中國對台灣的瞞天大謊

台灣想要的東西很多，但不包括戰爭

作為一個以中間偏左的自由派立場而自豪，堅決反對2003年美國出兵伊拉克，甚至一度和古巴領導人卡斯楚（Fidel Castro）一同出現在《反擊》（Counterpunch）雜誌同一頁上的加拿大人，我在這些年來是多麼頻繁地因為主張國際社會有切身利害、更有責任支援台灣抵抗中國侵略的自衛努力，而被說成「右翼分子」、「戰爭販子」或是西方情報機構的工具，實在是很耐人尋味的。這些指控被按步就班地運用，以詆毀在國際社會上支持台灣的人，足以說明中國的宣傳機器取得了多大的成功。

故事情節其實再簡單不過了：一個人口2300萬，在1980年代從威權體制和平轉型為民主體制的國家，正面臨著被一個人口14億，人權紀錄惡名昭彰，對外擴張傾向日益顯著的威權專制國家接管（甚至不惜動用武力）的可能性。但台灣和經常被拿來（錯誤）類比的以色列不同，它既沒有強佔別人的土地，更完全無意威脅自己的鄰國。事實上，台灣人的缺乏尚武精神還經常受到詬病。

大多數台灣人若不是支持法理獨立，就是主張維持現狀（事實獨立的婉轉說法）。只有極少數人支持台灣「回歸」從不曾隸屬其中的中華人民共和國，就連這些人也多半要在中國（有朝一日）民主化之後才會願意統一。大多數台灣人的祖先來自中國大陸，而中華文化和原住民、日本、歐美等諸多其他文化共同匯聚成了台灣島國五彩繽紛的文化，使得台灣成為獨具特色的美食與藝術天堂。

台灣是世界前20大經濟體之一，是全球供應鏈上的重要節點，在科技領域上也有巨大的潛力作出實質貢獻，但這份潛力由於北京長期施壓，把台灣從大多數國際組織中驅逐出去而遭受損害。

絕大多數台灣人並不「反中國」，實際上他們更支持和中國關係正常化，也樂見中國繁榮富強，但這絕不能和政治上與中華人民共和國統一混為一談，事實上，最近幾年的許多民意調查都呈現出恰好相反的趨勢。

台灣人最想要的，不過就是不受外力脅迫決定自己未來的權利，我們應當指出，這份權利是受到聯合國憲章明文規定，並被世界各國領袖一致宣告為「普世」權利的。美國前總統小布希（George W. Bush）在連任就職演說中道出了這份高貴的情操：「我們在世世代代中宣揚住民自治（self-government）的誡命，因為沒有誰生來就該做主人，也沒有誰生來就只能當奴隸。」

然而，不管是誰出來主張台灣應當獲得政治及軍事援助，以確保台灣人民不致被迫臣服，這人都會立刻被說成陰謀煽動第三次世界大戰，不然就是為一小撮國際情報機構及軍火商的利益服務。中國傳聲筒說出這種話來當然可想而知（職責所在），卻又不只他們而已，（通常從左翼立場出發的）許多西方論述也針對支持台灣的「好戰份子」作出類似的指控。這實在令人莫名其妙，畢竟我們期望的是這些論述支持捍衛民主，對抗專制的一方。

因為我主張台灣有權自衛而貼在我身上的標籤，可真是長長一串，其中包括：「中情局特務」、「西方情報員」（我坦白招供：我在加拿大安全情報局當過情報分析員）、「好戰分子」、「戰爭販子」、「新帝國主義者」，還有「軍火販子」。我還一天到晚被說成「仇中人士」，有一次甚至還花了漫長的幾分鐘，被一個從上海打電話來的人咆哮著要我說清楚為何這麼「痛恨」他的祖國。說實話，我對於中國本身一點都不反對，我認為中國是一個歷史悠久、地大物博的國家，但我堅決反對一個日益顯露其法西斯傾向的政權。這不是零和的問題：「愛」台灣並不意味著「恨」中國。那些指控我們仇恨中國的人，是為了實施「中國受害」（China as victim）戰略，抹黑我們主張台灣有權自衛的動機而這麼做的（在這一點上，中國和猶太復國主義者其實有些共通之處）。

我最近一篇主張台灣採取更有效遏制戰略的文章所引來的其中一篇氣急敗壞（卻又不期然地滑稽逗趣）的回應，是中國南京軍區前任副司令員王洪光在中共黨報《人民日報》上的評論：他把上面提到的那些罪名老調重彈，說我企圖引發第三次世界大戰。（他還不忘說我「軍事素質低劣」、「心智蒙昧」並且「智商太低」）。

既然道德天平是如此簡單明瞭，台灣的困境在國際社會中（至少在自由國家群體中）也理當產生「大衛對抗哥利亞」的思想訴求，我們因此也就不得不自問，為何台灣面臨着這樣的阻礙，多半擁護着自由、自決等這些崇高原則的支持台灣人士卻又一天到晚被說成「麻煩製造者」以及嗜血的右派。愛好和平，努力爭取自主的台灣是「惡」，以祖國統一之名追求領土擴張的專制獨裁國家卻是「善」，這樣一個是非顛倒的世界簡直荒謬到了極點。

台灣和巴勒斯坦人民的共通點多於和以色列人的共通點，甚至，就連這個類比都很不完整，因為台灣不像巴勒斯坦人那樣採取游擊戰或恐怖行動來保衛自己。然而，卻有這麼多理當更瞭解狀況的人公然鄙視台灣，好像爭取自由的台灣人才是台灣海峽緊張局勢的起因，而不是海峽對岸那些用導彈瞄準台灣、情蒐活動變本加厲，並且大張旗鼓實施對台兩棲作戰演習的正牌好戰份子。台灣面臨着生存危機，可是照北京當局及其世界各地聲援者的說法，對台軍售純粹是持續阻礙中國發展的遏制戰略之一環，其中絕無任何高貴的理念，但美國長久以來對台灣及台灣人的支援實際上卻未必是完全無關理念的。

許多人基於各式各樣的理由，完全採納中國對於台灣的瞞天大謊。有些人認為台灣的民主對他們造成阻礙；也有些人能因著支持北京的路線而獲利，若不如此表態就會讓投資受到損害；還有些人若是對這個身處強大歷史潮流中的脆弱民主表示支持，就無法到中國的大學教書，也無法會見中國官員。

不管他們的論調有哪些可取之處，我只請求他們至少給予我們這些盡心盡力保衛台灣，好讓台灣人民自行決定前途的人應有的尊重。就算要聲討我們的罪狀，也請實事求是。為了你們的證券投資而指責我們吧，就算說我們幼稚無知、不切實際都好。但是請不要說我們是為了挑起戰爭，摧毀這片我們深愛並且在此落地生根的土地而來的。把台灣說成兩岸關係的反派角色，是運作良好的中國宣傳機器充分利用了他人的自我利益羅織而成的。從來都只有一方公開宣稱「我全副武裝在思想戰線上等你一決勝負」，而那一方明明不是台灣。

中譯：William Tsai

Original article: http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/the-great-chinese-lie-about-taiwan/

The Great Chinese Lie About Taiwan

Condone Chinese militarism and you are being a realist. Support the defense of democratic Taiwan against authoritarian expansionism, and you are dubbed a militarist, a warmonger 

As a left-of-center and proud liberal Canadian who vehemently opposed the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and once shared a page with Fidel Castro in CounterPunch magazine, it is fascinating how often I have been accused over the years of being a “right-winger,” a “warmonger,” or an instrument of Western intelligence for arguing that the international community has an interest in and the responsibility to help Taiwan defend itself against Chinese aggression. The systematic use of such allegations, which have been used to discredit supporters of Taiwan, demonstrates the extent of the Chinese propaganda apparatus’ success. 

The plot is actually rather simple: A nation of 23 million people that bloodlessly transitioned from authoritarian rule to democracy in the 1980s faces the prospect of being taken over — perhaps by military force — by an authoritarian country of 1.4 billion people with an atrocious human rights record and increasingly expansionist tendencies. Unlike Israel, with which it is sometimes (wrongly) compared, Taiwan does not occupy another people’s land, nor does it have any intention to threaten its neighbors. In fact, its people are often accused of lacking martial spirit. 

My article, published today in The Diplomat, continues here (photo by the author)

Taiwan’s ‘Apache-gate’ and a call for restraint

Security violations are a serious matter. But Taiwanese media and the opposition should not blow things out of proportion 

The optics could hardly have been worse: Lt. Col. Lao Nai-cheng, a pilot manning the Taiwanese Army’s AH-64E “Guardian” helicopter—one of the most advanced helicopters of its kind in the world—is caught after surreptitiously taking a group of civilians, including a few foreign nationals, on a tour of the base, during which an entertainer had her photo taken while sitting in the cockpit. 

As the details of the March 29 visit to the Army base in Longtan, Taoyuan, became public, it was soon evident that the Taiwanese military had yet another controversy on its hands. Besides failing to register the visit with security officials at the base, it emerged that Lao, a pilot with Army’s 601st Aviation Brigade, had also taken the Apache helmet—a controlled item—off base for a Halloween costume party at his home in 2014. 

My article, published today on the China Policy Institute blog, University of Nottingham, continues here. (Photo by the author)

US Marine F-18s Land at Taiwan Air Base, Beijing Protests

Exactly 14 years after the EP-3 incident near Hainan, and as the PLAAF conducts exercises in the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines, two U.S. F-18s make a precautionary landing in Taiwan

Two U.S. Marine F/A-18C Hornet aircraft did a precautionary landing at an air force base in southern Taiwan on April 1 after one of the aircraft reportedly flashed a persistent engine oil pressure light warning. Unusual in itself, the incident, which has been widely covered in Taiwanese media, could be more significant than initially thought.

The U.S. Department of Defense confirmed on April 2 that the two aircraft were from the U.S. Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323 (VMFA-323). The squadron is under the Marine Aircraft Group 11 (MAG-11). Mark Zimmer, the spokesman of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the United States’ de facto embassy in the absence of official diplomatic ties, said the two aircraft took off from an airbase in Japan on Wednesday. Major Paul L. Greenberg, a spokesman for the U.S. Marine Corps,added that the F-18s were on a routine mission in support of a training exercise. According to the U.S. Marine Corps’ 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Public Affairs Office, the pair of F-18s was en route to Singapore to participate in the COMMANDO SLING air-to-air joint exercises with the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF).

My article, published today in The Diplomat, continues here. (Photo: Liberty Times)

The Politics Behind Taiwan’s AIIB Bid

Expect the controversy over Taiwan’s application to join the Beijing-led financial body to spill into the 2016 elections 

The sudden announcement on the evening of March 30 that Taiwan had applied to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) — Beijing’s answer to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank — caused some consternation after it was discovered that Taiwanese authorities agreed to join despite Beijing’s precondition that it do so under the “one China” principle. Lack of transparency, the absence of consultations or review within the legislature, as well as uncertainty over which channels were used to submit the application have raised serious questions about what happened. Alarming though this may all be, expect more trouble ahead as the AIIB question will likely become an item of contention in the lead-up to the 2016 elections and a challenge for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). 

My article, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here.

Taiwan Applies to Join AIIB Under ‘One China,’ Sparking Protests

Echoes of the Sunflowers? Taiwan applies to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, provoking protests in Taipei 

Dozens of young protesters clashed with police and security guards outside the Presidential Office in Taipei on the evening of March 31 after the government unilaterally announced that Taiwan would join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), an international financial institution initiated by China. 

After Taipei expressed its interest in joining the AIIB, Beijing said it would welcome Taiwan as long as it joined under the “one China” principle. Beijing’s terms also stipulated that Taiwan must apply through the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), the agency under the State Council that handles relations with Taiwan. Beijing does not recognize Taiwan’s sovereignty and regards Taiwan as a province, to be “re-united” by force if necessary. At this writing, the name under which Taiwan applied to join the AIIB remains unknown. 

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), the government agency in charge of relations with China, faxed the Letter of Intent to the TAO at 7 pm on March 31. The TAO will then transmit Taiwan’s application to the Interim Secretariat of the AIIB. 

My article, published today in The Diplomat, continues here. (Photo: Black Island Youth Front)

Taiwan's Master Plan to Defeat China in a War

The surest way Taiwan can defeat China in a major war is to make sure that it never happens 

A consensus seems to have developed among a large number of defense analysts in recent years arguing that despite the balance of power having shifted in China’s favor, Beijing has no intention to use its military to invade Taiwan and thus resolve the Taiwan “question” once and for all. Doing so would be too costly, some argue, while others contend that Beijing can accomplish unification by creating enough economic dependence and incentives to convince Taiwanese over time of the “inevitability” of a “reunited” China. 

Although these factors certainly militate against the desire to go to war over the island-nation, we cannot altogether discount the probability that the Chinese military would be called into action, especially if the rationale for launching an attack were framed in terms of a defensive war—China being “forced” to take action because of changing and “untenable” circumstances in its environment. 

My article, published today in The National Interest, continues here.

Black Island: Two Years of Activism in Taiwan is Out!

Long before the student-led Sunflower Movement stormed the legislature in Taipei on March 18, 2014, sparking the most serious political crisis in Taiwan’s modern history, journalist J. Michael Cole was chronicling the rise of civic activism in this young democracy and warning us of the coming troubles. In this long-awaited collection of essays, the author takes us to the heart of this extraordinary recrudescence of activism and shows that there was nothing ‘spontaneous’ about the Sunflower Movement. With on-site observations and unique access to the protagonists, Black Island brings you to the frontlines of civil unrest — the police shields, pro-Beijing gangsters, victims of injustice, callous government officials and the idealists who are fighting back — and explains why the rise of civil society will change the face of politics in Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait for years to come. 

The book comes in three sections — The Long Road to 318; Article 972 and the Rise of Christian Evangelicals-Yes, in Taiwan; and Game Changer: The Sunflowers Take Action — and collects most of my writing on activism published since the end of 2012 through March 2015, all of it updated and re-edited. It also includes a long introduction that puts everything in context.

Black Island is now available on Amazon.com. Stay tuned for updates on book events in Taiwan, and join the Facebook page for updates and extra material!

Unstoppable: China's Secret Plan to Subvert Taiwan

A convoluted network of Chinese companies and organizations is involved in Beijing's "onion layer" strategy against Taiwan and the world 

Mao Zedong reportedly once said that warfare is 70 percent political. Arguably, no conflict in recent times has adhered to this concept more faithfully than China’s ongoing campaign to “reunite” Taiwan with the “Mainland.” While analysts have tended to focus on the threat which an increasingly powerful People’s Liberation Army (PLA) poses to the democratic island-nation, the political warfare component of Beijing’s “reunification” strategy has received much less attention, perhaps because cross-strait symposia on tea and culture are far less “newsworthy” than the latest missile boat or combat aircraft. 

Given Beijing’s preference for “nonkinetic” solutions to the impasse (war would be costly and unpredictable), it makes perfect sense that its leadership would explore alternative means by which to win the war in the Taiwan Strait. Political warfare (or the “Three Warfares,” 三战), targeting both Taiwan and its supporters in the international community, is a favored instrument. There has been a growing number of interactions between Taiwan and China since 2008. And what with rapidly expanding cross-strait travel, academic exchanges and investment, the opportunities for China to engage in political warfare have increased exponentially. 

My article, published today in The National Interest, continues here.

The Big Bad Blue Lying Machine is Back

An incident involving an academic’s invented quotes from a closed-door meeting between the DPP chairperson and a US official sets a new standard for crassness 

How time flies! Less than a year from now, Taiwanese will have elected a new person to lead the country, concluding eight long years of the Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) presidency. The idea hasn’t completely sunk in yet, but election season — and the complete, all-consuming madness that comes with it — is right around the corner. In fact, the madness part of the electoral cycle has already begun. 

The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) may still be struggling to find a viable candidate for the January 16 election, but this hasn’t prevented the big machine behind it from shifting into high gear to undermine its opponent, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文). And given what’s at stake and the high likelihood that Tsai could win this time around, the nastiness of the 2012 elections could feel like a walk in the park compared with what lies ahead. 

My article, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here.

Is Taiwan out of Vogue in Washington DC?

We don’t hear much about Taiwan in Washington nowadays. But not for the reasons that Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman gives us 

After delivering remarks at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on February 27, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy R. Sherman was asked a rather simple question by one of the journalists present: Why don’t we hear much about Taiwan in Washington, D.C. nowadays?  

John Zang, a journalist with CTiTV in Taiwan, had good reasons to ask. After all, in Sherman’s entire presentation, which focused on the situation in Northeast Asia, Taiwan was only mentioned once. And in that one passing reference, her formulation — “our friendship with the people of Taiwan” — deftly skirted the possibility of Taiwan existing as a nation or state, or the fact that U.S. relations with the “people of Taiwan” are rather more substantial than mere friendship. 

My article, published today in The Diplomat, continues here.

Independent Candidates: How Independent Can They Afford to Be?

Unless it wants to be the eternal outsider, the ‘third force’ in Taiwanese politics must agree to form strategic coalitions within the system 

The decision by a number of social activists and academics in recent months to step over the line and dirty their hands in the muck of electoral politics is a healthy development in Taiwan’s contemporary history. In the past few weeks, two new parties — the New Power Party (NPP) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) — have come into being, promising to shake up a political environment that without doubt has ossified over the years. By bringing fresh faces and ideas to the political arena, new independent parties bring hopes of rejuvenation to the nation. But how independent can this third force really be? 

The decision to form a new party already tells us a few things about the state of mind of its creators and points to a disagreement (usually along ideological lines) with existing parties and the system of which they are part. The goal is therefore to propose something new, to promote a specific issue (e.g., environmentalism), or to change the system from within. 

My article, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here (photo by the author).

Contesting Nationalisms in the Taiwan Strait

Much of the irreconcilable differences between Taiwan and China are the result of different types of nationalism, the ‘blood’ versus the ‘civic’ 

“The degree of shared or conflicting understandings of what the nation is,” writes Stephen M. Saideman, “has significant implications not just for whether a country will go to war but with whom” (Nationalism and War, John A. Hall & Sinisa Malesevic, eds., Cambridge UP, p. 342). Though Saideman does not once mention China in his chapter, could just as well have been discussing Beijing’s irredentist designs on Taiwan. Conflicting understandings of what the nation is, as he writes, is at the heart of the decades-long conflict in the Taiwan Strait, one that, despite the recent rapprochement, will not be resolved anytime soon. 

Although academic literature often draws a direct link between nationalism and war, I would argue that in the context of the Taiwan Strait, misunderstanding the other side’s nationalism (or a conflicting understanding, to quote Saideman) is even more likely to drag the two countries — and perhaps the region — into war. 

My article, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here. (Photo by the author)

China Demolishes the Taiwan ('92) Consensus

Chinese President Xi Jinping doesn't think that the 1992 consensus, the framework that has facilitated 'peace and stability' in the Taiwan Strait over the years, is good enough anymore

After decades of high tensions between Taipei and Beijing and the looming shadow of a devastating war between the United States and China, relations in the Taiwan Strait underwent a major transformation in 2008 with the election of Ma Ying-jeou and the return to power of the Kuomintang (KMT).

Over the seven years that followed Ma’s victory, Taipei and Beijing made substantial strides in liberalizing their interactions, signing 21 bilateral agreements, opening the floodgates of tourism and investment, and facilitating academic exchanges. Amid the cross-strait summits and handshakes, the international community breathed a sigh of relief, optimistic that the old tinderbox could soon be shelved—as long as we ignored, that is, the mounting apprehensions of a segment of Taiwanese society, which saw behind the rapprochement evidence of Beijing’s machinations to bring about “one China.”

[...] Given what has been achieved under the Consensus, it would be logical to assume that Beijing would seek its continuation. However, recent comments by Chinese President and CCP Chairman Xi Jinping, as well as articles appearing in official Chinese media, indicate that the Consensus no longer suffices.

My article, published today in The National Interest, continues here.

Xi, the PLA, and the State of Perpetual Conflict

What if the leadership in Beijing saw advantages in not resolving the Taiwan ‘issue’?

Continuing a long tradition set by his predecessors, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) on Wednesday warned against “independence forces” in Taiwan, calling them “the biggest threat to cross-strait peace and stability” in the Taiwan Strait.

Xi, who made the remarks at this year’s Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), was not saying anything we’ve not heard before: The Taiwan independence movement “poisons” stable cross-strait relations and threatens to “divide” the Great Chinese Nation.

One peculiar characteristic of that rhetoric is that regardless of who runs the government in Taipei — Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) or Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) — Beijing keeps repeating it. That is not by accident. By sustaining the notion of “Taiwan independence” forces threatening peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, Beijing ensures that Taiwan and China remain in a state of perpetual conflict.

My article, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here.

KMT Reform? We’ll Believe It When We See It

A former KMT spokesman argues in an influential foreign publication that the KMT is in the ‘throes of reform’. That would be wonderful, but don’t hold your breath 

A recent article in Foreign Policy magazine penned by Charles Chen (陳以信) has caused a bit of a sensation among some Taiwan watchers for its seemingly candid assessment of the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) failures and need to reform. Chen, who until recently was the KMT spokesman and has now been elevated to the position of spokesman for the Presidential Office, is absolutely right when he argues that the party needs to change. Sadly, he gets just about everything else wrong. 

Published on Feb. 17, Chen’s article, titled “How Taiwan’s Ruling but Reeling Kuomintang Can Win the Future,” sparked an odd reaction among some Taiwan specialists who saw in the piece the germs of true reform within the KMT, which since Jan. 17 has been headed by Eric Chu (朱立倫). A number of those experts, who up until then had been scathing critics of the KMT, regarded the article as a groundbreaking admission of mistakes by the party, a “wow” moment even. Undoubtedly there are many others overseas who will likely reach similar conclusions. 

However, if we pay close attention to the language used in the article, it becomes clear that Mr. Chen’s blueprint for reform is not quite what it seems. 

My article, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here. (Photo by the author)

The Sky Isn’t Falling Over Taiwan

Overly bleak pictures of Taiwan’s willingness and ability to defend its way of life are not only misleading, they play right into Beijing’s political warfare strategy 

This cannot be repeated often enough: Although the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is now the most powerful military in the Taiwan Strait, and despite the fact that the capability gap continues to widen in China’s favor, Beijing would much prefer to “win” Taiwan without having to fire a single bullet in anger than plunge into the fog of war, what with all the messiness and unpredictability of armed combat. 

Although it is generally recognized that winning without fighting is a major aspect of Chinese strategy honed over centuries, many people — defense analysts among them — seem to develop severe amnesia when it comes to the question of Chinese designs upon Taiwan, the island-nation Beijing hopes to annex, “by force if necessary.” 

Undoubtedly, in the past two decades or so the PLA has acquired and modernized capabilities that would ostensibly play a role in a Taiwan contingency, and it has held a number of military exercises (some of them high profile) simulating an amphibious assault on Taiwan. 

However, for every drill practicing an attack against the island, armies of soldiers engage in silent, non-kinetic operations to whittle down perceptions of Taiwan’s ability to defend itself — and most importantly perhaps, to erode the willingness of Taipei’s allies to come to its defense should the PLA be activated at some point. 

My article, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here (photo by the author).

Prison Hostage Situation in Taiwan Turns Deadly … and Political

A botched prison break in Kaohsiung turns into a political melodrama with a tragic conclusion 

A dramatic hostage-taking situation at a prison in southern Taiwan took a tragic turn early in the morning of February 12 when the six hostage-takers, all inmates at the jail, failed in their bid to escape and turned the guns they had stolen from the prison’s armory on themselves. 

The situation at Kaohsiung Prison began a little before 4 p.m. on February 11 when the six inmates, led by Cheng Li-te, a member of the Bamboo Union triad who is serving a 28-year sentence for murder, pretended they were ill and were sent to the infirmary. Soon thereafter, they reportedly used scissors to take three prison officials hostage and were then able to break into the armory, where they seized four assault rifles, six handguns, and more than 200 rounds of ammunition. 

My article, published today in The Diplomat, continues here. (Photo by the author.)

Let 118 Sunflowers Bloom

A total of 118 people, including Lin Fei-fan and Chen Wei-ting, will be prosecuted for the 318 and 323 occupation and a smaller incident on 411 

If we could be 100% certain that the court system in Taiwan can act independently, it would perhaps be less tempting to suspect that the Taipei District Prosecutors’ Office’s announcement on the morning of Feb. 10 that 118 individuals, including student leaders Lin Fei-fan (林飛帆) and Chen Wei-ting (陳為廷), will be prosecuted for various “crimes” committed during the occupation of the Legislative Yuan (“318”), of the Executive Yuan (“324”) and a small protest outside a police station (“411”) last year was politically motivated. 

Sadly, our faith in the court system is justifiably shaky, and this encourages speculation that the indictments, and the timing of the announcement, may provide needed distraction for the embattled Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), which faces numerous crises at the moment, including the recent arrest of Tainan City Council Speaker Lee Chuan-chiao (李全教) for bribery in the Dec. 25, 2014, council elections, the possibility that the reprehensible Legislator Alex Tsai (蔡正元) will be unseated by the Appendectomy Project on Feb. 14, and corruption investigations that could very well implicate former Taipei mayor Hau Lung-bin (郝龍斌), who has presidential ambitions, and President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九). 

My article, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here (photo by the author).

Chinese Students Go Ballistic at Model UN Event

Proud and nationalistic Chinese students are increasingly vocal overseas. Often, though not always, they get away with bullying others on key issues 

A delegation of Chinese students at the Harvard Model United Nations held Jan. 29 to Feb. 1 made a dreadful discovery when they cracked open this year’s conference handbook. What they saw was so offensive that they made a scene, and several members of the group ended up being expelled from a meeting. Two words were at the heart of the kerfuffle: Taiwan and country. 

There is something about Taiwan that brings out the very worst in many a Chinese student overseas. Time and again, young Chinese have gone haywire at academic settings whenever someone dared to argue that Taiwan may actually be a country rather than a province of China, as Beijing claims. When that happens, they just snap. They scream, storm out, threaten, gang up on others, and intimidate whoever stands in their way, including school authorities. 

My article, published today on Thinking Taiwan, continues here. (Photo by the author)