideration. 

There were other less easily quantifiable successes. Despite officials claims to the contrary, the Ma administration’s reputation suffered a terrible blow. The drama re-energized civic activism, bringing political awareness among the population to levels unseen in years, and generated substantial interest overseas by making Taiwan exciting and newsworthy. Finally, the occupation undoubtedly had an impact on the Nov. 29 “nine-in-one” local elections, in which the ruling Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) was roundly defeated. 

As I argued in a commentary a few months ago, the next step for the Sunflowers and the young activists the movement inspired is for themselves to enter politics and work from the inside. Since then, it has been encouraging to see a number of them choose to do so. Some of them ran in the Nov. 29 elections, while others started their own party or decided to join an existing political party — in almost every case the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a much more natural ally, given its ideology, than the KMT. 

My article, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here (photo by the author).

The Spies Are Coming! The Spies Are Coming to Taiwan!

Damage assessments following the busting of a spy ring must look not only to the secrets that were stolen, but also to the propaganda value of the exercise 

The optics couldn’t be worse — four Taiwanese military officers, including an Air Force pilot, a lieutenant colonel and a former Army major general, indicted on charges of belonging to a spy ring led by a Chinese intelligence officer. Oh, and the owner of a karaoke club, to boot. The January 16 indictments, which follow the arrest in September last year of Zhen Xiaojiang, the Chinese handler who was also indicted, are but the latest in a string of arrests on espionage charges in recent years. Fifteen cases were uncovered in 2014 alone. Has the Taiwanese security apparatus been completely penetrated by Chinese spies, as some analysts have been arguing? 

Maybe, but the extent to which systems and people have been compromised is anyone’s guess. The People’s Liberation Army is particularly interested in establishing a complete picture of Taiwan’s C4ISR architecture, radar and air defense systems, as well as war preparedness plans, a focus that has been confirmed through the string of arrests over the years, including the latest case. Despite warming ties between Taiwan and China since 2008, espionage efforts against the island-nation never abated; in fact, substantially increased contact between the two sides created a wealth of opportunities for intelligence collection and source recruitment by China. 

My article, published today in The Diplomat, continues here (photo by the author).

破解台海前途歷史必然的迷思

台灣與中國的統一絕非必然。事實上，它已經不再是選項

數十年來，學者和政治人物都費盡心思要為台海兩岸的死結尋求解套方式。至今提出過的一切解決方案，其核心都必定涉及「一個中國」的概念，無論用詞上作何表述。中國的智庫學者，以及台灣的藍、綠兩陣營，在這一點上挖空心思創造出各種詞彙：「一國兩憲」、「九二共識」、「一個中國各自表述」、「大一中」、「憲法一中」、「一國兩制」，諸如此類。他們期望運用這樣的發明創造避免台灣海峽再起戰端。但所有這些提案最大的問題，不只在於「統一是歷史必然」這一基本預設本身就漏洞百出，更在於這種基本預設完全是中國傳聲筒一手炮製出來，既限縮台灣選擇餘地，更把台灣和中國捆綁在一起的迷思。

目前，隨著民主進步黨2016年重回執政的前景看好，部分知識人開始主張民進黨凍結「台獨黨綱」對於台海兩岸的和平穩定至關重要，還有一些人最近更認為，民進黨也必須一併廢除1999年5月8日通過，用以取代台獨黨綱的「台灣前途決議文」。

前任行政院大陸委員會副主委童振源是綠營內部提出這種主張的論者之一。一如先前其他類似的論調，北京當局看來非常樂意大力宣揚這些論者的觀點。

在政治大學任教的童振源認為，民進黨不只應該廢棄「台灣前途決議文」，更要提出一個全新的兩岸交流平台，明文規定民進黨願意接受和中國統一，但必須以中國實現民主化為前提。我們姑且稱它為「兩岸民主統一論」。童振源也警告我們，要是做不到這點，兩岸關係就很有可能急速惡化。

「以『民主』這個字修飾「統一」一詞，完全符合台灣的根本價值與利益，並且讓中國繼續對統一抱有期望。」童振源在《台北時報》近日刊出的對頁評論中寫道。他接著說：

「此外，這也能夠讓統一成為開展中國民主化的積極力量。台灣可以宣佈自己只和人民普選產生的中國政府討論和平民主統一問題，唯有在北京實行民主之後，它和台北才能開會談判和平民主統一事宜，商討統一的具體內容及進行方式。」

童振源的提議有不少缺陷。如果這個提案確實是受到極力促統的《旺報》早先刊登的一篇社論啓發，這甚至還不成問題。更嚴重的是，他的說法和先前許多人如出一轍，把台灣當成了達成特定目的的手段，是通往中國民主化的途徑。他想讓我們相信，一旦這個結果實現（但我不得不說，這個成果十分渺茫，畢竟中國有太多機會向世界其他民主國家汲取民主經驗，卻從來不曾向民主前進一步），台灣自我犧牲，回歸「統一中國」的時候也就到了。倘若認同與國族情感是決定政治體制性質的唯一因素，那我們應當期望比利時人心甘情願地成為法國的一部份，但這再荒唐也不過了。

童振源和他的先進們掉進了同一個陷阱：他也認為統一是歷史必然，只是政治糾紛作梗，一旦爭議獲得解決，統一也就毫無阻礙。他甚至玩起了以「民主」替換「統一」的文字遊戲，但這種手法豈能騙過北京當局？換得的終歸還是同一個結果。

他的論證更要命的缺陷，則是徹底無視台灣人民的意志與期望，彷彿民主化的中國就會不可思議地自動放棄主宰台灣人命運的渴望。回歸統一的中國之後，台灣2300萬人口也就從自己國家裡的多數，成為全中國之下的少數，在全中國14億人口裡面差不多只佔了六十分之一。要假定只佔這麼少數的台灣人還能在統一的中國之下，確保一百多年來不受中國統治的經驗所產生的需求能繼續得到照顧，需要比孤注一擲更強大的信念。實際上，我們甚至可以斷言，民主化的中國比起不民主的中國更不可能照顧台灣人的需求，因為可想而知，實行專制的北京當局提供台灣破格待遇，並且強要中國人民接受是更輕而易舉的。

最後，童振源等人提出的這一類構想，最大的致命傷是根本缺乏可行性。民進黨決不可能向選民提出這種構想而不喪失民意基礎的。問題其實更加嚴峻：「一個中國」對台灣人就是行不通，如此而已。無論是以民主還是其他方式，台灣人對於和中國統一的支持度充其量只有百分之十，剩下的要不就支持獨立，要不就維持「現狀」，而維持現狀本身就是獨立的委婉表述，就算只是事實上的獨立。

長久以來的認同趨勢，加上過去一年發生的諸多事態，包括太陽花運動佔領立法院，以及11月29日九合一選舉結果，都指出了台灣國族主義即使受到中國及世界各國的壓力，仍然持續鞏固強化，而在我看來，這一演變是不可阻擋的。木已成舟、覆水難收，除非中國出兵攻佔，否則台灣會繼續作為一個獨特的政治實體而存在。

那麼，為何至今提出過的幾乎每一套替代模式，始終堅持要以中國統一的必然性為前提？我以為主因還是中國方面的宣傳，宣傳的對象倒不是台灣人民，而是國際社會。毫無疑問，中國共產黨想要製造出不可避免的必然感受，好瓦解台灣人的意志。北京當局對台北市長柯文哲明確示意，只有表態支持九二共識才允許他訪問中國，似乎足以證實這個結論，觀點和童振源相同的淡江大學教授王崑義推斷，這個條件很可能一體適用於其他有意造訪中國的民進黨籍縣市首長。中國是在警告：認同「一個中國」，否則你治理的城市就會被排除，得不到和中國往來的利益。

然而，正如前文所述，這樣的策略看來是失敗的。自我認同、以及統一對獨立支持度的各項關鍵指標都足以證明這個失敗。相形之下，中國的宣傳策略則力圖在國際上孤立台灣，將台灣的選擇限縮到只能戰爭與和平二選一。中共運用「中國統一是歷史必然」的概念，堅持複誦「『台灣問題』不過是一家屋簷下兩兄弟內部鬥爭的延續，而非兩個不同國家深刻歧異與衝突」這樣的謊言。這對於衝突的化解產生了嚴重影響，因為處理這兩種狀況所需的介入調停機制明顯不同。持續錯誤呈現衝突本質的結果（必然性概念強化了台海問題是「國內衝突」而非「國與國衝突」的認知），也就確定了我們要繼續運用錯誤的工具解決問題。

於是我們面臨一個抉擇：要不就改變早已過時的處理台海危機範式，要不就繼續無視台海兩岸衝突的本質，將無效的解決方案強加於台灣人，從而製造出更大的後患。台灣與中國的統一絕非必然，事實上，它已經不再是選項。

中譯 : William Tsai
Original article: http://thinking-taiwan.com/debunking-the-myth-of-inevitability/

Debunking the Myth of Inevitability in the Taiwan Strait

Unification between Taiwan and China is not inevitable; in fact, it is no longer an option 

For decades academics and politicians have sought to find ways to untie the Gordian Knot in the Taiwan Strait. Almost every solution proposed has at its core contained some reference, howsoever worded, to “one China.” Thinkers in China, and within both the green and blue camps in Taiwan, have toyed with variations on the theme — “one China, two constitutions,” “1992 consensus,” “one China, different interpretations,” “greater one China,” “constitutional one China,” “one country, two systems,” and so on. Creativity, they hoped, would help avert war in the Taiwan Strait. The problem with all these proposals is not only that the underlying assumption of unification as an inevitable outcome is deeply flawed, but that it is a myth that was created by Chinese propagandists to limit Taiwan’s options — to lock it in, in fact. 

More recently, with the prospect of a Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) comeback in 2016, some intellectuals have argued that future stability in cross-strait relations will be contingent on the DPP agreeing to freeze its “independence clause.” Others have more recently opined that the party’s “Resolution on Taiwan’s Future,” which after its adoption on May 8, 1999, replaced the “independence clause,” must also go. 

My article, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here (photo by the author).